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THE U.S.: MARKET VALUE AND INFORMATION MEASURES 
 
Sabri Güray Üner, Ph.D. 
University of Pittsburgh, 2009
Abstract 
This dissertation studies foreign firms’ shareholder value and earnings-related information 
measures in relation with the implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Chapter One 
addresses the value implications and empirically tests the changes in market values of foreign 
firms around SOX related announcements, and how it varies across home country legislative 
characteristics. My findings on market reactions provide mixed evidence. SOX related 
announcements exhibit the expected sign, but statistical significant is limited. Results from cross-
sectional analysis are partially aligned with the bonding hypothesis implications. My findings 
suggest that the market reaction for cross-listed firms from countries with common-law origin 
and, consequently, better investor protection is not statistically different than firms from civil law 
originated jurisdictions and, consequently, weaker investor protection. Chapter Two studies the 
earnings-related information environment for foreign firms following the enactment of SOX Act 
in comparison with earlier periods. In particular, I empirically analyze the change in forecast 
accuracy, dispersion among the analysts’ forecasts, and the informativeness of earnings 
announcements. My analysis suggests there was no significant improvement or deterioration in 
forecast accuracy and informativeness of earnings announcement in the post-SOX period relative 
to pre-SOX period. However, my findings suggest some improvement in forecast dispersion of 
foreign firms for the post-SOX period. 
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CHAPTER 1 – ESSAY 1: THE SOX ACT AND MARKET VALUE OF FOREIGN 
ISSUERS 
  1
1.0  INTRODUCTION 
In response to the collapse of major corporate names due to accounting scandals, the U.S. 
Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX hereafter), to restore public trust and so-called 
“investor confidence” in U.S. capital markets. However, the enactment of the Act has 
considerably increased the hurdle of accessing U.S. equity markets, due to direct and unintended 
costs associated with SOX compliance.  
The SOX Act established new requirements mandating stricter disclosure and governance 
rules. These new requirements affected all public companies on U.S exchanges that have 
securities registered with the SEC1. As a result of the additional burden imposed by SOX 
compliance, corporations responded in various ways to free themselves from the Act, either by 
going private or by deregistering and being traded on OTC market (Leuz, Triatis and Wang 
(2007), Engel, Hayes and Wang (2004)).  However, the evidence on the value effect of SOX 
rules on foreign firms listed on U.S. exchanges is limited and controversial. This chapter 
contributes to this area, by examining the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 and the association with 
the foreign firms’ shareholder value. In this study, I investigate the value effect of stricter 
                                                 
1 The Act applies to any issuer, including any non-US issuer, that has securities registered under Rule 
12(b),  Rule 12(g) or Rule 12(d) and is required to file reports under Rule 13(a ) the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 (the “Exchange Act”). The Act does not apply to issuers who merely submit information under Rule 12g3-2(b) 
of the Exchange Act. On March 27, 2007, the SEC published Release No 34-55540 with Rule 12h-6, to amend Rule 
12(g) that ease the de-registration process for foreign issuers. Hence, the Act contains no explicit exemption for 
foreign issuers unless the issuer terminates registration by filing Form15F. 
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disclosure and governance rules for foreign firms listed on U.S exchanges in the aftermath of 
SOX.   
The SOX is a unique opportunity to study the shareholders’ value effect. It is imposed 
exogenously on all firms listed on exchanges, i.e. the analysis is not affected by the endogeneity 
of firms’ choices. Being the most comprehensive Act since The Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, the SOX Act and its implications for public companies have been the focus of attention 
both for academicians and its practitioners. However, there is no consensus on the effects of the 
Act on firm value. Various studies (Zhang (2007); Li, Pincus and Rego (2006)) analyzed the 
value implication for U.S. firms and documented controversial results. Zhang (2007) finds a 
significant decline in U.S. share prices during the events leading to the adoption of SOX. Li et. al 
(2006) report that share prices actually increased. Few other studies (Smith (2007), Litvak 
(2007b)) investigated the foreign firms listed on the U.S. exchanges and reported negative 
market reaction by 5-10 %. While my study attempts to answer a similar research question 
undertaken by Litvak (2007b), there are some differences in my approach. In my study, I adjust 
for possible cross-correlation with alternative methods and I extend the analysis by documenting 
intraday market reactions around the announcements. However my overall results are mixed and 
limited in terms of statistical significance to support the hypothesis. My findings do not suggest 
any significant difference in average market reaction between the foreign issuers from well-
governed legislations versus weakly-governed legislations. This observation is weak to support 
‘Bonding Hypotheses. Regarding my approach, I include only the announcements that reveal 
new information about the legislation. And I support my decision to exclude these events with 
the insignificant abnormal returns2 associated with these events at daily and intraday periods. In 
                                                 
2 The terms “abnormal returns” and “excess return” are used synonymously hereafter. 
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addition, I address the possible cross-sectional correlation in abnormal returns due to common 
announcement dates by reporting adjusted test statistics. For the cross-sectional association 
between value effect and firm characteristics, I follow a portfolio time-series methodology 
introduced by Sefcik and Thompson (1986). And lastly, I extend my analysis with intraday 
returns and provide empirical evidence on intraday returns following SOX-related 
announcements. 
Using a sample of 674 foreign firms listed in the U.S. within the SOX legislative and 
administrative period, I study the following empirical questions: a) What are the economic 
implications of each legislative announcement leading to SOX and administrative 
announcements after the Act? b) Is the net effect of stricter disclosure and the governance rules 
imposed by SOX Act on foreign firms value-enhancing or value-destroying? c) What are the 
links of these empirical findings with the ‘Bonding Hypothesis’? d) And finally, how does the 
strength of investor reaction to stricter rules by foreign firms differ cross-sectionally in terms of 
firm-level and country-level growth, size factors, and risk-taking behavior?  
My findings are mixed about the value implication of SOX announcements. Relative to 
U.S. domestic firms, foreign firms’ excess return is less negative on average. However, empirical 
evidence based for the ‘Bonding Hypothesis’ is not clear and mixed for univariate and 
multivariate analysis. In multivariate regressions, market reaction for foreign issuers from 
countries with common-law origin and better investor protection is not statistically significant 
when compared to firms from civil-law originated jurisdictions and weaker investor protection. 
Specifically, the change in shareholders’ value is heterogeneous among firms and covariates with 
the firm characteristics (size, growth opportunities) but not with the home country legislation 
characteristics. 
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Regarding the change in shareholders’ value associated with individual SOX 
announcements; I document the following observations: 
? Both U.S. firms and foreign issuers are associated with negative price reactions on 
average when WorldCom revealed information on June 25, 2002 about the 
massive fraud. It is highly significant for U.S. firms’ based on intraday returns 
and marginally significant for foreign firms based on daily MVMR regressions. 
? Agreement by the US Senate and House and the filing of Conference report on 
July 25, 2002 is associated with negative but statistically insignificant market 
reaction. 
? The SEC’s announcement on August 27, 2002 requiring all exchange listed firms 
to certify financial statements as part of SOX is also associated with negative but 
insignificant market reaction. 
? Harvey Pitt’s announcement on October 9, 2002 that increased the probability of 
requiring foreign issuers to comply with SOX is associated with negative and 
statistically significant reaction on average, for both U.S. and foreign issuers’ 
indices. 
? The SEC’s announcement on proposals for section 404, 406 and 407 is associated 
with negative market reaction, but significant only for the S&P500 index. 
 
Regarding the determinants of changes in market value, I find the following: 
? Firm size is negatively related to market reaction. This is not consistent with the 
disproportionate net effect on small firms, but it is aligned with prior studies. 
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? The association of growth opportunities is captured mainly by the GDP growth, a 
country-level measure. The estimated coefficient is negative as expected both for 
country-level measure and firm-level measures but statistically significant only 
for the country-level growth measure. 
? Market based and accounting based risk-taking measures are not significantly 
associated with the average market reaction. 
? The difference between foreign issuers from weakly-governed versus well-
governed legislations is not statistically significant and the findings neither 
contradict nor support the ‘Bonding Hypothesis’. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2.1, I provide background on 
cross-listing alternatives and the required compliance for foreign issuers and overview of the 
legislative chronology for the SOX Act. In Section 2.2, I review the related literature on SOX 
and the implications for capital markets and for the cross-listed firms.  In Section 2.3, I present 
my hypotheses. In Section 3, I discuss the data sources and sample selection for foreign firms. 
Section 3.2 discusses the methodologies, multivariate market regression model and the Sefcik 
and Thompson (1986) methodology to study cross-sectional relations between price reactions 
and firm characteristics In Section 4, I present the descriptive statistics for my sample and overall 
market reaction around SOX announcements. Section 4.2 analyzes market reaction to each SOX 
announcement. Specifically, section 4.2.2 presents the findings for the change in shareholders’ 
value for daily returns as well as providing the results at intraday level. Section 5 is devoted to 
cross-sectional analysis of shareholders’ value and firm & country characteristics. Section 6 
discusses the robustness of the results and Section 7 concludes the chapter. 
  6
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2.0  INSTITUTIONAL DETAILS, LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS 
DEVELOPMENT 
2.1 INSTITUTIONAL DETAILS 
2.1.1 Foreign ISSUERS3 Listed on U.S. Equity Markets 
2.1.1.1 Cross-Listing Mechanisms 
Past studies of foreign issuers documented empirical findings that support various motivations to 
access U.S. equity markets. Foreign firms cross-list on U.S. markets to minimize costs that is 
borne due to segmented markets (Karolyi 1998, 2006), to raise capital, to enjoy greater liquidity 
(Errunza and Losq 1985, Karolyi 1998, Foerster and Karolyi 1999, Lins, Strickland and Zenner 
2004), to gain prestige and corporate visibility through analyst coverage (Bris, Cantale and 
Nichiotis (2006), Zingales (2007)), and to utilize their stock as currency for International Merger 
& Acquisition activity (Benos and Weisbach (2003), Ammer, Holland, Smith and Warmack 
(2006)). Another motivation for accessing U.S. markets is based on agency theory rather than a 
transaction cost explanation. A group of studies (La Porta et al. (1998, 2002 and 2003)) 
                                                 
3 The term "foreign issuer" is defined in Securities Act Rule 405 [17 CFR 230.405]. A foreign issuer is any 
issuer that is a foreign government, a national of any foreign country or a corporation or other organization 
incorporated or organized under the laws of any foreign country. 
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document empirical evidence pertaining to the relationship between the legal protection of 
investors and the development of financial markets. Legal bonding based on a ‘Bonding 
Hypothesis’ was first argued by Stulz (1999) and Coffee (1999, 2002). Based on this 
explanation, high quality firms from a legal environment with weak institutions can borrow other 
country’s institutional environment by listing in that market and enjoy higher market valuation 
and lower costs of capital in return (e.g., Doidge 2004, Doidge Karolyi and Stulz 2004, Hail and 
Leuz 2005). 
A foreign issuer may list on U.S. exchanges a) through direct listing via public offerings, 
b) through a depository program, c) through a dual-listing program adopted by Canadian and 
Israeli firms, or d) through ‘Global Registered Shares’. Foreign public offerings are issued and 
traded as ordinary shares on U.S. exchanges.  
Global shares are securities that are issued and traded in the same form in the home 
country and in U.S. markets and shareholders have the same privileges in both markets4. These 
shares are issued in the U.S. and registered in different countries, thereby making them foreign 
securities5. ‘DaimlerChrysler’, ‘UBS’, and the Swiss chemical company ‘Celanese’ are a few 
examples of Global Shares issued since 19986. Global Registered Shares should not be confused 
                                                 
4 Global Shares enable 24-hour securities trading. Global Shares are tracked in a single global registry, and 
trade is conducted in the home currency of each market. 
http://www.nyse.com/about/education/1095056911801.html 
5 Global Registered Shares (GRS) are similar to an ordinary share except that investors can trade them on 
multiple stock exchanges around the world in many currencies. ADRs, by contrast, are dollar-denominated 
certificates traded only in the United States. CFO Magazine November 12, 2001 
6 Karolyi, George Andrew, "DaimlerChrysler AG, the First Truly Global Share" (September 1999). Dice 
Center Working Paper No. 99-13. 
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with American Depositary Receipts (ADRs7) or Global Depositary Receipts (GDRs), which are 
domestic securities representing a foreign (outside the U.S.) interest.  
Due to similarities in clearance and settlement rules between U.S. securities markets and 
Canadian, Israeli securities markets, these exchanges have developed effective mechanisms that 
allow same securities to be listed on a U.S. exchange and on a home market. Dual-listing is 
available through the dual-listing programs of NASDAQ and NYSE.  
However, other than country-specific reasons, most foreign firms cross-list in the U.S. 
through American Depositary Receipt or Global Depositary Receipt programs. American 
Depositary Receipts (ADRs) are claims on securities of foreign firms traded on foreign 
exchanges. ADRs were first developed in 1927 in an era of physical securities and physical 
settlement as a means to facilitate the transfer of ownership of foreign securities in the United 
States. An ADR facility may be 'sponsored' or 'unsponsored' based on the relationship between 
the depository bank and the issuer. Sponsored ADRs are initiated by a formal agreement between 
the issuer and the depository bank. An unsponsored facility is established by the depositary 
acting on its own, usually in response to a perceived interest among U.S. investors in a particular 
foreign security that is not traded on a U.S. exchange. Sponsored ADR facilities are described by 
the market participants in terms of three categories based on the extent to which the foreign 
                                                 
7 Since 1983, the SEC's regulations have made a distinction between ADRs and American depositary 
shares ("ADSs"). Under this distinction, an ADR is the physical certificate that evidences ADSs (in much the same 
way as a stock certificate evidences shares of stock), and an ADS is the security that represents an ownership 
interest in deposited securities (in much the same way as a share of stock represents an ownership interest in a 
corporation). Although conceptually accurate, it appears that ADR market participants largely do not differentiate 
between ADRs and ADSs. In this release, the term ADS is not used, and the term ADR may, depending on the 
context, refer to either the physical certificate or the security evidenced by the certificate. 
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company has sought to access U.S. capital markets. They are identified by the markets in which 
they are available or the rules and regulations associated with their structure. A `Level I' category 
is a sponsored facility traded in over-the-counter markets. A `Level II' facility denotes ADRs 
quoted on a national securities exchange when the ADRs have not been offered in a public 
offering in the United States (but are publicly traded in one or more markets outside the United 
States). A `Level III' facility refers to ADRs quoted on a national securities exchange following a 
U.S. public offering. Level I, II, and III ADRs are publicly available to investors in the U.S. 
Global Depository Receipts (GDRs) are offered to investors in two or more markets outside the 
home country, and have a U.S. leg pursuant to ‘Rule 144A’ and ‘Regulation S’ under the 
Securities Act of 1933, and are also called `Level IV' ADRs or RegS/144A ADRs.  
Level I ADRs are traded over-the-counter (OTC) markets via Pink Sheets and/or on the 
OTC Bulletin Board (OTCBB). Level I issuers do not need to file form 20-F with the SEC 
because Rule 12g3-2(b)8 provides exemption from the reporting requirement under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 for depository receipts and certain foreign firms. It takes nine weeks on 
average to establish a Level I program9. 
Level II ADRs list on any of the U.S. national exchanges such as the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE), the American Stock Exchange (Amex) and the National Association of 
                                                 
8 Under section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, non-U.S. issuers with total assets exceeding 
U.S. $10 million and a class of equity security held of record by 500 or more U.S. shareholders become subject to 
the registration and reporting provisions of the Act. Paragraph (b) of Rule 12g3-2 exempts certain DRs and certain 
foreign securities from reporting under the Act provided that they furnish the SEC with the information they are 
requested to disclose in their home country. 
9 Citigroup Depository Receipts Information Guide http://wwss.citissb.com/adr/pdf/InfoGuide05.pdf 
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Securities Dealers Automated Quotation System (NASDAQ). A Level II issuer must comply 
with the individual exchange’s requirements, and the issuer must register under the Securities 
Act of 1933 and report under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. These issuers file a Form F-
610 registration statement with the SEC and periodically submit a 20-F. On average, a Level II 
ADR program establishes an exchange-traded program within 15 weeks. 
A Level III program, otherwise similar to a Level II ADR, includes additional public 
offerings to U.S. investors. It provides the issuer with the ability to raise capital by accessing the 
broadest U.S. investor base. As the initial public offering, Level III issuers submit Form F-1 to 
the SEC for securities registration, whereas they submit form F-6 to register the depository 
receipts. The ADR issuer also hires an investment bank to underwrite the offering and to market 
the depository receipts to U.S. investors. Level III ADRs are also required to file form 20-F 
annually and to submit form F-2 or F-3 for any follow-on offerings. It takes 15 weeks on average 
to establish a Level III program. 
Private placement ADRs, i.e., GDRs, such as Rule 144A Depository Receipts (RADRs) 
and Regulation S (Reg S) Depository Receipts, are programs that are privately placed in the U.S. 
Rule 144A was adopted by the SEC in 1990 in conjunction with the adoption of Regulation S. 
This change greatly increased the liquidity of privately placed securities by allowing Qualified 
Institutional Buyers (QIBs) to resell these repository receipts privately to other QIBs without a 
holding requirement and other formalities. Rule 144-A and Reg S programs do not have to be 
registered under the Securities Act of 1933, and do not have to comply with the periodic 
reporting requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Issuers can raise capital through 
private placements with RegS/144A DR programs as Level III ADRs do by utilizing security 
                                                 
10 Securities and Exchange Commission 17 CFR 239.36 
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offerings. Their trading is facilitated by PORTAL, the NASD’s quotation system. Due to the 
lower hurdle for compliance requirements, a RegS/144A program is usually established within 
only 7 weeks.  
2.1.1.2 Reporting Requirements Applicable to Foreign Issuers 11 
Foreign issuers must comply with the individual exchange requirements in conjunction 
with the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 193412. Under the Exchange 
Act, foreign firms need to file annual reports, i.e., form 20-F13. 6-K forms should also be filed 
similar to the 8-K required for U.S. issuers. DR issuers are not required to comply with 
Regulation FD, but many of them do voluntarily comply with the requirements imposed by 
Regulation FD14. ADR issuers are also exempt from filing Proxy Statements15 unless (i) more 
than 50% of outstanding shares are held by U.S. citizens, or (ii) more than 50% of the assets are 
in the U.S, or (iii) the majority of the executives are U.S. citizens.  
                                                 
11 SEC International Reporting and Disclosure Issues in the Division of Corporate Finance  Nov 1, 2004, 
http://sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/internatl/cfirdissues1104.htm 
12 Foreign issuers with total assets in excess of $10,000,000 and a class of equity securities held of record 
by 500 or more persons, of which 300 or more reside in the United States, are subject to registration under Section 
12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. 
13 Form 20-F requires comprehensive disclosure about the company, including information about its 
business operations and its financial statements, similar to the 10-K form for U.S. issuers. 
14 Citigroup Depository Receipts Information Guide http://wwss.citissb.com/adr/pdf/InfoGuide05.pdf 
15 Regulation 240.3a-12-3(b) under the Exchange Act exempts foreign private issuers from the proxy 
regulations. 
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Foreign issuers are not exempt from the SOX Act. However, there are some provisions 
specific to them mainly to accommodate different practices in the Audit committee16, and an 
extended timeline for compliance, especially with Section 404. The SEC offered an extended 
timeline for foreign firms to comply, and amended provisions for country-specific governance 
forms, tailored mostly for German and Japanese issuers17. Appendix A provides the compliance 
dates for domestic and foreign issuers based on the most recent SEC announcement of August 9, 
200618. All foreign issuers with securities registered under Securities Exchange Act 1934 should 
comply with the SOX Act. Hence this includes all foreign issuers with ordinary shares, global 
shares and dual listings that are traded on NYSE, NASDAQ and Amex. For ADRs, only Level 
III and Level II programs are required to comply with the SOX Act, since other ADR programs 
are not SEC registered and not listed on exchanges such as NYSE, NASDAQ and Amex.  
2.1.2 The Sarbanes Oxley Act Chronology 
Following the corporate scandals and the market value lost as a result; year 2002 was the period 
when the Congress and the regulators rushed to respond the problems that led to the so called 
“loss of investor confidence”. Appendix B.1 presents the table of announcements leading to 
                                                 
16 Foreign private issuers that file their annual reports on Form 20-F already are required to identify the 
members of their audit committee in their annual reports. For these listed issuers, however, the SEC mandates the 
requirement that these issuers must disclose if the entire board is serving as the audit committee. 
17 Not requiring foreign audit firms to provide registration information to PCAOB where provision of such 
information would violate home country law, and allowing non-management employees to serve as audit committee 
members, consistent with German Corporate Law. 
18 Aug. 9, 2006 SEC Release No. 2006-136 http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-136.htm  
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SOX, and Appendix B.2 provides the detailed description of the corresponding announcements 
with the precise date and time when it was first public. 
The first noteworthy announcement related to SOX was on January 17, 2002 (EST 
13:30)19. At a news conference, SEC chairman Harvey Pitt made the first call for the overhaul in 
corporate rules. He proposed a new organization to oversee the accounting profession for public 
firms. He stated that all disciplinary actions or decisions should be subject to oversight by the 
SEC and added "The body should be empowered to perform investigations, bring disciplinary 
proceedings, publicize results, and restrict individuals and firms who have failed to meet ethical 
or competent standards from auditing public companies." 
Later in April 16th 2002 (EDT20 18:44)21, House of Representatives’ (HR) Financial 
Services committee approved the proposal for H.R 3763 (Oxley Bill). Approval came in a 49-12 
vote, interestingly with the (relatively) weakest consensus among all SOX legislative polls. 
Committee chairman Michael Oxley addressed the panel and stated that "President Bush has 
asked us to move on his plan and our committee is sending a solid, bipartisan legislative product 
to the House floor". This statement revealed information on the outlook of the bill for coming 
months. Soon in H.R, Oxley Bill passed quickly on April 24th 2002. However, after the markets 
were closed the day before on April 23rd 2002 (EDT 17:22)22, State Attorney General Eliot 
                                                 
19 Reuters News 17 January 2002 18:30 GMT, “Proposed Auditor panel needs powers-US SEC’s Pitt”  
20 Daylight saving for US is observed for the following dates: For 2002: April 7th – October 27th; For 
2003: April 6th – October 26th. 
21 Dow Jones News Service 16 April 2002 22:44 GMT “House Panel Adopts Accounting Reform Bill In 
49-12 Vote” 
22 Associated Press Newswires 23 April 2002 21:22 GMT “Spitzer asking Congress to address alleged Wall 
Street conflicts” 
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Spitzer addressed the Congress and raised the conflict of interest issue for sell-side analysts. 
Spitzer’s speech for bringing the conflict of interest issue for sell-side the analysts under 
attention is an important piece of information regarding the rules governing capital markets, 
because later in 2002 there is a significant legislative outcome related to this announcement; 
know as ‘Global Settlement’23. Due to this major confounding event, I do not consider this date 
in cross sectional analysis but report the result for abnormal return. 
There was no apparent announcement until June 18th 2002 (EDT 14:52)24, when Senate 
Banking committee approved the proposal for S.2673 (Sarbanes Bill). In a 17-4 vote, the 
committee backed the proposal offered by its chairman, Sen. Paul Sarbanes, but there were some 
objections. The Banking Committee also rejected an amendment offered by Sen. Phil Gramm, 
which would have left any decision on restricting consulting services up to the new accounting 
oversight body. Gramm argued that smaller businesses would not be able to afford separate 
auditors for accounting and consulting and stated "We're writing into law things we shouldn't." 
He said that he wants the new board PCAOB, to take the lead in this area, avoiding heavy-
                                                 
23 On December 20, 2002 Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Harvey L. Pitt, New York 
Attorney General Spitzer, North American Securities Administrators Association President Christine Bruenn, NASD 
Chairman and CEO Robert Glauber, New York Stock Exchange Chairman Dick Grasso, and state securities 
regulators announced an historic settlement $1.4 billion Global Settlement, includes penalties and funds for 
investors, with the nation's top investment firms to resolve issues of conflict of interest at brokerage firms. The 
"global settlement" concludes a joint investigation begun in April by regulators into the undue influence of 
investment banking interests on securities research at brokerage firms. The settlement will bring about balanced 
reform in the industry and bolster confidence in the integrity of equity research. 
24 Reuters News 18 June 2002 18:52 GMT “UPDATE 1-US Senate panel passes post-Enron accounting 
bill” 
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handed interference from Congress. Sen. John Ensign, R-Nev. who voted against the bill also 
supported him and warned “We may be doing more harm with this legislation than good,". 
When the announcement of WorldCom’s “massive fraud” hit the U.S. Capital markets; 
the sluggish legislative process received a boost from the Congress. On June 25th 2002 (EDT 
18:26)25, WorldCom’s board of directors made an announcement stating that the company has 
engaged in ‘massive fraud’ overstating its earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization by $3.6 billion over the last five quarters. Following this critical announcement, 
SEC chairman Harvey Pitt stated that he would speed up the process to create a public 
accountability board, and added that the SEC would begin to talk to government officials and 
corporate representatives and investors to get suggestions for who might serve on the board. This 
announcement is also considered similarly by other studies. In her study, Zhang argue that the 
revelation of the WorldCom scandal in late June boosted rulemaking activities26. In addition, Li, 
Pincus and Rego (2005), after consulting to former SEC chief Accountant Lynn Turner, also 
conclude that this event has changed the political atmosphere and provided more support for the 
proposals27. Furthermore, there is anecdotal evidence supporting the WorldCom announcement 
being an eye-opener and having implications in terms of changing the support and hence 
likelihood of Bill passing. According to Dow Jones newswires on June 26, 200228, Leon Panetta, 
                                                 
25 Dow Jones News Services, 25 June 2002 22:26 GMT “WorldCom Improperly Booked $3B In Expenses 
-Sources ” 
26  Please see earlier version of Zhang’s study, Zhang (2005) page 5. 
27 Please see Li, Pincus and Rego (2005) page 6. 
28 WorldCom/Reform -2: Could Boost Sarbanes Reform Plan 26 June 2002 Dow Jones News Service 18:29 
GMT 
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the former White House chief of staff who was co-chair for the NYSE committee that developed 
the exchange's governance plan, said WorldCom's apparent example of betraying the trust of its 
shareholders makes it "that much more urgent" to develop tough governance guidelines for 
companies. Also same newswire mentioned that in a statement on Wednesday June 26, the SEC 
stated that the events at WorldCom "further demonstrate the need for comprehensive market 
regulatory reforms that the (Bush) administration, the Congress and the SEC have been 
advocating and implementing”. 
Next day, on June 26th 2002 (EDT 19:01)29 SEC approved an order directed to 
approximately 1,000 of the nation's largest companies saying that chief executive and chief 
financial officers must certify the accuracy and veracity of the disclosures and their financial 
statements by mid-August. SEC issued the list of the top 945 U.S. publicly-traded companies 
with revenues greater than $1.2 Billion whose financial statements must be certified as accurate 
by their chief executive and financial officers. 
Later on July 15th 2002, (EDT 18:43)30 Senate proceeded with the Sarbanes Bill and 
passed by an overwhelming 97-0 vote. The voting result suggests that the outcome was highly 
expected, and hence I do not anticipate this announcement to reveal any unexpected new 
information to the market and yet to yield significant market reaction. I do not include this date 
in my cross sectional analysis but report the price reaction consistent with the above argument. 
                                                 
29 Reuters News, 26 June 2002 23:01 GMT “UPDATE 1-SEC issues list of firms needing CEO 
certification” 
30 Reuters News, 15 July 2002 22:43 GMT “U.S. Senate passes sweeping corporate reform bill” 
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Next day on July 16th (EDT 13:42)31, HR caught up with the Senate and voted to toughen 
their version of the bill to match the standards of a Senate bill. HR 5118 Bill, which passed with 
overwhelming bipartisan support of 391-28, and added criminal penalties to earlier version HR 
3763 passed by the House in April32. 
Later in the following week, with the efforts in conference committee, two bills 
addressing the similar issues were merged. The importance of this event is not the evidence of 
‘mutual agreement’ only, but the conference report itself. According to the HR.3763 Legislative 
Actions chronology from Thomas Library of Congress33, the conference report is filed on July 
24 at 10:09 pm. This final report is the first document that discusses the SOX sections in detail; 
including Section 404 for internal control34. The first day that the markets can capitalize on this 
information is July 25, when it was voted and agreed by the H.R and the Senate. On July 25th 
2002 (EDT 8:00)35 conference report, preserving much of a Senate bill requiring stricter 
                                                 
31 Associated Press Online 16 July 2002, 17:42 GMT “Senate Bill to Curb Corporate Fraud” 
32 New measures raised to 20 years the time behind bars for wire and mail fraud, double the ten-year 
penalty, which was already twice the existing penalty in current law for those crimes. New bill also created a new 
crime of securities fraud with a maximum 25 years in prison - more than double the 10-year term approved by the 
Senate. 
33 Thomas Library legislative information from the Library of Congress  
H.R. 3763 http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:h.r.03763: 
S. 2673 http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:s.02673: 
34 The Library of Congress, for the 107th Congress Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor 
Protection Act of 2002 (Engrossed Amendment as Agreed to by Senate)[H.R.3763.EAS] 
35 Reuters News 25 July 2002, 16:11 GMT “US House and Senate reach pact on corporate reform.” 
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oversight of auditors but adopting stiffer criminal penalties, approved both in the Senate and the 
H.R  
 And finally, on July 30th 2002, (EDT 8:02)36 President signed the Sarbanes-Oxley Bill 
into law. However, this was already expected given president’s calls to accelerate the legislative 
process. I do not anticipate this announcement to contribute any new unexpected information and 
exclude it for cross-sectional shareholders’ value analysis. But I do report result for the abnormal 
return consistent with my expectation. 
Since the SOX Act became a law fairly quick in order to respond corporate scandals in 
U.S., implementation period brought more complications than the legislative period. 
Announcements related to the administrative practices of the Act are therefore revealing more 
important and unexpected information than the legislative events. This is especially true for the 
foreign issuers who were hoping to get exemptions. SEC started rulemaking activities and acted 
promptly on August 27th 2002 (EDT 12:23)37 by approving the rule that require chief executives 
and financial officers of all publicly listed companies on US stock exchanges, including foreign 
companies, to certify personally the accuracy of their financial statements. This move by the 
SEC came as the first surprise to the foreign issuers which had raised objections with the SEC. 
They were anticipating an exemption, or at least a compromise measure. SEC commissioners 
said they had already considered the issue of whether to require foreign companies to certify 
their financial statements on June 26 2002, when they announced the one time certification 
requirement. Alan Beller, director of the SEC's division of corporate finance, said the fact that it 
                                                 
36 Associated Press Newswires, 30 July 2002, 12:02 GMT “Bush signs legislation designed to combat 
corporate fraud” 
37 Financial Times, 27 August 2002, 16:23 GMT “SEC rule to include foreign companies” 
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was not proposed at that time, reflected a desire to move incrementally on the issue, not a 
possible exemption. And he added that foreign companies had lived with other U.S. legal 
requirements for decades, and that the new rules were generally formulated. "I think it is a broad 
enough concept that foreign private issuers ought to be able to live with it."38 
Second shock for foreign issuers came on October 8th 2002 (EDT 16:08)39, during a 
public comment by the SEC’s chairman Harvey Pitt. Speaking by a video link to a financial 
group in London, SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt addressed foreign issuers concerns on compliance 
requirements. Harvey Pitt stated that the SEC has limited room for maneuver in granting 
exemptions to non-US companies, and must respect the will of Congress. After his speech, 
foreign firms’ hope for exemption vanished even more. In addition, SEC Corporate Finance 
division director Alan Beller, speaking to the same group in London added "We cannot promise 
that our final rules will always accord with your concerns, but we do promise to listen and 
carefully evaluate them," and stated that as the SEC writes rules to implement the law, "foreign 
companies can expect that many of the new rules will apply to them,"40. These statements 
revealed important surprises for foreign issuers’ hope for an exemption and the SEC’s support 
for their argument. Both Harvey Pitt’s and Alan Beller’s comments support the idea that SEC 
could not promise any exemption, which had vanished the hope for exemption. 
                                                 
38 SEC may exempt non-US accountants” FT.com 8 October 2002, By Andrew Parker in London, Adrian 
Michaels in New York and Francesco Guerrera in Brussels. “ 
39 Dow Jones News Service, 8 October 2002 20:08 GMT “SEC Urges Non-US Firms To Voice Sarbanes-
Oxley Concerns” 
40 FT.com October 8th 2002 by Lydia Adetunji “SEC include foreign issuers” 
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Just one week after addressing foreign firms’ concerns, on October 16th 2002 (EDT 
10:51)41, SEC moved quickly to implement the corporate reforms ordered by the U.S. Congress, 
and the proposed rules implementing the SOX Sections. SEC backed rules forcing companies to 
disclose more about their internal controls (Section 404) and codes of ethics (Section 406)  and 
the rule requiring companies to disclose if their boards' audit committee has any ‘financial 
experts’ on it (Section 407). The proposals required all issuers with ‘registered securities’ to 
comply with these rules, including the foreign issuers. This announcement is important for 
foreign firms’ compliance requirement. 
Later on November 5th 2002 (EST 18:03)42, Chairman Harvey Pitt resigned under 
pressure. In a letter to President Bush, Pitt stated "the turmoil surrounding my chairmanship" had 
made it difficult to stay in the job. "Rather than be a burden to you or the agency, I feel it is in 
everyone's best interest if I step aside now, to allow the agency to continue the important efforts 
we have started." There were no objections and The White House quickly accepted his 
resignation. However, the resignation came on an important date, the date of U.S. general 
election. I report the result for this announcement as well but do not include it in my analysis due 
to the confounding event. 
Another important announcement for foreign issuers came early in the new year on 
January 8th, 2003 (EST 11:25)43. SEC proposed amendment to permit companies from countries 
such as Germany and Japan to maintain their established corporate governance practices. The 
biggest concessions involved the independence of company audit committees. Germany pointed 
                                                 
41 Reuters News, 16 October 2002 14:51 GMT “U.S. SEC proposes annual internal control reports” 
42 AP Online  5 November 2002 23:03 GMT “Harvey Pitt Resigns As SEC Chairman” 
43 Reuters News 8 January 2003 16:25 GMT “SEC gives OK to fitness plan for audit committees.” 
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out that its two-tier structure of management and supervisory boards often led to employee 
representatives making decisions on audits. Countries such as Japan and Italy complained that 
company audit committees were not always staffed by people who were also board directors. 
These provisions include: allowing non-management employees to serve as audit committee 
members, consistent with "co-determination" and similar requirements in some countries; 
allowing shareholders to select or ratify the selection of auditors, also consistent with 
requirements in many foreign countries; allowing alternative structures such as boards of 
auditors to perform auditor oversight functions where such structures are provided for under 
local law; and addressing the issue of foreign government shareholder representation on audit 
committees. The SEC proposed that such structures would be allowed "where provided for under 
local law"44. 
2.2 RELATED LITERATURE 
2.2.1 SOX Literature 
Since the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is arguably the most 
sweeping and important U.S. federal securities legislation affecting public companies and other 
participants in U.S. capital markets. The reforms in the Act are broad-ranging and include new or 
enhanced provisions affecting disclosure requirements for public companies, their governance 
                                                 
44 Also not requiring foreign audit firms to provide registration information to PCAOB, where provision of 
such information would violate home country law. Allow non-management employees to serve as audit committee 
members, consistent with German Corporate Law 
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mechanisms and the auditor oversight. The SOX Act discusses the new requirements under 11 
main titles. The first title, Section 101, establishes a new independent agency, Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) to oversee, regulate, inspect and discipline the services 
provided by the audit industry for public companies. The Act also covers topics such as limited 
non-audit services from audit firms (Section 201), and all independent audit committees (Section 
301) with a financial expert serving as a member (Section 407). The SOX Act also mandates 
additional disclosure requirements, such as CEO/CFO certification of financial statements 
(Section 302), disclosing transactions involving directors, officers and shareholders with more 
than a 10% interest (Section 403), as well as prohibiting to extend personal loans to directors and 
officers (Section 402). And finally, the most debated and costliest section for establishing 
internal control mechanisms and the assessment reports required from the management and the 
audit firm (Section 404 a-b). Not surprisingly, having such a broad impact on U.S. Securities 
Law, the SOX Act attracted much attention and became a focus of debate among finance 
scholars as well. 
A majority of the recent empirical literature analyzed the relationship between the SOX 
Act and U.S. firms. These studies mainly analyze the compliance cost and the value effect of the 
Act, as well as corporate actions to adapt to the post-SOX era. In this respect, Asthana et al. 
(2004) and Eldridge and Kealey (2005) studied the direct cost effects of the Act and documented 
significant increase in average audit fee. In addition, Linck, Netter and Yang (2006) documented 
increased average costs for the services of boards of directors, mainly due to increased demand 
and compensation for independent directors as well as D&O insurance. Relating to the implicit 
costs of the SOX Act, Gifford and Howe (2004), and Cohen, Dey and Lys (2007) provided 
empirical evidence of reduced incentive-based compensation in post-SOX era, and documented 
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increased managerial distraction, risk aversion and dampened corporate investments as a result. 
Moreover, many policymakers and corporate executives argue that the SOX Act had a chilling 
effect on the risk-taking behavior of U.S. corporations45. In this respect, a recent working paper 
by Bargeron, Lehn and Zutter (2007) documented evidence in line with this argument. Their 
findings suggest that compared to U.K. benchmarks, U.S. firms have shown reduced investment 
in risky projects in the post-SOX era, based on both financial and equity-based measures. 
Other series of recent papers study the strategic responses of firm managements to free 
themselves from the stricter rules and additional costs associated with the SOX Act. Engel, 
Hayes and Wang (2004) argue that the Act is associated with an average increase in the rate of 
decisions ‘to go private’. In line with this finding, Leuz, Triantis and Wang (2007) documented 
that about 200 U.S. companies voluntarily deregistered (going dark) their shares with the SEC 
following the enactment of the SOX Act. Relating the SOX Act to the M&A market, Kamar, 
Karaca-Mandic and Talley (2007) documented that the SOX Act induced small firms to exit 
capital markets through acquisitions by private firms. Moreover, Marosi and Massoud (2004) 
studied the factors associated with these decisions and their results suggest that firms with fewer 
growth opportunities and greater insider ownership are more likely to go dark in the post-SOX 
era.  
An ill-conceived legislation and regulation can have unintended effects that extend well 
beyond the tangible dollars and cents costs that economists, accountants and policymakers may 
                                                 
45 Adrian Michaels “After A Year Of U.S. Corporate Clean-Up, William Donaldson Calls For A Return To 
Risk-Taking” FinancialTimes.com. July 24, 2003. Also the testimony of Chairman Alan Greenspan Federal Reserve 
Board's semiannual monetary policy report to the Congress Before the Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House 
of Representatives July 15, 2003 
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focus on46. One of these unintended effects is the gradual migration of financial transactions and 
securities offerings overseas, especially to London. An additional group of studies focused on the 
migration to SOX-free environments at the global level, specifically the competition between 
U.K. and U.S. markets for international listings following the SOX Act. In this respect, Doidge, 
Karolyi and Stulz (2007) documented that the cross-listing trend reduced both in the U.S. and in 
the U.K. following the Act. The difference is explained mainly by firm profiles and by the 
structural increase in AIM listings. It is argued that exchange listing in U.S. has unique 
governance benefits for foreign firms. They argue that these benefits have not been seriously 
eroded by SOX and cannot be replicated through a LSE listing. In a similar study, Piotroski and 
Srinivasan (2007) also provided empirical evidence that is in line with Doidge et al. (2007). They 
documented that lost deals involve firms that are on average smaller and less profitable. They 
also argue that nearly all of the firms listed in the U.S. after SOX are from emerging markets. 
They interpret this being consistent with large, high quality firms from weak institutional 
environments being drawn by the enhanced bonding benefits of a U.S. listing after SOX. 
Moreover, several working papers study the association between the change in U.S. 
firms’ shareholders’ value and the SOX Act. However, the findings in this area are controversial. 
Li, Pincus and Rego (2006) analyzed market reactions to events surrounding the SOX Act. They 
documented significant positive returns associated with events resolving the uncertainty of the 
SOX becoming law. Moreover, they argue that the abnormal returns are positively related to the 
extent of firms’ earnings management. With a similar motivation, Rezaee and Jain (2005) 
documented significant positive abnormal return around legislative events that increased the 
likelihood of the Act’s passage. In contrast, Zhang (2007) documented significantly negative 
                                                 
46 AEI Peter J. Wallison, Sarbanes-Oxley Impairing Corporate Risk-taking (Cont.)? September 28, 2007  
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abnormal returns around legislative events leading to the passage of the Act. She argued that the 
cumulative unadjusted market reaction around SOX announcements is around -15.35% to -
12.53%. After adjusting for the expected return, she estimates cumulative abnormal return as -
8.21% to -3.76% by different measures. Zhang argues that the coverage of more events in her 
study than previous papers drives the negative price reaction in her study. Finally, Berger et al. 
(2005) examined the value-weighted portfolios of domestic versus foreign private issuers and 
documented more negative abnormal returns for the foreign firm portfolio.  
Other recent working papers study the cross-sectional relationship between market value 
and governance practices in place. In this respect, Aggarwal and Williamson (2006) found 
empirical evidence that SOX complaint practices are associated with higher market value if 
adopted before they became mandatory. They argued that this evidence suggests that the market 
rewards governance practices efficiently without external interference from regulators. In 
addition, for their sample of financial services firms Akhigbe and Martin (2006) found that firms 
with more independent boards had a stronger positive response to the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley 
compared to that of firms with less independent boards.  
There are two working papers, Smith (2007) and Litvak (2007a) that study foreign issuers 
and the value effect of the SOX Act. In this respect, this chapter analyzes the same question and 
extends the market reaction for SOX announcements to intra-day level. In addition, the sample of 
cross-listed firms and SOX-related events used in this study are more comprehensive than Smith 
(2007). Litvak (2007a) implements an alternative matching approach rather than a market model 
for the event study. With methodologies that address possible cross-correlation, the results for 
the statistical tests in this study control for possible biased test statistics. Using the Sefcik and 
Thompson (1986) approach, which is extensively used in regulation event studies in the finance 
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and accounting literature, this study contributes to the empirical evidence provided on the value 
effect of SOX on cross-listed firms. Moreover, this chapter analyzes and document empirical 
evidence for the association between risk-taking behavior and the SOX value effect. 
Furthermore, I provide evidence at the intra-day level price reaction following the SOX 
announcements. 
2.2.2 Cross-Listing Literature 
Early literature emphasized the importance of market segmentation and the higher 
liquidity in U.S. markets on cross-listing decision. Studies in this area provided evidence that one 
motivation for foreign firms to cross-list or to enlist on a foreign exchange is to minimize the 
costs due to segmented markets (Karolyi, 1998, 2006). Karolyi (1998) argued that the perceived 
benefits of U.S. markets and SEC registration are access to greater capital, greater liquidity lower 
cost of capital, heightened corporate prestige, and greater investor protection. As a result of the 
expected savings in financing costs, these firms enjoy greater liquidity in capital markets, 
lowered cost of capital and access to capital in greater amounts than in their home markets (e.g. 
Errunza and Losq 1985, Karolyi 1998, Foerster and Karolyi 1999, Lins et al. 2004).  
Other studies on foreign listing emphasize governance related factors and discuss 
additional motivation for cross-listing based on agency problems rather than the transaction 
costs. This stream of literature argues that U.S. listing is a credible bonding mechanism for better 
investor protection and examines the bonding motivation for foreign listings (Stulz 1999, Coffee 
1999, 2002). Through cross-listing, firms can overcome the shortcomings of the home country’s 
institutional environment and jurisdictions by adopting other countries’ capital market practices. 
Using this explanation, high quality firms from weak institutional environments list their shares 
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on U.S. exchanges. This race to the top is motivated mainly by their desire to opt into better 
investor-protective laws. Under this hypothesis, adopting the U.S. institutional environment 
bonds the management’s interest with shareholders’ from not expropriating corporate assets. By 
committing to stricter legal environments, cross-listed firms signal their quality and separate 
themselves from the pool of firms coming from their home country. (e.g. Doidge 2004, Doidge 
et al. 2004, Hail and Leuz 2005). As a return, managerial commitment to the stricter legal and 
regulatory environment is rewarded by higher market valuation and lower cost of capital (Doidge 
2004, Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz 2007). Since an important gain of better governance is a 
superior ability to raise capital, firms from weak institutional environments that have a higher 
need for capital are able to capitalize even more through managerial bonding mechanisms as 
opposed to issuers with fewer growth opportunities. Hence, another factor in the value of cross-
listing for the firm is a conditional one: growth opportunities conditional on the institutional 
environment. 
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2.3 HYPOTHESES 
2.3.1 Reaction to Individual Events Leading to the SOX 
Various industry surveys47 and academic studies (e.g. see, Elridge and Kealey (2006), Asthana, 
Balsam and Kim (2004), Boulton, Lehn and Segal (2006)) have documented considerable out-of-
pocket costs associated with the Act. These costs are especially related to the internal control 
requirements of Section 404 and the extra audit fees paid to outside auditors. However, ill-
conceived legislation and regulations can have unintended effects that extend well beyond the 
tangible dollar costs that economists, accountants and policymakers may focus on48. Consistent 
with this, various studies document diverse unintended consequences of the Act and its chilling 
effect on capital markets, as discussed in the literature review. In addition to the direct 
compliance cost, previous findings on the unintended effects suggest that the period following 
the Act is associated with increased demand and compensation for (independent) directors 
(Linck, Netter and Yang (2006)), lowered investments due to increased liability and less 
                                                 
47 A survey of corporate boards released by RHR International and Directorship reveals annual Sarbanes-
Oxley compliance costs average $16 million -- a jump of 77 percent from the year before, Nov. 19, 2004. Other 
studies include CRA International “Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 Costs and Implementation Issues: Survey Update 
2005” and “Sarbanes-Oxley Section 404 Costs and Implementation Issues: Survey Update Spring 2006”, Foley & 
Lardner LLP “The Cost of Being Public in the Era of Sarbanes-Oxley” June 15, 2006. 
48 AEI Peter J. Wallison, Sarbanes-Oxley Impairing Corporate Risk-taking (Cont.)? September 28, 2007  
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incentive-based compensation for executives (Cohen, Dey and Lys (2007)), in addition to a 
deterioration in risk taking activity (e.g. see, Bargeron, Lehn and Zutter (2007), Litvak (2007a)). 
However, despite the consensus on SOX’s cost consequences, there is no agreement on the net 
value effect of SOX announcements. Recent studies of shareholders’ value around SOX-related 
announcements reported both positive and negative net value effects. (e.g. see, Li, Pincus and 
Rego (2006), Rezaee and Jain (2005), Zhang (2007), Kamar et. al (2007)). Given the 
controversial findings of previous studies, I do not postulate on the direction of the net effect. 
However, under the maintained hypothesis that the stock price correctly incorporates all the costs 
and benefits of any exogenous event, including the SOX Act, I argue the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Price reaction around the SOX events will reflect the net economic impact 
of each announcement leading to the Act. Thus, if the SOX’s net effect is value reducing, then the 
market reaction to individual events increasing (or decreasing) the probability of passing the Act 
and the likelihood of including the foreign issuers for compliance will be associated with a 
negative (or positive) market return. If the SOX’s net effect is value enhancing, then the market 
reactions will be vice versa. 
2.3.2 Shareholders’ Value and association with Firm characteristics 
Because a large fraction of the SOX compliance cost is fixed (Elridge and Kealey (2006)), 
imposing the same set of rules and control requirements on large and small firms would imply 
higher unit costs for smaller firms. And as documented by the previous empirical studies, SOX 
has a disproportionate effect on small firms (e.g. see, Linck, Netter and Yang (2006), Kamar, 
Karaca-Mandic and Talley (2007)). Evidence by these studies on the firm characteristics and the 
SOX Act suggests a disproportionate effect on firms with different characteristics. In this 
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respect, Kamar, Karaca-Mandic and Talley (2007) document small firms and high growth firms 
being impaired by SOX. Likewise, it has been argued that potential criminal liability established 
by the Act may have unintended effects, such as dampened managerial incentives to take risks as 
well as reduced trust and cooperation within organizations. SOX may also have affected the 
ways in which corporate information is produced and distributed (e.g. see, Linck, Netter and 
Yang (2007), Bargeron, Lehn and Zutter (2007) and Griffin and Lont (2005)). In a study relating 
to risk-taking measures, Bargeron et al. (2007) document reduced investment on risky projects 
relative to U.K. benchmark both in financial and equity-based risk measures. In line with their 
findings, Litvak (2007a) documents results consistent with the view that SOX induced cross-
listed firms to take less risky projects, which places a particular burden on riskier and high 
growth firms. 
Based on this evidence, I propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Small firms, firms with better growth options, and more risk-taking 
activities will be especially disturbed by the ‘one-size-fits-all’ SOX requirements. Hence, the 
market reaction to SOX announcements by these firms will be stronger. This suggests that 
growth and risk-taking measures will be negatively related, and the size measure will be 
positively related on average with the overall value effect of the SOX announcements. 
2.3.3 Change in Shareholders’ Value and association with Country-level measures: 
Following the enactment of the SOX Act, having registered stock on U.S. exchanges has 
placed an additional compliance burden on public firms. By no surprise, additional rules and the 
compliance requirements associated with the SOX increased the cost of accessing the U.S. 
capital markets (e.g. see, Asthana et al. (2004), Elridge and Kealey (2005), Cohen, Dey and Lys 
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(2007), Linck, Netter and Yang (2007)). However, stricter rules mandated by SOX may 
strengthen the credibility of the bonding mechanism for firms that commit to these standards, 
thus increasing the expected benefits (Piotroski and Srinivasan (2007)). This credible bonding 
mechanism may imply some benefit for some foreign firms, since the higher compliance 
requirements offer them the opportunity to separate themselves from the pool of firms from their 
home country. Foreign issuers that inherit potential agency problems due to their country-level 
institutional and legal environments would benefit from this commitment to stricter disclosure 
and governance standards. These firms would capitalize on the SOX requirements if the 
‘Bonding Hypothesis’ is a key decision factor for them to list on U.S. exchanges. Given the 
rearrangement in cost and the benefit for the foreign issuers, the perceived net economic effect of 
these enhanced requirements is a function of the additional gains due to the bonding mechanism 
net of costs associated with the SOX. In addition, since a significant gain of the bonding is the 
ability to raise capital at a lower cost (Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2004)); firms with a higher 
need for external financing and with more growth opportunities would capitalize even more on 
the bonding benefits. Whether the net economic gain associated with more credible bonding 
outweighs the economic cost of compliance by stricter SOX requirements is an open question. 
How this economic gain is related to country and firm-level governance, growth factors is also 
an important question. Based on the bonding literature and under the maintained assumption that 
the SOX requirements are stricter relative to the pre-SOX environment and additional 
compliance to SOX is credible, I propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Price reaction around SOX events will reflect the net economic effect of 
the Act requirements given the motivation to cross list. Hence, under the ‘Bonding Hypothesis’, 
the net benefit of SOX will be a function of additional value due to the bonding benefit. Market 
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reaction of foreign issuers subject to SOX would be based on the expected net benefit of SOX 
requirements, i.e.  
i. Firms with an inferior institutional environment and investor protection would 
experience a higher net effect associated with SOX rules than firms from countries with a better 
environment.  
ii. Since empirical evidence documents the lower cost of capital and higher 
valuation as a result of bonding through cross listing, it follows that firms from weakly-governed 
countries that have better growth prospects and a ‘higher demand for financing’ will capitalize 
even more on the commitment for stricter rules. Thus, after controlling for firm characteristics 
and industry factors, foreign issuers from weakly-governed legislations and with more growth 
opportunities will be positively associated with the overall market reaction. 
Empirical Implications of the Hypotheses for the proxy variables: 
In my empirical analysis, I use variables that are commonly used in corporate finance and 
governance literature to proxy for firm characteristics and country-level governance factors. 
Firm Size: 
I use book value of total assets and the market value of equity as firm-size measure. As 
discussed in the previous section, smaller firms experience a disproportionately higher unit cost 
of compliance since a large fraction of the SOX compliance cost is fixed. Hence, there are 
economies of scale in SOX compliance, and small firms might be particularly affected as a 
result. This effect has already been documented for U.S. firms (Eldridge and Kealey (2005), 
Linck et al. (2006), Holmstrom and Kaplan (2003)). Another justification for this relation would 
be based on the governance explanation. Since small firms’ inherited agency problems are 
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different than those of large firms due to the environment they operate (Lehn, Patro and Zhao 
(2006)), uniformly mandated ‘one-size-fits-all’ governance practices will have unintended cost 
effects especially for small firms. Consistent with either explanation, I expect the size measure to 
be positively related with the market reaction on announcements leading to SOX. 
Growth Opportunities: 
Similar to the size measure, the association between growth opportunities and market 
value can be explained under two views, i.e. by limited resources or by governance practices. 
According to the former explanation, high growth firms may not able to update their internal 
control systems in a timely manner, which would make them more likely to experience delays 
and increased compliance costs. Alternatively, due to inherited agency issues in their nature 
(Lehn et al. (2006)), growth firms may be disproportionately affected by ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
governance practices. 
I use a market-to-book ratio of total assets, which is a commonly used proxy for 
investment opportunities. I also use sales growth as a measure of a firm’s growth opportunities. 
Same as Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2006), I have calculated it as the 3-year geometric average 
of annual growth in sales prior to 2001. 
As a standalone variable, consistent with previous studies, I expect growth proxies to be 
negatively related with market reaction after controlling for size. However, conditional on the 
bonding benefit, this measure proxies also for the financing need, and I expect the growth 
measure (growth measure interacted with institutional environment), to be positively associated 
with the overall market reaction, as implied by Hypothesis 2. 
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Risk Taking measures: 
Bargeron, Lehn and Zutter (2007) document that relative to the U.K. benchmark, U.S. 
firms reduced risk-taking activities in the post-SOX era. Following this paper, I study the risk-
taking measures in cross-sectional relation with the SOX net effect on shareholders’ value. 
Following Bargeron et al. (2007), I use capital expenditure and R&D expenditure over total 
assets as accounting-based risk measures that account for the level and types of investments. As 
three stock-based measures which capture the market’s assessment of firms’ equity risk, I use 
beta of foreign issuers’ stock vis-à-vis the FTSE index (excluding the US), stock return volatility, 
and the root mean square error from the market model. In line with previous studies, I anticipate 
these risk-taking measures to be negatively related with the market reaction to SOX 
announcements. 
Legal Origin and Shareholder Rights Score: 
As a proxy for the institutional environment and investor protection, I use law-based 
variables, legal origin and the shareholder rights score from La Porta et al. (1998, 2003). 
Consistent with Hypothesis 3, I anticipate a positive relation between a weaker institutional 
environment and investor protection with the market reaction around SOX announcements.  
Control Factors – ROA, Leverage, Industry, Country level growth measure 
As a measure of profitability, I use the ROA for the year 2001, calculated as EBIT 
(Earnings before interest and taxes) over the book value of assets. Leverage is computed as book 
value of debt over book value of assets. In my cross-sectional analysis, I also use industry fixed 
effects that would capture the common industry-specific SOX effect within each industry. To 
control for alternative country characteristics and trends affecting all companies in their 
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respective markets, I use the following country-level factors: GDP growth, and total market 
capitalization over GDP. Since GDP is not a forward-looking measure, GDP growth is measured 
as the 3 year geometric average of annual GDP growth post 2002. This variable controls for 
growth opportunities due to country characteristics. I also use total market capitalization over 
GDP to control for the level of capital markets and financing opportunities in the home country.  
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3.0  SAMPLE SELECTION AND EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY 
3.1 SAMPLE  
3.1.1 Foreign Issuers Sample 
I form an initial sample of foreign issuers using a combination of four different sources, three 
Depository Banks’49 and CRSP-Compustat databases. I use Factiva news source to identify the 
ADRs that are either upgraded to or downgraded from national exchanges. This information is 
vital to assess the sub-sample of foreign issuers that are required to comply with SOX. In 
addition to sample of issuers from Depository Banks’ databases, I also identify the foreign 
issuers from CRSP-Compustat database by ‘financial incorporation’, ‘share code’ and ‘company 
                                                 
49 Bank of New York (BNY) DR Directory provides information on currently active ADR programs. BNY 
database also provides information on the active ADR programs as well as the terminated issues. Citigroup’s (CITI) 
Depository Receipt Service’s Universal Issuance Guide also provides information on ADRs, but only for the 
currently active programs. Although the database defines some listings as “inactive”, these ADRs are not the 
terminated listings. For Citibank database, this inactive definition identifies the ADR programs that have switched 
their depository banks from Citibank to others. I verified this information after contacting Citibank’s Depository 
Receipt Service department. JP Morgan’s (JPM) ADR Universe database includes information on ADR programs 
but only for the active programs. JPM database provides specific level status but this information is the most recent 
level for the ADR program. 
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name’ identifiers. Besides the foreign issuers listed through ADR program, I also gather the 
sample of Non-ADR issuers from Compustat and DataStream databases. I use ‘financial 
incorporation’ and ‘share code’ descriptions from Compustat database and Country description 
from Thomson One Banker WorldScope database. This sample includes mostly foreign issuers 
other than depository programs, such as dual-listings, foreign public offerings and Global Shares.  
Later, I verify the foreign issuers sample with the available information from several 
sources. For the issuers listed on NYSE, I verify the listing date and the share type information 
with the Non-US issuers’ database for year 2002 available from NYSE50. For issuers listed on 
NASDAQ, I use NASDAQ International Companies information available from the NASDAQ 
website51. I also verify the Israeli issuers with the TASE (Tel Aviv Stock Exchange) information 
available52. I utilize Thomson Global (Worldscope), for F-1 filings to verify level information 
for Level III ADRs. I use the Factiva news source to identify the events for exchange upgrades / 
downgrades. This way, I identify the accurate listing information around the SOX 
announcements. For termination, acquisition, bankruptcy, deregistration and status information, I 
utilize CRSP delisting information, in conjunction with the Factiva announcements and SEC 
Form-1553  deregistration filings under Worldscope and SEC Edgar database.  
                                                 
50 Last accessed October 2, 2007, NYSE Non-U.S. Data: Complete list of Non-U.S. Listed Issuers 
http://www.nyse.com/marketinfo/datalib/1022221393065.html 
51 Last accessed October 2, 2007, NASDAQ International Companies  
ttp://www.nasdaq.com/asp/NonUsOutput.asp 
52 Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange Dual Listed bt Securities Law 
http://www.tase.co.il/TASEEng/MarketData/Stocks/MarketData/MarketData.htm?action=2&dualTab=2&SubAction 
53 SEC Form 15, Certification and notice of termination of registration under Section 12(g) or suspension of 
duty to file reports under Sections 13 and 15(d), SEC2069 
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Figure 1 demonstrates the new and the cancelled listings grouped by ADRs and other 
programs on an annual basis. U.S. markets experienced strong growth in foreign listings and the 
number of issuers have increased ever since 1990. The number of foreign issuers listed on U.S. 
exchanges was stable through 2000-02 periods and has dropped considerably following the year 
2002. Post-SOX period experienced fewer number of new issues and higher number of 
terminated programs compared to pre-SOX period. The negative growth over the post-SOX 
period is mostly attributable to drop in the number of new listings rather than terminated listings, 
and this holds both for ADR and Non-ADR listings. 
Table 1 summarizes my sample and the survival information for the foreign issuers that 
are active around the SOX legislative events. To get this sample, I use several filters on the 
initial sample. I exclude Investment Funds, Investment Trusts and issuers from countries known 
as tax havens, such as Bermuda, Barbados, Marshall Islands, Cayman Islands, Bahamas, British 
Virgin Islands and Belize54. For issues with different classes55, I only include the issues with the 
one-share-one-vote scheme. Final sample includes 888 listings, starting as early as 1930. This 
sample includes all foreign listings up to December 30, 2006, which have price data on CRSP 
database. Table 1 provides further classification of the foreign issuers based on their listing status 
around and after the SOX Act. There are 135 issues that are terminated before the enactment of 
the SOX Act, and 79 foreign firms accessed U.S. equity markets after the enactment of SOX. 
There are 674 foreign issuers that are active around the SOX legislative events. The final sample 
                                                 
54 “Places in the sun, Survey: offshore finance” Feb 22nd 2007 From The Economist print edition 
http://www.economist.com/surveys/displaystory.cfm?story_id=8695139 
55 There were five dual class issues in my sample; Telefonos De Mexico SA De CV, Transcom Worldwide 
SA, Royal Dutch Shell Plc, Embotelladora Andina SA, Sociedad Quimica Minera De Chile. 
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for my analysis consists of these 674 foreign issuers, where approximately 62% of them listed 
through ADRs and 38% listed through other means. I conduct the event study analysis based on 
this final sample of foreign issuers.  
3.1.2 Financial and Market Price Data 
I cross-referenced the sample with CRSP and Compustat databases for pricing and financial data. 
For the financial data, I use the observation for the most recent fiscal year prior to December 
2001. Following the previous studies (Piotroski and Srinivasan (2007), Dodige, Karolyi and 
Stulz (2007)), I use the values for the fiscal year ending in 2001 to compute these measures.  
Firm level sales growth is measured as the three-year geometric average of annual 
growth. Leverage is defined as the total debt divided by total assets. ROA is used as the 
profitability measure and is computed as the earnings before extraordinary items divided by total 
assets. I use market-to-book and GDP growth as firm level and country level growth proxies. 
Market-to-book is the market value of assets divided by total assets at the end of fiscal year 
2001. The market value of assets is calculated as the long-term debt plus book value of preferred 
stock plus market value of common stock.  
For risk taking proxies, I use similar accounting-based and stock-based measures as 
Bargeron, Lehn and Zutter (2007). Accounting-based measures of the level and risk of corporate 
investment are (i) the ratio of R&D expenditures to assets, (ii) the ratio of capital expenditures to 
assets, and (iii) the ratio of cash holdings to assets. Stock-based measures of risk are (i) the 
standard deviation of monthly stock returns, (ii) the estimated beta from the market model, and 
(iii) root mean square error from this market model. Market model is estimated using daily 
returns over the year 2001, vis-à-vis FTSE Global index excluding U.S. markets. 
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3.1.3 Country Level Data 
For legal origin grouping I use La Porta et al. (1998) classification. For countries that are not 
covered by their sample, I use JURIST56  database and CIA Factbook to identify the legal origin. 
I also use Shareholder Rights Score from La Porta et al. (1998) as country level governance 
proxy. For the countries that are not covered by La Porta et al. (1998), I obtain Shareholder 
Rights Score from Pistor, Raiser and Gelfer (2000). 
As a market benchmark in the market model, I use global indices of developed countries 
excluding U.S. Both FTSE and Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) have indices in this 
structure. For this purpose I use ‘FTSE W World Ex US’57 and ‘MSCI World Ex US’58 indices. I 
gather price data for these indexes from Thomson One Banker-DataStream. 
I also use factors for the size of the capital market and growth opportunities at country 
level. I use market capitalization divided by GDP (Gross Domestic Product) as the proxy for 
                                                 
56 University of  Pittsburgh, Law School database 
57 The FTSE All-World ex US Index comprises Large (83%) and Mid (17%) cap stocks providing coverage 
of Developed and Emerging Markets (47 countries) excluding the US. The index is derived from the FTSE Global 
Equity Index Series (GEIS), which covers 98% of the world’s investable market capitalization.  
http://www.ftse.com/Indices/  
58 The MSCI World Index is a free float-adjusted market capitalization index that is designed to measure 
global developed market equity performance. As of June 2006 the MSCI World Index consisted of the following 22 
developed market country indices: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland and the United Kingdom. 
http://www.msci.com/equity/indexdesc.html  
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capital markets’ size measure (Doidge et. al 2007), and three-year geometric average of annual 
GDP growth as the proxy for the country specific growth opportunity. I use the World Bank 
WDI dataset from country level data59.  
3.1.4 SOX Announcements Data 
I identify the set of announcements related to SOX from several sources. For the chronology of 
the legislative events leading to the passage of SOX, I use Thomas Library of Congress for the 
107th Congress60. I include the events that reveal significant information which affects the Act 
becoming law. For the administrative events after June 30th 2002 when Act became law, I use 
SEC’s ‘Proposed Rules’61 and ‘Final Rules’62 archives for 2002 in addition to the event sample 
used by previous studies. I use Factiva news source to identify the exact time of the earliest 
announcement related to each event. I also use Factiva database, to check for any confounding 
event. I exclude announcements that interfere with an important confounding event that would 
affect capital markets. An announcement date is treated as confounding event if there is any 
other announcement with significant implications and/or legislative outcomes.  And there were 
                                                 
59 World Development Indicators Online (WDI) provides direct access to more than 700 development  
indicators, with time series for 208 countries  and 18 country groups from 1960 to 2006, where data are available. 
60 Thomas Library legislative information from the Library of Congress  
H.R. 3763 http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:h.r.03763: 
S. 2673 http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:s.02673:  
61 SEC Proposed Rules 2002 http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/proposedarchive/proposed2002.shtml  
62 SEC Final Rules 2002 http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/finalarchive/finalarchive2002.shtml  
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two cases like this in my sample. I also exclude the events with highly expected outcomes, such 
as Senate passing the Sarbanes Bill by 97-0 vote, and the President signing the Act.  
Appendix B.1 provides the list of events leading to the passage of SOX, as well as the 
administrative events after the passage along with date and time information. Appendix B.2 
provides the details for each SOX announcement. Corresponding event windows are adjusted for 
the announcements made after or before trading hours. These 15 legislative and administrative 
events cover announcements by the SEC, meetings by the House and the Senate committees, 
reports and votes for the Oxley Bill and the Sarbanes Bill, announcements related to foreign 
issuers’ compliance, proposal for SOX sections and propositions for foreign issuers and other 
related events. There are ten legislative events including July, 30th 2002 when the Act was 
signed into law by President Bush. There are five subsequent administrative events after the 
enactment of the Act; mainly the proposed SEC rules for the SOX sections, resignations from the 
SEC, and SEC provisions to accommodate foreign firms’ audit committees. I excluded four 
announcements from the cross-sectional analysis, two due to other confounding events, and 
another two due to expected outcome. However, for the sake of robustness, I report the market 
reactions to these announcements and the CAR return estimates including these events. 
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3.2 EVENT STUDY METHODOLOGY 
3.2.1 Multivariate Market Regression (MVRM) 
To assess the value implication of SOX Act for foreign firms I analyze the market reaction of 
foreign issuers around the SOX related announcements. I estimate the excess returns around 
these SOX legislative and administrative events using event study approach. I use multivariate 
regression model (MVRM) which was first suggested by Izan (1978) and used extensively in 
finance and accounting literature63 for regulatory announcements during the same calendar date. 
MVRM approach estimates the abnormal returns as the coefficient of each dummy variable for 
the event period rather than prediction errors. Detailed discussion for this method is provided by 
Binder (1985a, 1985b), Thompson (1985) and Karafiath (1988).  
Regulatory events usually involve no single well defined announcement; rather there are 
multiple announcements, such as committee, House, or Senate approval during legislative and 
administrative process. Hence multivariate framework provides easier setting for events with 
multiple announcements. MVRM methodology is similar to Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
                                                 
63 Smirlock and Kaufold (1987), Karafiath and Glascock (1989), Cornett and Tehranian (1989,1990), De 
Jong and Thompson (1990), Eyssell and Arshadi (1990), Demirguc-Kunt, and Huizinga (1993), Madura, Tucker, 
and Zarruk (1992, 1993), Unal, Demirguc-Kunt, and Leung (1993), Clark and Perfect (1996), Cornett, Davidson, 
and Rangan (1996), Johnson and Sarkar (1996), Bin and Chen (1998), Cosimano and McDonald (1998), Sinkey and 
Carter (1999), and Stewart and Hein (2002) are examples of empirical studies that use such an approach in 
examining the significance of a wide variety of events. 
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(SUR) system with one equation for each firm. MVRM assumes that disturbances are 
independent and identically distributed within each equation, but their variances differ across 
equations. It also assumes that the contemporaneous covariance of the disturbances is nonzero, 
whereas the non-contemporaneous covariance all equal zero across equations (Theil 1971). The 
real advantage of the MVRM framework over the standard methodology lies in its ability to 
allow abnormal returns to differ across firms, including signs, and to easily test joint hypothesis 
(Binder 1998). This feature makes this methodology the robust choice for regulator events.  
MVRM estimates the individual equations with GLS method, but the estimated 
coefficients are identical to OLS method. Parameter estimation security by security is equivalent 
to OLS estimates of the entire system. OLS has an advantage of simplicity yet still provides 
unbiased parameter estimates. However, in comparison to GLS approach (EGLS estimated var-
covariance matrix), OLS is less efficient. However, Hughes and Ricks (1984b) have shown that 
the t-test for an equally weighted MVRM model on the hypothesis that the average abnormal 
return during common announcement period equals zero is equivalent to F test in SUR system. 
Similarly Thompson (1985) shows that if there is a common event date for all firms, CAR test 
can be implemented using an equally weighted portfolio as the dependent variable. In line with 
this, Schipper and Thompson (1985) suggest that same result could be achieved more easily by 
examining a portfolio of firms and estimating the average abnormal return(s) rather than the SUR 
system. EGLS coefficients can be interpreted as coefficients on a portfolio of the underlying 
firms having weights . If S, estimated covariance matrix of residuals is chosen 
to be scalar, the portfolio weights imply an EW portfolio. Therefore, the significance of EW 
portfolio event parameter estimate provides a valid hypothesis test on the mean, even if the 
( ) ISISIP 111 −−−′=
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assumption of a common event parameter across sample is false. Portfolio method avoids EGLS 
regressions and yet provides unbiased parameter estimates and test statistics. 
The MVRM is applied over 2 year period, 6 months before the first announcement, 1 
year legislation period and 6 months after the last announcement. I estimate abnormal returns 
(ARs) as the coefficients for dummy variables for each SOX announcement, and the cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) as the coefficient for a single dummy variable for all announcements. 
In addition to the t-statistics for EW portfolios, I report the t-statistics for the standardized 
abnormal returns. Abnormal returns are standardized by residual standard deviation estimate 
from the individual regressions following the Boehmer Musemeci and Poulsen (1991) approach 
based on Patell (1976). Cross-sectional t-statistics are calculated for standardized abnormal 
returns and reported as t-std as discussed in Appendix C.1. Standardization serves mainly two 
purposes: It adjusts t-statistics for the fact that event-period residual is an out of sample 
prediction and hence it will have a higher standard deviation, known as event induced variance. 
Standardization, as applied before forming portfolios, allows for heteroskedastic event day 
residuals and prevents firms with large standard deviation to dominate the test. This approach 
accounts for heteroskedasticity in abnormal return across firms, and event induced variance. I 
also report t-statistics for non-parametric Wilcoxon Sign test for null hypothesis of equal 
probabilities to observe (+) and (-) abnormal return which is robust to any assumption about the 
underlying distribution.  
In addition to test statistics from MVRM, I report t-statistics that incorporate 
contemporaneous correlation from covariance matrix. This approach is based on the inference on 
average cross correlation on abnormal returns across firms, instead of full covariance matrix 
estimation as in GLS approach (Schipper and Thompson (1985)). Kolari and Pyonnen (2006) 
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suggest t-statistic adjustments for standardized Patell and BMP approaches using residual 
estimates from stock return regression, which accounts for the contemporaneous cross-
correlation. Appendix C.2 provides the details for correlation adjustment for t-statistics. 
3.2.2 Portfolio Approach for Cross-Sectional Analysis: 
As discussed earlier, the mean stock price reaction may not be significantly evident on 
announcement date due to cross-sectional variations in market reactions, which may be driven by 
different country and firm characteristics. Actually, this is what Hypothesis 2 and 3 investigate, 
the cross-sectional association of firm and country characteristics on market reaction. A typical 
method of testing this relation of firm characteristics on market reactions is to run cross-sectional 
regressions of abnormal returns on the characteristics of interest. However, for common event 
dates as in many regulatory event studies, the analysis is likely to have cross-sectional 
heteroskedasticity and cross correlation in residuals, which can lead to biased standard errors of 
the coefficients.  
To address this issue, I use the weighted portfolio approach proposed by Sefcik and 
Thompson (1986) to test these hypotheses. This approach, being a MVRM method, is a 
multivariate extension of Mandelker (1974), Jaffe (1974) which incorporates the 
contemporaneous correlation of residuals in to the estimation process. It generates unbiased 
standard errors and parameter estimates that account fully for heteroskedasticity and 
interdependence in cross-sectional disturbance. Sefcik and Thompson (1986) suggest a 
weighting approach to form factor portfolios and to estimate unbiased test statistics for cross 
regression of abnormal returns on firm characteristics using overtime regressions, and Appendix 
C.3 provides the details of portfolio weights for each factor in a cross-sectional setting.  
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If the abnormal return of the N firms around the events of interest are hypothesized to be 
related with K (firm, industry and country) characteristics, and  is a matrix of these 
characteristics, then set of portfolio weights W  is a matrix = 
F NxK
KxN ( ) F ′−1FF ′ . Each row of W  
produces a portfolio that corresponds to only one characteristic and independent from the impact 
of all the other 1−K  characteristics. This procedure estimates the coefficients from the MVRM 
one at a time for each characteristic, instead of cross-sectional regression estimating all at once. 
However, unlike the cross-sectional regression, standard errors of these estimates account fully 
for the cross correlation and heteroskedasticity in firm disturbances. 
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4.0  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Table 2 provides industry classifications for the foreign issuers sample based on the two-digit 
North America Industry Classification System (NAICS). Panel A displays the industry 
distribution for the sub-samples of ADR and non-ADR listings. Foreign issuers are mainly from 
the manufacturing, mining & oil, and information industries. ADR and non-ADR foreign issuers 
are comparable in terms of their industry distribution. The mining-oil-gas extraction industry is 
slightly skewed toward non-ADR listings due to the number of Canadian firms from this industry 
utilizing the dual-listing program. Panel B displays the industry distribution for foreign issuers 
from legislations with Common Law versus Civil Law origins. Other than Canadian firms in the 
mining-oil-gas extraction industry contributing to the Common Law sub-sample, foreign issuers 
with Common and Civil Law origins are comparable in terms of their industry distribution. 
Table 3 provides the statistics for foreign issuers’ country distribution, percentage of 
ADR and non-ADR listings from each country, and listing weights within the country. Most of 
the foreign issuers are incorporated in Canada, England, Israel, the Netherlands and France. 
Approximately 60% of all non-ADRs are represented by Canadian firms, and 25% are 
represented by Israeli firms. Cross-listing through direct-listing is comparatively easier for these 
two legislations using the dual-listing option. Only Dutch firms have equal representation for 
both ADR and non-ADR listings. Issuances from most of the other countries seem to be highly 
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skewed, either to ADR or non-ADR listings. The ADR sample is mainly represented by firms 
incorporated in England, France and Japan, and these countries have low non-ADR listings. 
4.1 FIRM AND COUNTRY CHARACTERISTICS 
Table 4 provides summary statistics for growth, size, and risk-taking measures along with the 
other firm and country characteristics. Panel-A presents the statistics for the full sample. 
Approximately 42% of all foreign issuers are from legislations with a common law legal origin 
and 43% have a Shareholder Rights score below the median. Although the mean value is very 
close, the correlation between the ‘Legal Origin’ measure and ‘Shareholders Rights Score’ 
measure is only 0.53. Hence, approximately 42-43% of all foreign issuers are from weakly 
governed legislation by either measure. In 2001 U.S. dollar value, the average foreign issuer had 
a size of $18 billion in assets and $7.7 billion in market capitalization. The mean leverage for 
foreign issuers was around 40%, and they experienced a 4.6% ROA for the fiscal year 2001. The 
average market-to-book asset ratio was 1.86, and they experienced an average growth of 37% in 
sales. The average volatility in stock returns was 4.5% with a mean beta of 0.92. For firms with 
R&D expenses for fiscal year 2001, the average R&D-to-asset ratio was 8.3%, and they had on 
average a 6.5% capital expenditure-to-asset ratio. 
Panel-B displays the summary statistics for the sub-sample of legal origin. For countries 
with a Common Law legal origin, 80% have a Shareholder Rights score above the median. In 
general, two samples of foreign issuers which are slightly different from each other in terms of 
size, growth, and risk taking measures are comparable in terms of market risk, leverage, and 
capital expenditure-to-asset ratio. Interestingly, foreign issuers from Civil Law legislations are 
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larger in average size but generate more cash in terms of profitability and are slightly more 
leveraged. In terms of growth opportunities, the market-to-book ratio is comparable but slightly 
lower for Civil Law firms. They also experienced smaller growth in sales for the pre-SOX 
period. Moreover, in terms of risk measures, Common Law firms experience higher volatility in 
stock return and unsystematic risk. However, the mean ‘market beta’ is comparable between 
Common and Civil Law firms. Common Law firms also invest more in R&D and hold more cash 
relative to foreign issuers from Civil Law countries.  
Table 5 provides the Pearson correlation among firm and country-level characteristics 
used in the cross-sectional analysis. The correlation between Legal Origin and the Shareholder 
Rights score is 53.2%. As expected, risk-taking measures are positively correlated with each 
other; therefore, they are considered one at a time in the cross-sectional analysis. The 
profitability measure ROA is negatively correlated with all the risk-taking measures other than 
capital expenditure over asset. This suggests that firms at the high end of the risk-taking 
distribution are also generating less cash. This is consistent with these firms being early in their 
growth stage, exercising risky projects and not generating enough cash. Two size measures, total 
assets and market capitalization are also positively correlated, as expected. 
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4.2 THE SOX ACT AND MARKET REACTION TO ANNOUNCEMENTS 
4.2.1 Overall Market Performance of Foreign Issuers vs. U.S. and Global Indices 
As a first step in assessing the relationship between the SOX Act and shareholders’ value for 
foreign issuers, I examined the overall performance of the markets64 [The U.S. market is 
represented by the ‘S&P 500’ while Global Markets other than the U.S. are represented by the 
‘FTSE Index for Developed Countries, excluding U.S.’, and foreign issuers listed in the U.S. are 
represented by the ‘VW Cross-Listed Index’]. Figure 2 presents the Buy-and-Hold performance 
of a ‘value-weighted foreign issuers’ portfolio along with the ‘S&P 500’ and ‘FTSE index for 
Developed Countries excluding U.S.’ (FTSE index hereafter). Figure 3 displays the difference in 
Buy-and-Hold performances (i.e., BHAR) between each market for relative comparison. Market 
performances are calculated over the June 2001–August 2003 period, starting approximately 6 
months before the first SOX announcement and continuing to 6 months after the last 
announcement. The SOX legislative period is marked between Jan 17, 2002 and Jan 08, 2003. 
On average, the performance for the first six months before the SOX period is approximately -
5% for all markets. This level is marked in Figure 1, to infer Buy-and-Hold performance from 
Jan 17, 2002, the date of the first SOX-related announcement. 
                                                 
64 I also used the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) value weighted US index (vwretd) to 
represent the U.S. market; and the MSCI World Index excluding the U.S. to represent global markets, but the results 
are not sufficiently different to warrant presentation. Availability of the intraday S&P 500 returns motivates 
reporting the S&P 500 results for comparison with the intraday results. 
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There are three main observations that deserve further attention. First, over the six 
months prior to the SOX period, foreign issuer portfolio performance is comparable to both the 
S&P 500 and FTSE index. Even throughout the period following September 11th 2001, the 
foreign issuers’ performance follows that of the largest 500 U.S. firms. Later, both foreign firms’ 
and S&P 500 firms’ performance diverge from the FTSE Index through 2001 Fall, but they catch 
up in the following three months. 
Secondly, with S&P500 performing the worst, all three portfolios underperformed 
throughout the legislative year 2002. Over the year 2002, with U.S. capital markets going 
through scandals and regulative changes, S&P 500 buy-and-hold performance is around -20% 
and underperforms by -8% relative to both FTSE index and foreign issuers listed in the U.S. 
How much of this underperformance is associated with the regulative changes and is attributable 
to SOX announcements deserves further analysis. 
Finally, the performance of the foreign issuers’ portfolio also diverges from the FTSE 
index and mostly underperforms throughout the year 2002. However, the overall BHAR 
performances of these two indices are approximately the same around -12% by the end of 2002. 
Whether this deviation between the performance of foreign issuer portfolios and the FTSE index 
is associated with SOX announcements is an important question to be analyzed. 
4.2.2 Market Reaction to Individual Events – Daily Return Analysis 
The next step in my analysis is the market reaction to SOX related announcements, to see how 
much of the underperformance throughout the year 2002 is attributable to SOX announcements. 
Table 6 provides the market reaction on the 15 SOX related announcement dates. This list of 
SOX events includes four events that are excluded from later analysis which infer aggregate 
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market responses related to the SOX events. As discussed in the previous section, two of them 
are excluded because of other confounding events that reveal significant information for the U.S. 
market. In addition, two more are dropped due to highly expected outcomes65, such as the Senate 
passing the Sarbanes Bill by a 97-0 vote on July 16, 2002, and the President signing the Act on 
July 30, 2002. Reported results are consistent with the view that the market reactions for these 
highly expected events are not statistically significant, which is in line with the above argument.  
The SOX chronology used in this study covers 11 announcements related to the 
enactment of the SOX Act that reveal new information about the Act becoming law and is free of 
any confounding events. For statistical tests on the announcement dates, I follow Mitchell and 
Netter (1989) who studied the provisions of the House proposal triggering the 1987 stock market 
crash. Time series return data from pre- and post-event periods provide variance estimates to test 
the statistical significance. The source of the pre-event time series data is the 150 trading days 
preceding the first announcement on January 17, 2002, and the source of the post-event time-
series data is the 150 trading days following the last announcement on January 8, 2002. The post-
event time series data allow for a permanent increase in the variance of the stock returns due to 
the Act. This does not address the potential problem of increased variance during the event 
period. However, again following Mitchell and Netter (1989), I use an alternative estimate, 
suggested by Brown and Warner (1985), by doubling the variance based on nonevent time series 
data. All t-statistics with three different variance estimates are reported in Table 666. 
                                                 
65 As a robustness check, Section 6 reports the results including these announcements as well. 
66 T-statistics based on the pre-event period variance are reported in parenthesis, t-statistics based on the 
post-event period variance are in brackets, and t-statistics based on doubling the pre-event period are in braces 
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Index returns reported in columns 6-9 are average market reactions, but this does not 
consider the expected return given the trend in global markets. For this purpose, I use MVRM 
model with FTSE index excluding the U.S. market as a benchmark. Columns 10 & 11, “MVRM 
US” and “MVRM Frgn.” provide the excess returns for U.S. firms and the foreign issuers vis-à-
vis global markets. Since the MVRM model is estimated for equal-weighted portfolios, the test 
statistics addresses contemporaneous correlation. 
In Table 6, Panel A presents the results for the legislative announcements leading to the 
SOX Act, and Panel B covers the administrative events after SOX was signed by the President. 
An EW foreign issuer’s portfolio declined in value by -4.0% over 11 announcements that reveal 
new information about SOX Act becoming law and free of any confounding events. The EW 
U.S. index declined by -4.62% whereas the S&P 500 declined by -7.96%. This result is 
consistent with prior studies reporting considerable market value (unadjusted) lost by U.S. firms. 
Zhang (2007) reported unadjusted -12.53% to -15.35% shareholders’ value lost for her sample of 
U.S. firms and her events sample. 
Over the SOX announcement dates, Global Markets excluding the U.S. (represented by 
FTSE index) gained 2.53% on average. Relative to Global Markets, the S&P500 lost around -
10.49% (-7.96% - 2.53%), which is close to the index’s BHAR underperformance for the year 
2002 relative to the FTSE index. The EW portfolio of U.S. firms lost approximately -7.15% (-
4.62% - 2.53%), shareholders’ value on average over the SOX events, relative to the FTSE 
index. However this result does not hold using the MVRM approach as the expected return 
model. The EW U.S. portfolio’s daily market reaction is an insignificant 0.23% on average after 
accounting for the trend in Global Markets using the MVRM method. Using the MVRM 
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approach, an EW portfolio of foreign issuer’s daily market reaction is 1.95% on average, but not 
statistically. 
The market reaction analysis around SOX announcements is mixed, depending on the 
methodology used. However; the difference in average market reaction between foreign issuers 
and U.S. firms’ indices suggests possible bonding explanation in Hypothesis 3. 
Market Reaction to Individual SOX Announcements: 
As an extra step to assess the value effect of the Act, I analyzed the market reaction for 
each announcement. Market reactions for the two announcements excluded due to highly 
anticipated outcomes (Senate passing the Sarbanes Bill by 97-0 vote and the President signing 
the Bill) are not significant. Also, the excess return when the House passed the Oxley Bill on 24 
April, 2002, the same date Attorney General Eliot Spitzer addressed the Congress on analysts’ 
conflict of interest issues, is not significant. However, the market response when Chairman 
Harvey Pitt resigned on November 5, 2002, the same date as the U.S. general elections, is 
positive and significant for EW US both for index returns and MVRM regression. All these 
events are excluded from the overall market reaction and from cross-sectional analysis in the 
next section. 
The first SOX related announcement was on January 17 2002, when SEC chairman 
Harvet Pitt proposed changes to accounting industry oversight. The market response both for 
U.S. firms and foreign issuers is positive but not significant. The EW US and EW foreign 
issuers’ index gained 0.70% and 0.81%, respectively. Using MVRM, abnormal returns are only 
moderate and not significant at 0.07% and 0.23%, respectively. 
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Later when the H.R. Financial Service approved the proposal for the Oxley Bill by 49-12, 
average excess return for U.S. firms using MVRM is zero. Market reaction for foreign issuers is 
0.87% and also not statistically significant.  
Later when the Senate Banking committee approved the proposal for the Sarbanes Bill by 
17-4 on June 18, 2002, both foreign issuers' and U.S. firms’ portfolios are associated with -
0.04% and -0.18% market reaction respectively, but statistically insignificant. MVRM estimates 
are also similarly, negative and not significant. 
On June 25, 2002 at 18:26 EDT, WorldCom Inc. announced the fraud involving inflated 
EBITDA figures. The next day, both U.S. firms and foreign issuers are associated with negative, 
-0.84% and -1.19% index returns respectively, but they are not statistically significant. However, 
based on MVMR regression it is marginally significant for foreign issuers with a -1.10% return. 
The following day, the SEC approved the CEO/CFO certification due in mid-August for 
the fiscal year. Interestingly, the market reaction for this one-time certification is positive, on 
average, U.S. and foreign firms at 1.15% and 1.76% respectively, but not significant using 
different variance estimates. Since the FTSE index is also associated with a positive return on 
this date, the MVRM estimate is even lower and again not significant. This is consistent with the 
findings of Bhattacharya et al. (2006) that certification announcement is a non-event for their 
sample of U.S. firms. 
On July 16, 2002 when the House passed the amended Oxley Bill HR 5118 with stiffer 
punishments for wrongdoing, both foreign issuers’ portfolios and U.S. firms associated with 
insignificant negative reactions. S&P500 is associated with moderate negative market reaction of 
-1.84% but it is also not significant in statistical means. However, based on MVMR regression 
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excess return is positive and marginally significant for U.S. firms. This positive price reaction for 
U.S. firms is not consistent with the expected (-) sign. 
On July 25, 2002 when the conference committee report was agreed by the Senate and 
the House, both U.S. firms and the foreign issuers are associated with negative returns, -0.32% 
and -1.29% respectively, but not statistically significant. This report is the first document to 
reveal the details of SOX’s main sections including 404. Interestingly, the foreign issuers’ 
reaction is stronger than U.S. firms’, which maybe due to the fact that the conference report 
included an amendment for the definition of ‘issuer’ including foreign firms as well67. Another 
interesting observation is that the value-weighted index of 22 developed countries excluding the 
U.S. reacted positively and statistically significantly by 2.42% on the same date. 
As discussed earlier, administrative announcements following the passage of the Act are 
more important than legislative events in terms of compliance requirements and complications in 
practice. Two events after the SOX Act was signed and became law are especially critical for 
foreign issuers. These two announcements revealed critical information on SOX becoming 
mandatory for foreign issuers as well. On August 27, 2002 SEC approved the annual CEO/CFO 
certification requirement for all registered public firms including foreign firms. However, market 
returns are insignificant for foreign firms based on EW index and MVRM returns.  
                                                 
67 The Library of Congress Thomas: HR 3763 Major Legislative Actions http://www.congress.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d107:HR03763:@@@X Consideration CR H5462-5480 Roll No 358, 148 Congressional Record 
S6687, 7/25/2002 12:06 pm 
  59
The second surprise for foreign firms came on October 9, 2002, the next day following 
Pitt Harvey’s announcement after trading hours. Mr. Pitt admitted ‘limited room for maneuver’68 
for possible exemptions and the SEC Finance Division director Mr. Beller stating ‘foreign firms 
should live with it’69 were not welcomed by foreign firms. Foreign issuers’ market reaction for 
this event date is -1.93% and is statistically significant, which is consistent with the expected 
sign. Interestingly, EW U.S. firms and S&P500 also lost -2.43% and -2.73% respectively, a 
significant shareholders’ value on the same date. 
On October 16, 2002, the SEC proposed rules for Section 404, 406 and the 407 of the 
Act. Both U.S. and foreign firms declined by -1.16% and -0.99% respectively, but it is 
significant only for S&P500 with a -2.41% return. Although these rules are milestones for the 
SOX compliance requirement, it is arguable whether this announcement revealed any new 
information or not. 
And finally, the SEC proposed provisions to accommodate governance practices by 
foreign legislations on January 8, 2003. These provisions addressed mainly the concerns of 
German and Japanese firms, non-management employees and government representation serving 
on audit committees, along with other accommodations. However, the foreign issuers’ market 
reaction was insignificant for index and MVRM returns, -0.73% and 0.02% on respectively. 
Since these provisions do not disclose information related to U.S. firms, the market reaction by 
U.S. firms is insignificant with -0.66% and 0.13% for EW index and MVRM returns on this 
event date. 
                                                 
68 FT.com October 8th 2002, By ANDREW PARKER IN LONDON, ADRIAN MICHAELS IN NEW 
YORK AND FRANCESCO GUERRERA IN BRUSSELS. “SEC may exempt non-US accountants” 
69 FT.com October 8th 2002 by Lydia Adetunji “SEC rule to include foreign companies” 
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Overall, the findings on the individual events are weak to provide evidence to support 
Hypothesis 1, especially for MVMR estimates. The estimated daily index returns and the market 
reactions on SOX announcements are consistent with the expected signs and but very limited in 
statistically significance.  
4.2.3 Market Reaction to Individual Events – Intraday Analysis 
This section looks for empirical evidence on the change in shareholders’ value around specific 
SOX announcements using intraday returns. Five of the announcements related to SOX were 
made after the market had closed the prior trading day, and six were made during trading hours. 
To the extent that the market became immediately aware of the announcements and their 
implications, the market response for those six announcements should have occurred during the 
early trading hours. Even though the results are weak due to short event windows, the U.S. 
market represented by the S&P50070 and EW foreign issuers moved in the predicted direction 
with significant market reactions for S&P500 on WorldCom (25-Jun-02) and no exemption (08-
Oct-02) announcements. Overall, results for intraday price reaction are weak and statistically 
significant only for two critical events. 
                                                 
70 Availability of the intraday S&P 500 returns motivates using and reporting the S&P 500 results to 
represent U.S. market with the intraday results. Due to disproportionate value effects being more pronounced on 
small firms, a VW index will understate the overall value effect. 
  61
4.2.3.1 Intraday Methodology 
I followed the study by Mitchell and Netter (1989) to analyze the S&P 500 and foreign issuers’ 
portfolio reactions to SOX announcements at the intraday level. Appendix B.1 provides the exact 
time of the announcement for each event. For announcements during the trading hours, I 
calculated the 1-hour return after the announcement. For announcements after trading hours, I 
calculated the 3 hours return from 9:30a to 12:30p on the next trading day. For announcements 
made before trading hours, I use the 4-hour intraday return for the same trading day.  
A time series of intraday returns from pre and post-event periods provide variance 
estimates to test the statistical significance. Similar to daily return analysis, the pre-event period 
is 150 intraday trading periods before the first announcement and the post-event period is 150 
intraday trading periods following the last announcement. The post-event time series data allow 
for a permanent increase in the variance of the stock returns due to the Act. This does not address 
the potential problem of increased variance during the event period. However, I use an 
alternative suggested by Brown and Warner (1985) to double the variance based on a nonevent 
time series. In Table 6, t-values based on the pre-event period variance are in parentheses, t-
values based on the post-event period variance are in brackets, and t-values based on doubling 
the pre-event period are in braces. 
4.2.3.2 Intraday Market Reactions 
Columns 12 & 13 in Table 6 report the S&P 500 return and the EW foreign issuers’ portfolio 
from the close of the day of the announcement through 12:30p on the event day for 
announcements made after trading hours. Using the pre- and post-event period variances, the 
S&P return has the overall expected sign. However, it is statistically significant only for the two 
announcements that have the strongest daily reactions. 
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When WorldCom announced fraud on June 25, 2002 at 18:26, the S&P 500 declined by -
1.91% within the first 3 hours on June 26, 2002. It is significant at the 0.05 level using both pre-
event and post-event variance estimates. However, it is only marginally significant using the 
event induced variance estimate. Interestingly, the intraday market reaction is stronger than the 
daily return, which dropped by -0.27%. On the same announcement, the EW Foreign issuers’ 
portfolio is associated with -0.47% price reaction within the first 3 hours. This suggests that the 
market reacted in the anticipated direction during the first few hours and compounded the new 
information fairly quickly. 
Another interesting observation is on October 9, 2002 following the announcement by 
SEC’s Chairman Harvey Pitt who addressed foreign issuers' concerns for possible exemption. 
The S&P 500 declined by -1.78% during the first 3 trading hours and it is statistically significant 
at the 0.10 level. The EW portfolio of foreign issuers also lost -2.23% shareholders’ value but it 
is not statistically significant. The daily market reaction on the same date was -2.73% and -
1.93% for S&P 500 and foreign issuers respectively. Market reactions for both U.S. and foreign 
issuers’ portfolios have the expected sign and the average intraday reaction is less than the daily 
reaction. 
Although the market reactions are weak and not significant for other announcements, 
overall they have the expected sign. Test statistics using pre-event and post-event variance 
estimates are similar, which suggests no permanent shift in the variance of stock returns due to 
SOX announcements. As anticipated, using double the pre-event variance estimate to control for 
event-induced variance, test statistics are weaker.  
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Overall, the results using the intraday market reactions are weak and aligned with the 
findings for daily returns. The intraday returns are statistically significant only for two events, 
which is limited support for Hypothesis 1. 
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5.0  CROSS SECTIONAL ANALYSIS OF SHAREHOLDERS’ VALUE 
5.1 CHANGE IN SHAREHOLDERS’ VALUE AND FIRM & COUNTRY 
CHARACTERISTICS 
The focus in this section is on the determinants of average shareholders’ value lost due to SOX 
announcements. First, under the maintained hypothesis that stock prices correctly incorporate all 
the cost and benefit of the SOX Act, less negative overall response by foreign issuers relative to 
U.S. firms suggests the possibility of additional benefits for some foreign firms. Under 
Hypothesis 3, I argue that there are additional benefits for foreign firms from weakly governed 
legislations under the ‘Bonding Hypothesis’. Second, previous studies document a 
disproportionate net-effect for small, high-growth firms (Linck, Netter and Yang (2006), Kamar, 
Karaca-Mandic and Talley (2007)) and provide evidence for reduced risk taking behavior 
associated with SOX (Bargeron, Lehn and Zutter 2007, Litvak 2007a). I investigate the 
association between shareholders’ value and the cross-sectional characteristics at univariate and 
multivariate settings. 
5.1.1 Univariate Results 
Table 7 provides the cumulative abnormal return for the foreign issuers’ portfolio and the U.S. 
firms’ portfolio. Panel A provides the results for the subgroups of SOX compliance, non-
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complaint OTC listings versus SOX mandated listings on organized exchanges. Since OTC 
traded listings are not registered under the Securities Act of 1933, SOX compliance is not 
mandatory for these firms. Within the group of exchange-listed issues, Panel B displays the 
findings by the exchange listed: Amex, NASDAQ and NYSE. Along with the t-statistics for EW 
portfolios (t-car), I report t-statistics adjusted by the BMP approach (Appendix C.1) for event-
induced variance (t-scar), and further adjusted by the KP approach (Appendix C.2) for possible 
cross-correlation (t-scar adj) and the test statistics for the non-parametric Wilcoxon sign test. The 
percentage of observations with a positive reaction from non-parametric test helps to document 
whether the impact is widespread or not. 
Average market reaction by foreign issuers is -5.19% and statistically significant by all 
measures, even after fully accounting for possible cross-correlation. Approximately two thirds 
(67.98%) of all foreign issuers listed on exchanges lost shareholders’ value around SOX 
announcements. The average market reaction by OTC-listed foreign firms is positive but not 
statistically significant. Due to a small sample size for OTC-listed firms, statistical inference is 
limited for this group. 
Consistent with the findings for the overall market reaction from the previous section, 
U.S. firms react more negatively around SOX announcements than foreign firms using the event 
study approach. 72.33% of all exchange-listed U.S. firms had a negative market reaction, and 
lost -6.61% shareholders’ value on average, around SOX announcements. Findings for the 
exchange-listed U.S. firms are also statistically significant by all measures. Market reaction by 
OTC-listed U.S. firms is also negative, but it is weaker than the exchange-listed sub-group. 
Furthermore, Table 7 Panel B reports result for NYSE, NASDAQ or Amex-listed foreign 
issuers and U.S. firms along with the OTC-traded listings. Although OTC-listed U.S. firms’ 
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average market reaction is negative and statistically significant by some measures, statistical 
significance does not hold once the t-statistic is corrected for cross-correlation. The market 
reaction by the issuers listed on NASDAQ is higher than those listed on NYSE, but this spread is 
more pronounced for U.S. firms. This does not hold with Hypothesis 2 and is inconsistent with 
disproportionate size effect, since firms listed in NASDAQ are relatively smaller. Findings are 
statistically significant by all measures both for the foreign and U.S. samples. One interesting 
observation is that approximately 66% of NASDAQ listed U.S. firms and 63% of NASDAQ 
listed foreign firms react negatively, whereas it is approximately 84% and 73% respectively for 
those listed with NYSE. Hence, SOX impact seems to be more widespread in NYSE firms, and a 
negative market reaction is more likely for a typical NYSE firm than a NASDAQ-listed firm. 
Hypothesis 3-a argues that the net-effect of stricter disclosure and compliance 
requirements is a function of country level factors due to the inherited agency problems of 
country legislation and institutional environments. Therefore, by studying sub-groups of foreign 
issuers by their jurisdictions, I shed more light on the association between SOX events and 
foreign firms’ reactions to SOX announcements. 
Table 8 provides the mean CARs for the exchange-listed foreign issuers by country 
legislation proxy. I use LLSV (1998) classification to group each jurisdiction as being Common 
or Civil Legal origin. I also use the Shareholder Rights Score from LLSV (1998) as a country 
level investor protection proxy. Panel A presents the result for the sub-groups of home country 
legislation characteristics i.e. ‘Legal Origin’, and the Institutional environment measure, i.e. 
median ‘Shareholder Right Score’. In Panel B, results are provided for each country with at least 
three foreign issuers listed in U.S. exchanges. 
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Ordinal relation in price reaction across different institutional environments is mixed for 
investor protection and legal origin measures. Foreign issuers from Civil Law countries react 
more strongly and more negatively than issuers from Common Law countries. However, foreign 
firms from countries with above median shareholder rights score react more negatively than 
those from below median shareholder rights score. Results are significant by all measures, but 
for issuers from Civil legal origins and issuers from below median score countries, statistical 
significance is limited, once we adjust for t-statistics for cross-correlation. This suggests market 
reaction for these issuers from weak investor protection countries not being statistically different 
than zero. This observation is not inconsistent but mixed to support the ‘Bonding Hypothesis’ 
that stricter disclosure and compliance rules provide additional benefits for the listings from 
weakly governed capital markets.  
Further sub-groups of legal origin are also presented in Table 8 Panel A. Foreign issuers 
from the legislations with English legal origin lost an average market value of -4.95% around 
SOX announcements. A negative impact across this sample is widespread: approximately 67% 
of these firms reacted negatively. The market reactions for issuers from French and German 
originated legislations are stronger but not statistically significant for French legal origins once 
adjusted for cross correlation. Scandinavian firms’ market response is not significant but the 
sample size is limited for this group. Results for the country sub-groups (countries with at least 
three listings) are provided in Panel B. Overall results are consistent with the previous findings, 
but the sample size is limited for most of the countries. 
  68
5.1.2 Cross Sectional Analysis: Country-Firm Characteristics and Risk Taking Measures 
Using a multivariate setting, this section investigates the association between the average 
shareholders’ value lost around SOX announcements and the country and firm characteristics 
that are documented to be associated with SOX compliance costs and unintended consequences. 
I conduct a cross-sectional analysis to assess which firm-level and country-level characteristics 
are associated with a reduction in shareholders’ value. For this purpose, I implement the Sefcik 
and Thompson (1986) approach (discussed in Appendix C.3) in a MVRM setting to address the 
possible cross-correlation across abnormal returns so that the standard errors are not negatively 
biased. 
Table 9 presents the results for the size and growth measures after controlling for firm, 
industry, and country factors. All regressions control for leverage, ROA, and also country-level 
measures such as institutional environment, growth, and capital market development measures. 
All regressions include industry fixed effects to control for otherwise un-captured industry 
characteristics that are associated with the SOX Act's net effect. In panel A, I use the Shareholder 
Rights Score as a measure for institutional environment and a dummy variable equal to 1 for 
weakly governed legislation (foreign issuers from countries with Shareholder Rights Score 
below median). Size and growth opportunity factors also interact with this measure to allow the 
effect of firm characteristics to vary with the institutional environment. 
Among the control variables, the country-level growth measure ‘GDP Growth’ is 
negatively related to market reaction, as expected, and the coefficient is highly significant. This 
observation is consistent with Hypothesis 2’s implication for growth opportunities, and suggests 
that foreign firms from countries with better growth prospects experience more negative net 
effect due to SOX. This is consistent with SOX compliance having disproportionate effect on 
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high-growth firms. The country-level capital market measure Market Capitalization over GDP, 
which controls for financing opportunities in the home country, is not significant for any of the 
regressions. Similarly, coefficients on firm-level financial distress (leverage) and profitability 
measures (ROA) are not statistically significant. However, results for these firm-level control 
variables are consistent with previous studies (Zhang 2007, Smith 2006, Litvak 2007b) both in 
sign and statistical significance. 
Regressions 1-4 study the firm size measure and their association with the market 
reaction. Consistent with Litvak (2007b) but contrary to Hypothesis 2 and other studies (Kamar, 
Karaka-Mandic and Talley 2007, Linck, Netter and Yang 2006), the size measure is not 
positively related to the market reaction to SOX. Firm size measures (Log(Asset) and 
Log(Market Capitalization)) are negatively and significantly related with the average market 
reaction to SOX announcements. One possible explanation is that additional bonding benefit 
would be driven by some firm characteristics that are negatively associated with firm size. 
Regressions 2 & 4 include the ‘Shareholder Rights Score’ measure along with the interaction 
variable. The coefficient on the ‘Shareholder Rights Score’ variable is positive, consistent with 
the ‘Bonding Hypothesis’ explanation, but it is not statistically significant. This observation is 
not strong enough to support Hypothesis 3 and the bonding explanation, that the net effect of 
SOX is less negative for firms from weakly governed legislations. The coefficient for the size 
interaction term is not significant. Due to its lower correlation with other factors, the total assets 
value is used as firm size measure in other regressions. 
Regressions 5-10 analyze the firm level growth measures. As expected, coefficients for 
‘Sales Growth’ and ‘Market-to-Book’ measures are negative but they are not statistically 
significant. Yet, for the results not reported, these factors are significant at the 0.10 level when 
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the country-level growth measure (GDP growth) is excluded. Since foreign issuers are usually 
large and well established firms, insignificant coefficient for firm level growth measure would be 
due to limited variation across firms from the same country after controlling for country level 
growth opportunities. However, the negative coefficient on growth proxies, both at the country 
and firm level, is consistent with Wintoki (2007) and supports Hypothesis 2, suggesting that the 
firms that operate in uncertain environments face higher compliance costs as a result of uniform 
governance rules. Regressions 6–8 include the ‘Shareholder Rights Score’ measure along with 
the interaction variable. The coefficient on the ‘Shareholder Rights Score’ variable is positive but 
not statistically significant. The coefficient for the interaction with growth measures is not 
significant either. The positive sign for interaction with sales growth is consistent with 
Hypothesis 3-b, suggesting that foreign firms from weaker institutional environments and with a 
greater demand for financing, capitalizing more on the bonding benefit; but weak in statistical 
means to support. Due to its lower correlation with other factors, the ‘Market-to-Book’ measure 
is used as the firm-level growth proxy in other regressions. 
Panel B, presents the regression results using the Legal Origin as the institutional 
environment measure. This identifier defined as 1 for the issues from Civil Law legislations. 
Overall, the results are similar to Panel A with the Shareholder Rights Score measure. 
Coefficients for both of the firm size measures, total assets and the market capitalization are 
negative and statistically significant. The country-level growth measure ‘GDP Growth’ is 
negatively related to average market reaction, and the coefficient estimate is statistically 
significant. However, neither ‘the Sales Growth’ nor ‘Market-to-Book’ measure are statistically 
significant. The coefficient for ‘Leg Origin’ is positive but this difference in average market 
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reaction between well-governed legislations versus weakly governed legislations is not 
significantly different than zero, also with ‘Legal Origin’ measure. 
Table 10 presents my findings for the association between the risk taking measures and 
the change in shareholders’ value around SOX announcements. I employ stock-based and 
accounting-based risk taking measures, used by Bargeron, Lehn and Zutter (2007). As discussed 
in Section 3.1.2, accounting-based measures are the ratio of R&D expenditures to assets, the 
ratio of capital expenditures to assets, and the ratio of cash holdings to assets. Stock-based risk 
taking measures are the standard deviation of monthly stock returns, the estimated beta from the 
market model vis-à-vis the FTSE Global index, and the root mean square error from this market 
model. In addition to firm and country-level control variables used in the previous analysis, all 
regressions include size, growth, and institutional environment measures. Similar to the previous 
analysis, results are reported using industry-fixed effects to control for otherwise un-captured 
industry characteristics associated with the SOX net effect. 
Regressions 1-6 study the stock-based risk taking measures, along with the interaction 
variable with an institutional environment dummy. All market-based risk taking measures have 
negative but insignificant coefficients. The coefficient for the interaction variable is also negative 
and not statistically significant. Regressions 7-12 consider the risk taking measures based on 
accounting measures. Similar to stock-based measures, the coefficient estimates are not 
significant for measures either. Across all the regressions, the coefficient for the ‘Shareholder 
Rights Score’ variable is positive but not statistically significant. Findings for the firm size 
measure are the same as in the previous analysis, except for regressions 8-10, R&D and Capex 
ratio as risk taking measures. The coefficient for firm size is negative but not significant for these 
regressions. Results for other control variables are the same as for previous findings. 
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6.0  ROBUSTNESS AND ADDITIONAL TESTS 
I followed various stress tests to assess the robustness of the reported findings. Univariate results 
and the findings in regression analysis are robust to the choice of benchmark Global Index. For 
the results not reported, abnormal return estimates on SOX announcements and the CAR results 
do not change significantly if one employs ‘MSCI World Ex US’ index instead of ‘FTSE W 
World Ex US’.  
Furthermore, for the variance estimates in Table 6, I also computed variance estimates for 
shorter and longer periods surrounding the event window. Using 50, 100 and 200 trading days 
prior to January 17, 2002 and post January 8, 2002, the same four announcements are significant 
but at the 0.10 level.  
In addition, I repeated the analysis in Table 7 Panel A & B including the two SOX 
announcements with highly expected outcomes, i.e. the Senate passing the Sarbanes Bill by 97-0 
vote on July 15, 2002, and the President signing the Act on July 30, 2002. Reported results from 
Table 6 already provide insignificant market returns associated with these dates and suggest no 
new information being revealed with these announcements. Univariate results including these 
announcements are reported in Table 11 Panel A & B. Overall, the results are similar to those 
reported in Table 7. Average market reaction for exchange-listed firms being negative, it is less 
negative for foreign issuers relative to U.S. firms. Moreover, same as Table 7, firms listed in 
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NYSE are associated with more negative price reaction relative to NASDAQ firms, which is 
consistent with the negative coefficient for the size measure.  
Results based on LLSV (1998) measures are reported in Panel B of Table 11 and similar 
to Table 7 Panel A, and suggests mixed findings for foreign issuers from weakly governed 
institutional environments versus issuers from better governed environments. The legal origin 
measure suggests a contradicting -2.12% average difference in abnormal returns between Civil 
versus Common law issuers, whereas the Shareholder Rights Score measure suggests 
insignificant difference.  
Table 5 suggests possible correlation between La Porta et al. (1998) measures and the 
risk taking proxies I used, especially for the Legal Origin measure. Although I have used the 
Shareholder Rights score measure, which is correlated only with the Beta, as the institutional 
environment factor in Table 10, the coefficient estimates for the risk taking measures may be 
misstated due to this correlation. To assess the robustness of findings in Table 10 for risk taking 
measures, I repeated the analysis without the ‘Share Rights Sc.’ and the results are reported in 
Table 12. Overall, the coefficient estimates are similar to those in Table 10, with size measure 
having negative and significant coefficient, and risk measures having negative but insignificant 
coefficients. 
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7.0  CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
In this chapter, I study the shareholders’ value effect of SOX announcements on foreign firms 
using a sample of foreign issuers that were listed in the U.S. around the SOX period. My analysis 
on the average market reaction provides mixed evidence for Hypothesis 1. Findings based on 
index returns suggest that there is an overall reduction in shareholders’ value for foreign firms 
associated with the SOX announcements. However, the estimates based on MVMR regressions 
and intraday analyses are weaker in statistical significance. Overall individual SOX 
announcements are associated with the expected sign, but statistical significance is limited to few 
announcements only.  
Specifically, the change in shareholders’ value is different across firms and covariates 
with the firm characteristics (size, growth opportunities) but not significantly different based on 
the home country legislative characteristics.  Firm size is negatively related to the market 
reaction. This observation is not consistent with the Hypothesis 2 explanation that SOX has a 
disproportionate net effect on small firms. Association of growth opportunities is consistent with 
Hypothesis 2 and mainly captured by the country level growth prospect rather than the firm-level 
measure. The estimated coefficient is negative but statistically significant only for country-level 
GDP growth. Risk taking measures are associated negative but insignificant coefficients. 
Based on the univariate findings in Table 7 Panel A; relative to U.S. domestic firms, 
foreign firms’ excess return is less negative on average. Further multivariate analysis suggests 
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limited and insignificant findings for the bonding hypothesis. To this end, empirical evidence 
does not support Hypothesis 3. Average price reaction by cross-listed firms from countries with 
common-law origin and consequently better investor protection is not significantly different than 
firms from civil law originated jurisdictions and consequently weak investor protection.  
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CHAPTER 2 – ESSAY 2: THE SOX ACT AND THE INFORMATION ASYMMETRY 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and its impact on the capital markets attracted endless discussions 
throughout the year 2002 and has been debated even more since it became law on July 30, 2002. 
As discussed in Section 2.2 of the previous chapter, various studies provide empirical evidence 
for the transformation in U.S. equity markets as a result of this new set of rules.  
The majority of recent empirical studies have analyzed direct compliance costs, the value 
effect of the Act and corporate actions to adapt in the post-SOX era (e.g., see Asthana et al. 
(2004), Eldridge and Kealey (2005), Lick, Netter and Yang (2006)). Another series of papers 
studied the strategic responses of firms to free themselves from strict rules and additional costs 
associated with the SOX (e.g., see Engel, Hayes and Wang (2004), Leuz, Triantis and Wang 
(2007), Kamar, Karaca-Mandic and Talley (2007), Marosi and Massoud (2004)). However, an 
ill-conceived legislation and regulation can have unintended effects that extend well beyond the 
tangible dollars and cents that economists, accountants and policymakers may focus on71. 
Supporting this idea, another group of studies documented results relating to the unintended 
effects of new SOX-mandated requirements that throw in additional compliance costs for public 
firms in soft dollars (e.g., see Gifford and Howe (2004), Cohen, Dey and Lys (2007), Bargeron, 
Lehn and Zutter (2007)). One of these unintended effects is the gradual migration of security 
offerings overseas, especially to London. An additional stream of studies focused on this 
migration to the SOX-free environment in international markets, specifically the competition 
                                                 
71 AEI Peter J. Wallison, Sarbanes-Oxley Impairing Corporate Risk-taking (Cont.)? September 28, 2007  
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between U.K. and U.S. markets for international listings following the SOX Act (e.g., see 
Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2007), Piotroski and Srinivasan (2007)). 
Furthermore, another group of studies question the explicitly stated objective of the Act 
“to improve the accuracy and the reliability of corporate disclosures”72,73. The motivation to 
analyze whether or not this objective has been achieved has also spurred a number of studies that 
examined the implications of the SOX on the extent of earnings management and various aspects 
of public disclosure quality (e.g., see Cohen, Dey and Lys (2007), Lobo and Zhou (2006), Heflin 
and Hsu (2004), Entwistle, Feltham and Mbagwu (2006)), Begley, Cheng and Gao (2007)).  
My findings in this essay complement these studies that analyze the information 
environment after SOX, and extend the results related to foreign issuers. In particular, in this 
chapter, I empirically examine the forecast accuracy of analysts, disagreement among the 
analysts’ forecasts and the change in informativeness of earnings announcement. This work is 
mainly performed to shed light on the earnings-related information environment before and after 
SOX. In particular, I test for changes in forecast accuracy, dispersion among analysts’ forecasts 
and the informativeness of earnings announcements for foreign issuers relative to comparable 
U.S. firms, for periods before and after SOX.  
My analysis yields the following results: after extending previous findings to foreign 
firms, there is no significant improvement or deterioration in earning forecast accuracy for 
                                                 
72 “To protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to 
the securities laws, and for other purposes.” The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 PUBLIC LAW 107–204—JULY 30, 
2002, page 1. Available at http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/soa2002.pdf 
73 SEC Chairman William H. Donaldson’s Testimony Concerning the Impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act  
on April 21, 2005, http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/ts042105whd.htm  
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foreign issuers in the post-SOX era relative to the 1995-97 and 1998-2000 periods. This 
observation does not support H1-Null, but holds with H1-a. Moreover, the results are consistent 
with the Act’s enhanced disclosure requirements not contributing any additional information for 
the U.S. firms. For my sample of U.S. firms, I have found no evidence that the accuracy and the 
forecast dispersion improved in the post-SOX period. Partially aligned with Begley, Cheng and 
Gao (2007), I observe that the forecast accuracy and dispersion for U.S. firms has not 
significantly improved in the post-SOX period relative to 1995-97 and 1998-00. Moreover, my 
findings suggest that forecast accuracy and dispersion have not deteriorated either in the post-
SOX period relative to early periods. 
However, the findings on forecast dispersion suggest some improvement for the foreign 
issuers in the post-SOX period relative to both 1995-97 and 1998-2000 periods. Yet, this does 
not hold for the U.S. firm sample. Hence, the results are partially aligned with the H1-Null 
hypothesis for forecast dispersion, and suggest a significant improvement in forecast dispersion 
in the post-SOX period relative to the pre-SOX periods only for the foreign issuers. In addition, 
there is deterioration in both forecast accuracy and dispersion for the 1998-2000 period, which is 
statistically significant for both foreign issuers and comparable U.S. firms.  
Moreover, my analysis suggests that in the post-SOX period, there is no significant 
change in the informativeness of a given earnings surprise, which is consistent with Cohen, Dey 
and Lys (2007). In addition, my study extends their findings to foreign firms and documents that 
this observation also holds for foreign issuers. This does not support H2-Null, but it is consistent 
with the alternative H2-a. This result suggests that mandated governance rules and new section 
404 control systems have not improved the integrity of public information by lowering the risk 
of wrong practices and have not contributed to the information content of the earning 
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announcement. The results are robust and hold for alternative estimation periods and for an 
alternative information content measure used by Cohen, Dey and Lys (2007). 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: in Section 2, I review the literature on SOX 
with implications for information asymmetry and develop my hypotheses. In Section 3, I discuss 
the data and determinants of forecast accuracy, dispersion and the informativeness of a given 
surprise used in the study. In Section 4, I present the results for the univariate analysis and the 
findings from panel regression analysis. After the robustness assessment in Section 4.3 with an 
alternative information measure, I conclude my study in Section 5. 
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2.0  THE SARBANES OXLEY ACT OF 2002 AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR 
INFORMATION ASYMMETRY 
2.1 ENHANCED DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS, THE EARNING FORECAST 
AND THE INFORMATIVENESS OF A GIVEN SURPRISE 
Accurate and reliable information through disclosure is a major component of public equity that 
is required to alleviate the information discrepancy between management and outside investors. 
Therefore, the degree of information asymmetry between the management and the public 
investors can be eased by the extent of disclosure and the accuracy of this information. 
The benefits of more information and reliable disclosure have been extensively examined 
in previous literature (e.g., see Diamond and Verrecchia (1991)). In a study of disclosure 
policies, Lang and Lundholm (1996) document that firms with more informative disclosure 
policies, as measured by the ratings from the Financial Analysts Foundation, have more analyst 
following, less dispersion among individual analysts’ forecasts, and less volatility in forecast 
revisions. In line with these studies, Swaminathan (1991) documents improved forecasts by 
analysts and lowered dispersion among these forecasts following the implementation of the 
SEC’s line of business disclosure requirements for multiple-segment firms. Consistent with the 
idea that the increased disclosure and additional information reduce information asymmetries, 
Piotroski (1999) provides empirical evidence on the discretionary reporting. In this study, he 
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reports that the discretionary expansion of segment reporting is also associated with an increase 
in analysts’ forecast accuracy and a decrease in the forecast dispersion. 
However, as discussed by various studies, recent corporate scandals have raised concerns 
about the integrity of financial disclosure and information asymmetry between the management 
and investors (e.g., see Jain, Kim and Rezaee (2006), Rezaee (2002)). The Congress responded 
to these corporate failures by enacting the most far-reaching reform in business practices in the 
U.S., the SOX Act of 2002, which establishes enhanced disclosure requirements and a new 
internal control mechanism and mandates uniform governance rules.  
2.1.1 Related Literature 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, enacted in mid-2002 in the wake of the Enron and WorldCom 
scandals, aimed to improve the accuracy and reliability of corporate financial disclosures74. In 
addition to considerable interest in the value effect of SOX and the corporate reactions to free 
themselves, there are various studies that analyze the intended goal of the new law and the 
regulatory changes on the information environment in the U.S. capital market. In this chapter, I 
focus on whether the Act has served this so-called objective for the foreign issuers to improve 
investor confidence through enhanced disclosure requirements and to provide more accurate and 
reliable information.  
                                                 
74 “To protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to 
the securities laws, and for other purposes.” The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 PUBLIC LAW 107–204—JULY 30, 
2002, page 1. Available at http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/soa2002.pdf 
“The Law of Unintended Consequences?” by Mark Hulbert, The New York Times, 4 November 2007 
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In a study of information asymmetry related to the SOX, Jain, Kim and Rezaee (2006) 
documented wider bid-ask spreads, lower depths, and higher spreads in the period surrounding 
corporate scandals relative to post-SOX.  
Cohen, Dey and Lys (2007) documented an increasing trend in earnings management in 
the period prior to the passage of SOX over 1987-2001 and a reversal of it in the period after 
SOX. They also provided evidence that the absolute informativeness of earnings increased 
steadily over time, and that there was no significant change in the earnings informativeness 
following the passage of the SOX. Lobo and Zhou (2005) analyzed conservatism in financial 
reporting and documented less income-increasing earnings management in the year of CEO/CFO 
certification relative to the prior year. In line with Cohen et al (2007), they documented that the 
level of abnormal accruals is lower in the post-SOX period relative to pre-SOX. In addition, 
Heflin and Hsu (2004) found a significant decline in the probability that reported earnings meet 
or beat analysts’ forecasts in the post-SOX period.  
A different group of studies analyzed other aspects of the public disclosure in relation 
with the SOX mandated rules. In this regard, Entwistle, Feltham and Mbagwu (2006) 
documented a significant decline in the percentage of firms reporting pro-forma earnings 
following the SOX. Cohen, Dey and Lys (2007) documented a lower level of option-based 
compensation for the post-SOX period. Furthermore, Begley, Cheng and Gao (2007) studied the 
quality of the information in capital markets and association with the governance reforms. They 
documented that the passage of SOX was associated with a temporary increase in public and 
private information quality measures immediately following the Act’s adoption, but that this 
improvement was not maintained over a longer period. One year after the Act, private and public 
information quality both declined and continued to stay slightly below their pre-SOX levels. 
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However, they studied the information measures over the two year period after the enactment of 
SOX, relative to the year 2001. 
To sum up, papers that have studied the implications of SOX on the information available 
to investors provide conflicting results. Previous studies documented less earnings management 
practices in the post-SOX period. In terms of information accuracy, some studies report short-
lived (less than 1 year) improvements in quality measures, but comparable or deteriorated 
information measures in the longer horizon relative to the pre-SOX period. Moreover, these 
studies did not examine the change in the information environment in the post-SOX period, 
especially for the foreign issuers. Given the documented difference in market reaction around the 
SOX announcements for foreign issuers vs. U.S. firms in the previous chapter, it is important to 
analyze the transformation in the information environment after the SOX Act for foreign issuers 
relative to the U.S. firms. 
2.2 HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
The Act’s stated goal75 was to improve the quality of financial reporting and the investor 
confidence. The critics of SOX mainly point to the high costs of compliance, especially the 
implementation of the internal control mechanism, Section 404. The proponents of the SOX on 
the other hand, argue the improved financial disclosure as the payoff for the new procedures. 
The SOX Act is a complex legislation, containing an assortment of features with 
implications for the quality and the quantity of the information available to public investors. 
                                                 
75 See footnotes 60, 61and 62. 
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Although earnings-related information is not the only type of information SOX addresses, 
enhanced reporting is clearly a target in general, as demonstrated by the stated objective of the 
Act and by the sections aimed at addressing these issues.  
Regarding the extent of disclosure, Section 302(a) requires that a company's chief 
executive and chief financial officer personally certify the accuracy of its financial statements 
and Section 906 imposes stiff fines and penalties for reporting misleading financial data. 
Moreover, Section 401(a) requires enhanced disclosure for off-balance sheet transactions, which 
addresses the fraudulent practice by Enron Corporation.  
In addition, SOX also introduces new requirements that are aimed at improving the 
integrity and reliability of the information by eliminating wrongdoings and fraudulent practices. 
To serve this purpose regarding the integrity and the reliability, SOX imposes uniform 
governance rules with minimum levels of board and audit committee independence, requires a 
financial expert within the audit committee and requires the establishment and assessment of the 
internal control system. Specifically, SOX sections include a number of requirements for a 
corporation’s governance structure, like requiring that the board's audit committee be 
independent (Section 301-a) with a member with financial expertise (Section 407) and that the 
outside auditor have no conflicts of interest (Section 303). In addition, Section 501 of the SOX 
Act includes rules that address the conflict of interest by the securities analysts and their 
treatment by the Registered Securities Associations. These provisions mainly limit analysts’ 
roles in IPOs, eliminate their supervision by the broker and dealers in order to improve the 
objectivity of their research and provide investors with more useful and reliable information76. 
                                                 
76 The SOX Act, Section 501 Treatment Of Securities Analysts By Registered Securities Associations (a) 
Rules Regarding Securities Analysts 
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The Act imposes these and other strict rules regarding the composition of the board and 
sub-committees with implications on the level of disclosure and the information integrity of this 
information in the post-SOX era. These requirements are introduced with the idea that mandating 
uniform governance rules can detect and eliminate wrong practices and lead to public 
information quality and restore investor confidence. Based on this premise, I investigate the 
information quality for foreign issuers to shed light on whether the stated objective by the 
regulators is achieved and observed empirically in the market. Specifically, I examine 
information measures to detect possible structural changes in the forecast accuracy, disagreement 
among analysts to forecast earnings and the informativeness of a given surprise in the post-SOX 
period with enhanced disclosure and mandated governance rules. 
If SOX requirements with enhanced disclosure by public firms help more information to 
be disseminated to the market and help investors to access more accurate and reliable 
information, then analysts’ forecast will benefit from this improvement as well. Hence, in the 
post-SOX period, measures of forecast accuracy and the disagreement among analysts can reveal 
this shift in the extent of public information in the post-SOX era. Furthermore, if the mandated 
governance rules and the internal control mechanisms help to control wrongdoings by a firm’s 
management and to improve reliability of the available information, then one would expect 
informativeness of earnings to be improved in the post-SOX period where these rules are in 
place. 
In this regard, I focus on two research questions to empirically analyze whether the Act 
has achieved any reform in the information available to investors and the integrity of this 
information. First, I investigate the earnings forecast accuracy and the dispersion among 
analysts’ forecast in relation to the enhanced disclosure in the post-SOX period. Second, I 
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investigate the strength of the market reaction to earnings surprises (i.e., informativeness of 
earnings announcement) before the Act and for the post-SOX period with the mandated 
governance rules and internal control mechanisms in place. 
To the extent that the enhanced disclosure requirements introduced by the Act bring 
improved transparency for investors in the post-SOX period relative to early periods, it is likely 
that the information asymmetry would be less severe following SOX compliance. If SOX has led 
to more and better information being available, on average, the analyst's earning forecasts would 
be more accurate in the post-SOX period. Moreover, the dispersion among forecasts by 
individual analysts should be smaller as well. In sum, I propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1:  
H1-Null: If the Act serves the promised purpose to lessen the information asymmetry by 
providing more disclosure, firms will have smaller forecast errors and less dispersion among 
analysts’ forecasts. 
H1a-Alternative: If the SOX requirements do not serve the promised purpose, following 
the SOX Act, forecast accuracy and the dispersion among analysts’ forecasts will not be 
statistically different relative to the pre-SOX period. 
Furthermore, since the Act was mainly triggered by corporate scandals, including the 
fraudulent behavior by Enron and massive fraud by WorldCom, another objective was to address 
these issues by improving the integrity and the reliability of the information available to 
investors through new rules. Hence, I hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 2: 
H2-Null: If the SOX-mandated governance rules and the costly internal control 
mechanisms help to detect fraudulent behavior and to improve information integrity, then the 
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informativeness of a given earnings surprise, i.e., the ERC, will improve on average, implying 
larger ERCs  in the post-SOX period relative to pre-SOX. 
H2a-Alternative: If the SOX-mandated governance rules and the costly internal control 
mechanism do not have a significant contribution to detect fraudulent behavior and to improve 
integrity, then the informativeness of a given earnings surprise, i.e., the ERC, will not be 
significantly different in the post-SOX period relative to pre-SOX era. 
Using the sample of foreign issuers and the sample of U.S. firms comparable in market 
capitalization, I test the hypotheses listed above that relate the change over time in forecast 
accuracy, dispersion and the ERC in the post-SOX period after accounting for firm 
characteristics and other determinants. I use a sample of foreign issuers listed in the U.S. 
exchanges over the 1995-2005 period, excluding the 2001-02 period of corporate scandals and 
legislative events. I conduct my analysis by dividing the sample period into three periods, similar 
to Bargeron, Lehn and Zutter (2007), by subdividing the pre-SOX period into two sub-periods. 
This approach not only provides more evidence, but also provides robustness for the results due 
to the shortcomings of a ‘comparison over time’ methodology. For the post-SOX period, I focus 
on the three year 2003-05 period. This allows entirely capturing the effects of SOX’s gradual 
implementation and being fully effective77. 
                                                 
77 Mandated audit committee rules were not effective until 2004. 
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3.0  SAMPLE AND THE EMPIRICAL DESIGN 
3.1 SAMPLE 
I use my sample of foreign issuers as discussed in Chapter 2, Section 3.1.1. This sample of 
foreign issuers includes ADRs and other foreign listings excluding Investment Funds, Investment 
Trusts and issuers from countries known as tax havens. The sample period is over Jan/1995-
Dec/2000 and Jan/2003-Dec/2005. Following the study by Bargeron, Lehn and Zutter (2007), I 
exclude the interim period of Jan/2001-Dec/2002 due to the corporate scandals and SOX 
legislative events surrounding the U.S. markets. Moreover, since Regulation Fair Disclosure 
(Reg. FD) went into effect in 2000-Q4 (October 23, 2000), eliminating two years of observation 
partially addresses the possible effect of this confounding event. I carry out a matched sample 
design and form a sample of U.S matching firms for each 3-year period. For the matching sample 
of U.S. firms, I require that each firm has Compustat and CRSP data and I/B/E/S analysts 
forecast data with a minimum of three analysts providing forecasts. For the first observation in 
each period, each foreign issuer is matched with a U.S. firm that has the closest market 
capitalization with a maximum of 20% difference. Over this 3-year period, the matching firm is 
the same unless it gets de-listed or dropped from the data sources. For the few cases like this, I 
use the second best match for the remaining years in that 3-year period. I repeat this procedure 
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for each period. As a result, foreign issuers may have a different matching firm for different 
periods. 
My primary source of data for the information related measures is the ‘Institutional 
Brokers Estimates System’, i.e., the I/B/E/S database. As the consensus forecast, I use the 
median forecast for earnings per share (EPS) reported for the month closest to, but preceding 
with maximum of 3 months, the date in which actual earnings are released. For my sample, I 
require that each firm has a minimum of three analysts providing forecasts. For the foreign 
issuers (mostly Canadian issuers) that report financial statements denominated by different 
currencies, I adjust actual and median EPS forecasts by reporting currency/U.S. dollar parity 
from the I/B/E/S database.  
All firm characteristics constructed from the Compustat database are measured at the end 
of the fiscal year preceding the year of forecast. Then, I cross reference my sample with CRSP 
for the price data. For consistency between CRSP stock prices and EPS data from I/B/E/S, I 
further adjust actual and median EPS forecasts using stock split factors. Hence, I use currency 
adjusted pre-split forecasts and actual reported values in my analysis. 
3.2 EMPIRICAL DESIGN 
To the extent that the enhanced disclosure requirements introduced by the Act bring 
improved transparency for investors in the post-SOX period relative to early periods, it is 
expected that the information asymmetry issue will be less severe following the SOX Act. If 
SOX has led to more and better information being available, on average, the analyst's earnings 
  92
forecast would be more accurate in the post-SOX period. Moreover, the dispersion in forecasts 
among individual analysts should be smaller as well. 
For my univariate analysis, I first examine the mean and median measures of forecast 
accuracy, dispersion and other measures for foreign issuers and U.S. matches for the periods 
before and after the enactment of the SOX Act. Next, I investigate the change over time in a 
multivariate regression setting after accounting for confounding changes in firm characteristics. 
As a first step, a separate regression is estimated for each 3-year period. In the second step, I use 
the same specifications with time fixed effects to capture the average change over different 
periods. 
3.2.1 Forecast Accuracy and Dispersion 
As proxies for asymmetric information, I use the accuracy of consensus forecasts and the 
dispersion among forecasts, same as Thomas (2002). These measures are based on the most 
recent observation in a [-3,-1] month window prior to the earnings announcement date. Similar to 
Thomas (2002), I analyze the forecast characteristics for the shortest possible forecasting horizon 
in order to minimize the optimism bias that appears to exist in forecasts made early in the fiscal 
year. (e.g., see O’Brien (1988), Easterwood and Nutt (1999)). 
In addition, Barron, Kim, Lim and Stevens (1998) show that mean forecast error and 
mean dispersion are also (inverse) functions of the quality of public and private information. To 
this extent, as common in the literature, forecast error and forecast dispersion are also used as 
proxies for public and private information quality, respectively. (e.g., see, Begley, Cheng and 
Gao (2007)). 
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Forecast Error, the primary measure of information asymmetry, is computed as the 
absolute difference between the actual earnings and the median forecast divided by the stock 
price five days78 before the earnings announcement date. Periods with more transparency and 
firms with a larger difference in information asymmetry between managers and outsiders 
regarding earnings are expected to be associated with larger forecast errors. As an alternative 
measure, I use forecast dispersion, which is computed as the standard deviation of analysts’ 
forecasts deflated by the stock price five days before the earnings announcement date. This 
measure accounts for the disagreement among analysts, which can result from lack of available 
information about the firm. Hence, larger information asymmetry is expected to be associated 
with greater dispersion. As mentioned before, these forecast measures, analysts’ forecast errors 
and the forecast dispersion are also used as information quality measures, with forecast errors 
being used to judge the public information quality and dispersion used to judge the private 
information quality (Barron et al. (2002), Gu (2004)). 
In regression analysis, I include firm characteristics that are documented by prior studies 
to be related with these forecast measures. As documented by the previous literature (Atiase 
(1985), Barron et al. (2002)), larger firms attract more analysts following, and more information 
available about them. In addition, smaller firms are more likely to suffer from the asymmetric 
information and bad reporting quality. As a result, if there is any potential benefit they should 
benefit the most from these new rules. Hence, a firm’s size is expected to be positively 
associated with the forecast accuracy and negatively with the forecast dispersion. As a measure 
of firm size, I include log of book value of total assets (BA) at the end of the previous fiscal year. 
                                                 
78 I use market price ten days before the announcement date if the price five days before is missing. 
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Same as Alford and Berger (1999), I use volatility of residuals as a proxy for the price 
relevant information about the firm disseminated daily to the market. A volatility measure is 
computed as the standard deviation of the market model residuals over the regression period [-
210,-11] days before the earnings announcement. Alford and Berger (1999) argue that as 
volatility increases, the amount of price relevant information that analysts must process also goes 
up and that an analyst’s ability to forecast earnings declines. Therefore, firms with higher stock 
price volatility are expected to have greater forecast error and dispersion. 
Another important factor for the information available for valuation is the growth 
options. Firms with more growth potential relative to firms whose values are mainly due to asset-
in-place are more difficult to forecast earnings for. Hence these firms are expected to have larger 
forecast errors and more analyst disagreement. As a proxy, I include the R&D79 expense to Sales 
ratio and Intangible Assets to Total Assets ratio in my analysis. 
Due to leverage effect on volatility of earnings, firms with more leverage are expected to 
have less accurate forecasts and higher dispersion among analysts. Thus, I also include the 
leverage that is computed as the long-term debt and debt in current liabilities divided by the total 
assets. 
I also include an identifier for the foreign issuers to control the difference in foreign 
forecast accuracy and forecast dispersion between foreign and U.S. firms. In aggregate 
regressions over all the periods, I include identifiers for different periods and a FOREIGN 
dummy variable is interacted with these variables for different periods, to analyze the change in 
the post-SOX period. Hypothesis 1-Null expects the identifier for the 2003-05 post-SOX period 
                                                 
79 For the analysis with R&D/Sales ratio, sample size is limited to the firms with non-missing R&D 
expense for that fiscal year. 
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to be negative if the forecast accuracy is higher and dispersion is lower in the post-SOX period 
relative to the 1995-98 pre-SOX period. If this structural change in accuracy and dispersion is 
observed differently for the foreign issuers, then the interacted FOREIGN variable will provide 
evidence for this. On the other hand, Hypothesis 1-a suggests insignificant coefficients for the 
post-SOX variables if the forecast accuracy and the dispersion have not changed significantly for 
the 2003-05 period. 
3.2.2 Price Impact of Earnings Surprises 
As discussed by Dierkens (1991), a strong market reaction to an earnings announcement 
is consistent with the managers of that firm releasing substantial private information and the 
existence of a large information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders for that firm. 
Furthermore, models of time-varying asymmetric information often characterize the periods 
immediately after earnings announcements as low information asymmetry periods. This is 
consistent with earnings announcements eliminating much of the asymmetry that existed prior to 
the release. Korajczyk et al. (1991) provide empirical evidence on this, and document that stock 
price declines at announcements of seasoned equity offerings increase in the time since the last 
earnings release. This measure called ERC is the association between earnings surprises and the 
abnormal return around earnings announcement and it captures the “informativeness of a given 
surprise”. It is also used a proxy for “the quality of earnings” (e.g., see Cohen, Dey and Lys 
(2007)). 
I followed Thomas (2002), to assess the informativeness of earnings announcements for 
stock prices. For this purpose, I estimate abnormal returns (ARs) for 3-day windows centered on 
the annual earnings announcement dates using an event study methodology. For the market 
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model, I use the firm’s daily stock returns and the FTSE Index similar to the analysis in Chapter 
2. The estimation period is [-210,-11] days before the earnings announcement where day 0 is the 
announcement date. To assess the magnitude of the market reaction, I use the absolute value of 
the 3-day cumulative abnormal return |CAR| as a non-directional measure. 
I regress |CAR| on factors that could impact the market’s reaction to earnings 
announcements over the pre-SOX and post-SOX periods. Moreover, I include interaction terms 
to assess whether the ERC deteriorated or increased in the post-SOX period. As discussed by 
Thomas (2002), the magnitude of the earnings surprise and the ex-ante dispersion will influence 
the market’s reaction. Therefore, the ERROR and DISPERSION measures are included in 
regressions. As discussed by Beaver et al. (1979), greater earnings surprises are expected to be 
associated with bigger market reactions. Similarly, greater dispersion among analysts’ forecasts 
is expected to be associated with larger market reactions. I also include an interaction term of 
post-SOX with ERROR, to assess the impact of additional SOX disclosure requirements on the 
ERC. I expect that the coefficient for the ERROR interacted with the post-SOX period, to be 
significantly positive if the reliability of the earnings-related announcements improved in the 
post-SOX period, and not significantly different if there is no significant change. Hypothesis 2-
Null expects identifier for the 2003-05 post-SOX period to be positive if the informativeness of 
earnings announcements improved due to more reliable information in the post-SOX period, 
relative to the 1995-98 pre-SOX period. If this change in accuracy and dispersion is observed to 
be different for foreign issuers, then the interacted FOREIGN variable will provide evidence for 
this. Hypothesis 2-a suggests an insignificant coefficient for the ERROR*2003-05 variable if the 
informativeness of a given surprise is not significantly different when compared to the earlier 
periods. 
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Other factors used in the analysis to explain market reactions associated with earning 
announcements are primarily from the ERC literature. Easton and Zmijewski (1989) argue that 
constraining the ERC to be the same across all firms can lead to other factors to be significant 
because they are correlated with cross-sectional variation in ERC. Hence, I include similar 
interaction terms of the ERC and cross-sectional determinants of the ERC used in Thomas 
(2002). Among these cross-sectional determinants are growth opportunities, firm size and 
financial risk. As a proxy for growth opportunities, I use market-to-book ratio (MTB), computed 
as the ratio of the firm’s market value (market value of equity (ME) plus the book value of total 
assets (BA) minus the book value of equity (BE) divided by the book value of total assets (BA)). 
As a proxy for firm size, I include the market value of equity at the end of the previous fiscal 
year (ME). As a measure of financial risk, I include leverage, computed as the ratio of long-term 
debt plus debt in current liabilities and total assets. 
I use the same explanatory variables for individual regressions for each 3-year period, 
and aggregate regressions over all periods. In order to assess the change in relation over time 
between the market reaction and cross-sectional determinants, I include interaction terms of 
these factors with identifiers for each 3-year period.  
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4.0  RESULTS 
4.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND UNIVARIATE ANALYSIS 
Table 13 reports the summary statistics, the mean and median values for the information 
measures, firm characteristics for foreign issuers and the comparable U.S. firms for each period. 
Observations are winsorized by 1% and 99% percentiles using CAR, ERROR (computed as the 
absolute difference between actual and forecast earnings, deflated by the stock price before the 
earnings announcement) and DISPERSION (the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts, 
deflated by the stock price before the earnings announcement) measures. Test results are 
provided for the Paired t-test and the Wilcoxon Signed Rank Sum test (the non-parametric 
version of a paired sample t-test) for the difference in mean and median values between two 
groups of firms. 
In terms of firm characteristics, sample of foreign issuers and their comparable U.S. 
matches are similar in market value of equity, as expected due to the matching method, and also 
comparable in asset size, market-to-book ratio, leverage and the R&D expenditure levels. 
However, foreign issuers have a smaller intangible assets ratio on average relative to their U.S. 
matches. On average, foreign firms have 5% - 13% intangible assets over the years 1995 - 00 and 
2003 – 05 whereas U.S. firms have 9% - 17% on average. The difference in intangible assets as a 
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ratio of the total assets, is statistically significant for all periods, both in mean and median 
measures.  
Consistent with relatively less public information available and fewer analysts following 
foreign issuers, forecast accuracy and dispersion among analysts is poor for foreign firms relative 
to U.S. firms on average. This difference is highly significant in both mean and median values 
for all periods. Average forecast error for foreign issuers ranges between 1.01% - 1.46%, 
whereas for U.S. matches it is around 0.32% - 0.61%. Average forecast dispersion among 
analysts has a similar pattern as well, ranging between 0.69% - 1.26% for foreign issuers and 
around 0.24% - 0.39% for their U.S. matches. However, the absolute value of market reaction to 
an earnings announcement has a different trend, ranging between 3.6% - 5.3% for foreign issuers 
and 4.3% - 5.3% for U.S. firms. The difference in market reaction is not significantly different in 
general, except for the 1995-97 period. For that period, the absolute market reaction of foreign 
issuers is less than that of U.S. firms in mean and median values, and it is statistically significant. 
In line with the amount of price-relevant information for foreign issuers that analysts must 
process, the volatility of the market model residuals is also higher on average for foreign issuers, 
and statistically significant except for the recent post-SOX period of 2003-05.  
Regarding the trend over time across different periods, forecast error and dispersion 
among analysts is highest over the 1998-00 period and goes back to the same level in 2003-05 as 
in the early 1995-97 period. This trend is similar for U.S. matches as well. However, the residual 
volatility over the estimation period and over the 3-day window period around the earnings 
announcement is also highest for the 1998-00 period relative to the earlier 1995-97 period and 
the 2003-05 post-SOX period. The absolute value of market reaction at earning announcements 
presents the same pattern as well. Taken together, these results indicate a variation over time in 
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forecast accuracy, dispersion and firm characteristics, but do not suggest a significant 
improvement or deterioration in information measures in the post-SOX period relative to the 
early pre-SOX period between 1995-97. However, univariate results do not control for the 
variation in firm characteristics over different periods. Regression analyses, especially the panel 
regressions in the next section, address this issue. To account for the change in levels over time, I 
use time fixed effects. I also interacted these time effects with explanatory factors to capture the 
overtime variation in association between the explanatory variables and information measures. 
Section 4.2 is devoted to that purpose and discusses the findings for the regression analysis. In 
addition, due to a significant difference in the level of information measures and average market 
reaction, I include the dummy variable for the foreign issuers in multivariate regressions to 
capture the difference in the amount of information available for the two groups. Moreover, as 
discussed earlier, I interact this variable with the forecast accuracy measure ‘ERROR’, to assess 
the marginal difference in ERC between foreign and U.S. firms. 
4.2 REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
To ensure that the results for the univariate analysis are not driven by confounding 
changes in firm characteristics, this section discusses the findings of the regression analysis for 
the information measures. Table 14 presents the Pearson correlations for the variables used in 
regression analysis, namely the information measures and firm characteristics. Consistent with 
the univariate results, correlation values suggest that foreign issuers have lower absolute 
abnormal returns around earnings announcements, a smaller standard deviation of abnormal 
return, market-to-book ratio and Intangible Assets ratios. But they are associated with higher 
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residual volatility, ERROR and DISPERSION measures. These results are in line with foreign 
firms, everything else equal, being less information transparent in nature. In addition, 
information measures, the forecast accuracy measure ERROR, and DISPERSION as a measure 
of disagreement among analysts are highly positively correlated. In addition, various firm 
characteristics are significantly correlated with each other. As expected, firm size measures, 
book value of assets ‘log(BA)’ and the market value of equity ‘log(ME)’ are significantly 
positively correlated. In addition, a negative correlation between firm size measures with the 
residual volatility, magnitude of market reaction at earnings announcement ‘|CAR|’ and the 
standard deviation of abnormal return ‘AR sigma’, is consistent with smaller firms having a 
more volatile price, and more price-relevant private information to be processed by analysts.  
4.2.1 Determinants of Forecast Accuracy 
Table 15 displays the regression results to analyze analysts’ forecast error and dispersion. 
Panel A corresponds to the results for the regressions to explain forecast accuracy, ERROR. In 
the first regression, the only explanatory variable is the FOREIGN identifier. The coefficient on 
FOREIGN is positive and highly significant. Not surprisingly, this is consistent with relatively 
less information being available for foreign issuers and as a result analysts’ forecasts for foreign 
firms being less accurate on average then U.S. firms. Over different periods, the estimated 
coefficient is comparable for the early 1995-97 period and the 2003-05 post-SOX period, and it 
is higher for the 1998-00 period. Regression analysis over all periods shed more light on the 
significance of these changes over time. Interestingly, this single explanatory variable can 
explain around 3% - 5% variation in the forecast accuracy measure ERROR. 
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Other regressions introduce firm characteristics used in prior literature that might 
influence analysts’ forecast accuracy. The ln(BA) size measure is introduced in regression 2. A 
negative and statistically significant coefficient on firm size is consistent with larger firms 
attracting more analysts, having more information available and experiencing greater accuracy in 
the earning forecasts. In regression 3, the R&D/Sales ratio is introduced along with the dummy 
variable for the missing R&D value. The level of R&D spending does not appear to be related to 
the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts. A positive and significant coefficient for the dummy variable 
indicates a higher forecast error, on average, for firms with missing R&D expenditure. 
Leverage is introduced in regression 4. The coefficient on this variable is positive and 
statistically significant for all periods, with an increasing coefficient and significance over time. 
This is consistent with firms with higher leverage getting less accurate forecasts from analysts on 
average. Moreover, the increasing trend is indicative of an increasing association between the 
financial risk measure LEVERAGE and forecast accuracy in the most recent period. In 
regression 5, the natural log of one plus the ratio of intangible assets to total assets is included in 
the analysis. Intangible assets do not appear to be significantly associated with the forecast 
accuracy for earlier periods. A negative coefficient is consistent with the prior literature (Thomas 
(2002)) and indicates that firms with more intangible assets get more accurate forecasts from 
analysts. However, the estimated coefficient is significant only for the 2003-05 post-SOX period. 
In regression 6, residual volatility is introduced as a price relevant information measure. 
VOLATILITY is an important factor to explain the forecast accuracy especially for the 2003-05 
post-SOX period, as evidenced by the apparent improvement in the adjusted R-sq, high statistical 
significance and the increase in the estimated coefficient. Firms with greater volatility have 
larger forecast errors as demonstrated by the positive and significant coefficient on volatility, 
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which is consistent with previous studies (e.g., see Comment and Jarrell (1995)). The coefficient 
on firm size becomes insignificant when volatility is introduced, except for the 2003-05 post-
SOX period, which is also observed in previous studies. This suggests that the volatility captures 
the variation in the forecast accuracy that is attributable to the cross-sectional variation in firm 
size. This is expected due to a high correlation between size measures and the VOLATILITY. 
In addition to separate regressions for each period, I conduct regression analysis over all 
periods. Table 16 displays the results for the aggregate regressions for forecast accuracy over all 
periods with time effects. Explanatory variables are interacted with the time effects for these 
regressions to assess the change in linear association over time. If the average forecast accuracy 
improved in the post-SOX period as a result of enhanced disclosure available in this period, H1-
Null hypothesis suggests a negative and statistically significant coefficient for the post-SOX 
coefficient. This coefficient should also be greater than the coefficient for the 1998-00 period in 
absolute value. As an alternative explanation, H1-a expects an insignificant change in forecast 
accuracy for the post-SOX period relative to earlier periods. Moreover, the coefficient for the 
interaction term FOREIGN*2003-05 captures the difference in improvement between foreign 
issuers vs. U.S. firms if there is an improvement in forecast accuracy in the post-SOX period. 
In the first regression to explain forecast accuracy measure ERROR, I introduce dummy 
variables for each period in addition to FOREIGN, the foreign firm identifier. Similar to the 
results in Table 14 Panel-A, the coefficient on FOREIGN is positive and highly significant, 
which is consistent with analysts’ forecasts for foreign firms being less accurate, by 60bps on 
average, than their U.S. counterparts over all periods. The positive coefficient on the dummy 
variable for the 1998-00 period suggests an average deterioration of approximately 40bps for all 
firms over this period. Forecast accuracy for the 2003-05 post-SOX period is not statistically 
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significant compared to the earlier 1995-97 pre-SOX period. This is not consistent with H1-Null 
but is in line with H1-a. 
Regression 2 introduces additional variables; FOREIGN identifier interacted with the 
time effects. The FOREIGN*1998-00 variable is positive and significant, and the estimated 
coefficient is 40bps. Hence, the deterioration in accuracy for the 1998-00 period is attributable 
mostly to foreign issuers rather than U.S. firms, as evidenced by the insignificant coefficient on 
the 1998-00 variable when FOREIGN*1998-00 is introduced. Hence, the discrepancy in forecast 
accuracy between foreign vs. U.S. firms deteriorates an additional 40 bps in the 1998-00 period. 
The ln(BA) size measure is incorporated in regression 3. Consistent with the results from 
Table 15, a negative and statistically significant coefficient on the firm size is consistent with 
larger firms experiencing greater forecast accuracy. Regression 4 introduces ln (BA) interacted 
with the dummy variable for each period. The coefficient for the interacted ln(BA) is negative 
and significant for the 1998-00 period, suggesting that the discrepancy in forecast accuracy for 
small versus large firms is wider in this period relative to the 1995-97 period. 
R&D/Sales ratio and the dummy variable for the missing observations are introduced in 
regression 5, and R&D/Sales ratio interacted with the time effects in regression 6. The level of 
R&D spending does not appear to be related to the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts for any of the 
periods. In line with the results in Table 14 Panel A, a positive and significant coefficient for the 
dummy variable indicates a higher forecast error, 20-30 bps on average, for firms with missing 
R&D expenditure. 
I include LEVERAGE as the financial risk measure in regression 7. The coefficient is 
positive and significant for the LEVERAGE. This is consistent with firms with higher leverage 
having less accurate forecasts from analysts. In regression 8, I introduce the interacted variables. 
  105
The coefficient for the LEVERAGE*2003-05 variable is positive and highly significant. 
Consistent with previous results, leverage becomes more important as a factor to explain forecast 
accuracy in the post-SOX 2003-05 period. 
Regression 9 introduces the intangible assets ratio (i.e., natural log of one plus the ratio of 
intangible assets over total assets). A negative and significant coefficient is consistent with the 
prior studies (e.g., see, Barth et al. (1998), Thomas (2002)) and suggests that the quality of 
forecasts by analysts vary with the degree to which a firm’s value is comprised of tangible assets. 
However, when the interaction variables are included in regression 10, the coefficient for the 
intangible assets ratio is still negative but insignificant. 
Regression 11 introduces the residual volatility. The coefficient for the VOLATILITY is 
positive and highly significant. This is consistent with firms with greater price-relevant 
information experiencing larger forecast errors. Similar to findings in Table 14, due to high 
correlation, the coefficient on firm size becomes insignificant when volatility is introduced. In 
regression 12, I introduce a volatility measure interacted with the dummy variable for the 1998-
00 and 2003-05 periods. Volatility is a more important factor to explain forecast accuracy for the 
post-SOX period as demonstrated by a positive and significant coefficient for 
VOLATILITY*2003-05. In addition, there is a considerable increase in adjusted R-sq once the 
volatility measure is introduced in the analysis. 
Overall, the results in Table 15 suggest some improvement in forecast accuracy in the 
post-SOX period relative to the previous 1998-2000 period. However, this improvement cannot 
be attributable to SOX requirements, because this level of forecast accuracy is not significantly 
different from the early pre-SOX period of 1995-97, as evidenced by the insignificant coefficient 
for the ‘2003-05’ variable. Hence, the results are inconsistent with H1-Null and suggest no 
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significant improvement or deterioration in forecast accuracy relative to the early pre-SOX 
period of 1995-97 which is in line with H1-a. Hence, the findings consistently suggest that the 
SOX mandated disclosure rules are not significantly more effective in providing additional 
information to investors than the 1995-97 period without any regulatory inference. However, 
there is a significant deterioration in forecast accuracy for 2003-05, especially for foreign issuers. 
4.2.2 Determinants of Forecast Dispersion 
Table 15 Panel B reports the results for the regressions to analyze dispersion among 
analysts’ forecasts as the information asymmetry measure. Overall, the results are similar to the 
forecast accuracy analysis. In the first regression, the only explanatory variable is the foreign 
issuer identifier. The coefficient on the FOREIGN identifier is positive and highly significant. 
This is consistent with relatively less information transparency for the foreign issuers and 
suggests higher disagreement among analysts’ forecasts as a result. The estimated discrepancy is 
comparable for the early 1995-97 and 2003-05 post-SOX periods, and it is relatively higher for 
the 1998-00 period. Parallel to the results in Panel A, this single explanatory variable can explain 
considerable variation in DISPERSION, as it captures around 4.5 – 9.0% variation in forecast 
dispersion. 
In regressions 2-6, other firm characteristics are introduced to account for the variation in 
dispersion that is associated with these factors. These measures affect the forecast dispersion 
among analysts as much as they affect the forecast accuracy. However the negative coefficient 
for the size measure is not significant for the 2003-05 period and the positive coefficient on 
leverage and intangible assets ratio is significant only for the 2003-05 period. In addition, the 
R&D expense is positively related to the forecast dispersion but statistically significant only for 
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the early 1995-97 period. In regression 6, the stock return volatility is introduced. Similar to 
forecast accuracy results in Panel A, VOLATILITY is also a critical determinant for the forecast 
dispersion as demonstrated by the highly significant coefficient and the apparent increase in the 
adjusted R-sq.  Firms with more price-relevant information experience greater disagreement in 
earning forecasts among analysts. Also, similar to the forecast accuracy analysis, the coefficient 
for the firm size measure changes sign once VOLATILITY is introduced due to the possible 
multicollinearity as discussed earlier. 
Table 17 reports the findings for the forecast dispersion analysis with panel data over all 
periods using time effects. In the first regression, I introduce a dummy variable for different 
periods in addition to the FOREIGN identifier. Similar to forecast accuracy results in Table 15, 
the coefficient on FOREIGN is positive and highly significant, which suggests that on average, 
analysts’ dispersion for foreign firms is 60 bps greater than U.S. firms. Results for the time 
effects are similar to the forecast accuracy analysis. The positive coefficient on the 1998-00 
variable suggests greater forecast dispersion on average for this period. On average, forecast 
dispersion for the 2003-05 post-SOX period is lower relative to prior 1998-00, but it is not 
statistically significant when compared to the earlier 1995-97 period. This observation does not 
hold with the H1-Null hypothesis, but it is consistent with the alternative H1-a, which suggests 
no significant change in forecast dispersion among analysts in the post-SOX period. 
Regression 2 introduces additional variables to analyze the discrepancy between foreign 
and comparable U.S. firms over time. These variables include FOREIGN interacted with the 
time effects. The FOREIGN*1998-00 variable is positive and statistically significant, which 
indicates that the difference in forecast dispersion between foreign and U.S. firms is 30 bps 
higher on average in the 1998-00 period. However, the gap is considerably narrowed in the post-
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SOX period ‘2003-05’ as demonstrated by the significant and negative coefficient for 
FOREIGN*2003-05. The discrepancy between the foreign and U.S. firms in this period is 20bps 
less on average relative to the 1995-97 period, and 50bps less relative to the 1998-00 period. 
The ln(BA) size measure is introduced in regression 3. Consistent with Atiase (1985) and 
similar to Table 15 Panel B and Table 16 results, the negative and statistically negative 
coefficient on firm size is consistent with larger firms, with more information availability and 
higher information transparency, experiencing lower forecast dispersion as a result. Regression 4 
introduces ln (BA) interacted with the time effects. However, the coefficient for the size measure 
is not statistically different across different periods. 
The R&D/Sales ratio and the dummy variable for the missing R&D/Sales ratios are 
introduced in regression 5. The R&D/Sales ratio is interacted with the time effects in regression 
6. The level of R&D spending is positively related to the accuracy of forecasts by analysts but it 
is only marginally significant. Similar to results from Table 15, a positive and significant 
coefficient for the dummy variable suggests a 30 bps higher forecast dispersion for firms with a 
missing R&D value. 
I included LEVERAGE as the financial risk measure in regression 7. The coefficient is 
positive and significant for leverage, which is consistent with highly levered firms having greater 
dispersion in analysts’ forecasts. In regression 8, I introduced the interacted leverage factors. 
Coefficients for these interacted variables are not statistically significant. This suggests that 
association between forecast dispersion and the leverage is not statistically different across 
different periods. 
Regression 9 introduces the intangible assets ratio into the analysis. Overall, the level of 
intangible assets is negatively related to the forecast accuracy and suggests that analysts have 
  109
better consensus in their earnings forecasts for firms with more intangible assets. Results in 
regression 10 for the interacted intangible ratios are not statistically significant. 
 Regression 11 introduces the residual volatility as the price relevant information 
measure. The coefficient for VOLATILITY is positive and highly significant. This indicates that 
firms with greater volatility experience greater forecast dispersion as demonstrated by the 
positive and significant coefficient on the volatility. Volatility explains an additional 
approximately 2% cross sectional variation in forecast dispersion as documented by the increase 
in adjusted R-sq. This positive association between volatility and the forecast dispersion is 
consistent over different periods. 
Overall, the results in Table 17 demonstrate that forecast dispersion as the information 
measure is consistent with the previous analysis for the forecast accuracy. However, the results 
suggest some improvement in forecast dispersion for foreign issuers in the post-SOX period 
relative to both the earlier 1995-97 and 1998-2000 periods. Yet, this does not hold for the 
comparable U.S. firms. Hence, the results provide some evidence to support H1-Null and suggest 
significant improvement in forecast dispersion in the post-SOX period relative to the pre-SOX 
periods. In addition, there is deterioration in forecast dispersion for the 2003-05 period which is 
significant for the foreign issuers.  
Begley, Cheng and Gao (2007) also study the forecast accuracy and dispersion around 
SOX. However, they use these measures as the proxy for the “information quality”. In that 
regard, these findings are partially aligned with Begley et al. (2007) in that there is no significant 
improvement in the information quality over the post-SOX period. However, they further 
document a decline in information quality measures relative to year 2001, the year before the 
  110
enactment of the SOX. However, my findings suggest no significant deterioration relative to the 
earlier 1995-97 period and significant improvement relative to prior 1998-00 period. 
4.2.3 Determinants of Earnings Informativeness 
If the mandated governance rules and internal control mechanisms help to discipline the 
fraudulent corporate practices and to improve reliability and the integrity of the public 
disclosure, then one would expect informativeness of earnings to be improved in the post-SOX 
period where these rules are in place. This section analyzes the implication of this argument as 
discussed in Hypothesis 2. H2-Null expects a higher coefficient for ERROR (ERC) in the post-
SOX period relative to earlier periods. Additionally in panel data regression, ERROR*2003-05 
would be significantly positive if there is a significant improvement in earnings informativeness 
in the post-SOX period. Alternatively, H2-a expects an insignificant difference in the ERROR 
coefficient across different periods. 
Tables 18 and 19 present results for the earnings informativeness and findings that 
analyze absolute abnormal returns around earnings announcements and their association with 
earnings surprise, respectively. Table 18 reports the results for separate regressions over each 
period, while Table 19 presents the results for the panel regressions over all periods. In the first 
regression, the only explanatory variable is the FOREIGN identifier. The coefficient on 
FOREIGN is negative and statistically significant for the 1995-97 period and the 2003-2005 
post-SOX period. Although it is consistent with the univariate analysis; interestingly, this result 
suggests that the average absolute abnormal returns around earnings announcements are 
significantly lower for foreign issuers. 
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Regressions 2 and 3 consider other control variables that are associated with the strength 
of the price reaction associated with an earnings announcement. In regression 2, ERROR and 
DISPERSION are included in the analysis. The coefficient on ERROR (i.e., the ERC) is not 
statistically significant. The coefficient on the DISPERSION is positive but statistically 
significant only for the 1995-97 period. 
In regression 3, interaction terms that are intended to account for the determinants of 
ERC are introduced. The coefficient on ERROR*FOREIGN is negative, indicating that foreign 
firms are associated with lower informativeness of a given surprise, i.e., ‘ERC’, but this 
difference is statistically significant only for the 1995-97 period. As documented in the ERC 
literature, firms with better growth prospects have higher ERC over the 1995-97 and the 2003-05 
periods, but not for the 1998-00 period. Additionally, firms that are larger in market 
capitalization have higher ERC as demonstrated by the significantly negative coefficient on 
ERROR*ln (ME). This difference in ERCs between small and large firms is more pronounced 
over the 2003-05 period and it is highly significant. LEVERAGE is not significantly related to 
the informativeness of a given surprise for any sample period. Moreover, ERC is not 
significantly different for firms with greater forecast dispersion versus firms with lower 
dispersion as suggested by the ERROR*Dispersion coefficient. 
Table 19 reports the results for the panel regressions to analyze absolute abnormal returns 
around earnings announcements over all periods with time effects. Explanatory variables used in 
the previous analysis are interacted with the time effects to assess the change in explanatory 
power of each factor over different periods and to test Hypothesis 2.  
In the first regression, the only variables I include are the time effects for each period and 
the FOREIGN identifier. Similar to prior analysis, the coefficient on FOREIGN is negative and 
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statistically significant, suggesting that the absolute abnormal returns around earnings 
announcements are on average 30bps-70bps lower for foreign issuers relative to U.S. firms. The 
positive and highly significant coefficient for the 1998-00 period suggests that abnormal returns 
around earnings announcements are greater by approximately 1.5% on average for this period. 
The average increase in absolute abnormal return for the 2003-05 post-SOX period is around 
40bps and less than the prior period, but it is still statistically higher than the earlier 1995-97 
period. However, this significance does not hold for most of the other regressions. 
Regression 2 introduces the interaction of FOREIGN with the time effects. The 
FOREIGN*1998-00 variable is positive and marginally significant. A higher abnormal return in 
the 1998-00 period is partially attributable to foreign issuers but it is mainly U.S. firms with 
approximately 1.2% higher absolute abnormal returns, as demonstrated by the highly significant 
coefficient on the 1998-00 variable even after introducing FOREIGN*1998-00. Moreover, a 
positive coefficient for FOREIGN*1998-00 along with the negative coefficient on FOREIGN 
indicates that the difference in abnormal returns between foreign and U.S. firms is smaller in the 
1998-00 period, which is observed in the univariate analysis as well. 
The measure for forecast accuracy ERROR is introduced in regression 3. Interestingly, 
the coefficient is not statistically significant. It becomes significant only when the 
ERROR*FOREIGN variable is introduced in regressions 7-11. Regression 4 includes ERROR 
interacted with the time variables, intended to analyze the difference in the informativeness of a 
given surprise over different periods. However, the coefficient for ERROR is not statistically 
significant for any of the periods. 
DISPERSION is introduced in regression 5, and interacted with the time effects in 
regression 6. Dispersion is positively associated with the absolute market reaction at an earnings 
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announcement, but the association is significant only at the 0.10 level and the significance is 
wiped out once other interacted variables are included in the analysis. 
In regression 7, the ERROR*FOREIGN term is included to capture the difference in the 
informativeness of a given surprise between the foreign and the U.S. firms. Consistent with the 
integrity and reliability of foreign issuers’ disclosure being inferior relative to comparable U.S. 
firms, the ERC for them is lower as evident by the negative and significant coefficient for the 
ERROR*FOREIGN variable. Once this term is introduced, the ERROR term is positive and 
significant, which is the ERC estimate for the U.S. firms. This term is further interacted with the 
time effects and introduced in regression 8, but the coefficients are not statistically significant, 
which suggests no significant change in foreign firm’s informativeness of a given surprise over 
different periods. 
In regression 9, I introduce all the other determinants of the informativeness of a given 
surprise considered previously in Table 18. Consistent with the literature (Collins and Kothari 
(1989), Teoh and Wong (2002)) and the previous analysis, smaller firms with better growth 
prospects have higher ERCs. Furthermore, firms with higher leverage have higher ERCs on 
average. ERC does not seem to be associated with forecast dispersion as suggested by the 
ERROR*DISPERSION coefficient. 
Regression 10 introduces the interacted determinants of the ERC, which are intended to 
account for the change in association over different periods. The only significant term is the 
negative coefficient for ERROR*ln (MTB)*1998-00, which captures the impact of growth 
opportunities on ERC over the 1998-00 period. A statistically significant coefficient suggests 
that, different than the 1995-97 and 2003-05 periods, the informativeness of a given surprise is 
not significantly different between high growth and low growth firms over the 1998-00 period. 
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Overall, the results in Table 18 and 19 do not suggest any improvement or any 
deterioration in the informativeness of a given surprise in the post-SOX period relative to early 
periods. Hence, the results do not support the implications of H2-Null but are in line with the 
alternative H1-a. Hence, as far as information integrity or reliability are concerned, the findings 
suggest that the SOX mandated uniform governance rules and the new internal control 
mechanisms do not perform superior or inferior than the periods without them. In addition, there 
is a significant difference in earnings informativeness between foreign issuers and the 
comparable U.S. firms. However, the change in the informativeness of a given surprise in the 
post-SOX period is insignificant between foreign and U.S. firms as well. 
4.3 ROBUSTNESS 
In this section, I assess the robustness of the reported results. Specifically I use an 
alternative estimation period and announcement windows for the abnormal return estimates at 
earning announcements. In addition, I also use an alternative measure for the informativeness of 
earnings disclosures, which is suggested by Beaver (1968) and used by Cohen et al. (2007).  And 
finally, I provided previous findings after controlling for the overtime trend in analyst coverage, 
which is documented by Mohanram and Sunder (2006) as the Reg. FD effect on the functioning 
of financial analysts. 
Although I do not report the results, the abnormal return values do not change remarkably 
if one considers [-1, +2], [-2, +1] or [-2, +2] as alternative abnormal return windows. In addition, 
the market model parameters are robust to alternative estimation periods, and results hold when 
the parameters are estimated over [-300,-10] and [-150,-11].  
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As an additional robustness check, I also consider the abnormal return variance in the 3-
day earnings announcement window as the informativeness of a given surprise which is 
suggested by Beaver (1968). As used by Cohen et al. (2007) and similar to the absolute abnormal 
return measure, this metric is an alternative non-directional measure of absolute information 
content in the sense that announcements with large information flow are likely to have large 
announcement return variances. 
Table 20 displays the results for the informativeness of a given surprise with separate 
analysis for each period, using the abnormal return variance as the measure. In general, the 
results are comparable with few differences to the results in Table 18 that are using the absolute 
abnormal return as the measure. Although the difference between the foreign and the U.S. firms 
is negative, it is not statistically significant. The coefficient on ERROR (i.e., the ERC) is positive 
and significant only for the 2003-05 post-SOX period. However, in regression 3, the ERC 
estimate is positive and significant for all periods once a difference in ERC between the foreign 
and the U.S. firms is controlled by introducing the ERROR*FOREIGN term. This relation 
between the earning surprise (ERROR) and the abnormal return variance is strongest in the early 
1995-97 period, and similar over the 1998-00 and post-SOX 2003-05 periods. Similar to findings 
in Table 17, ERC for the foreign firms is lower but it is statistically significant only for the 1998-
00 period, using abnormal return variance as the information content measure. Other 
determinants of the ERC are consistent with the literature and with the previous analysis. 
Additionally, larger firms with more growth opportunities and greater dispersion among 
analysts’ forecasts have higher ERC on average. 
Table 21 displays the results for the panel regressions using abnormal return variance as 
the alternative measure over all periods. In the first regression, the only variables I include are 
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the time effects for each period and the FOREIGN identifier. Similar to prior analysis, the 
coefficient on FOREIGN is negative but marginally significant. The positive and highly 
significant coefficient for the 1998-00 period suggests that the variance of abnormal returns 
around earnings announcements is approximately 1.1% greater on average for this period. The 
increase in abnormal return variance for the 2003-05 post-SOX period is approximately 30 bps 
and less than the prior period, but it is still statistically higher relative to the earlier 1995-97 
period.  
Regression 2 introduces the variable FOREIGN which is interacted with the time effects. 
These interacted variables are not statistically significant suggesting that the difference in 
abnormal return variance between foreign and U.S. firms is stable across different periods.  
The measure for the forecast accuracy, ERROR, is introduced in regression 3. 
Interestingly, the coefficient is not statistically significant. Just as in the previous analysis, it 
becomes significant only when the ERROR*FOREIGN variable is included in regressions 7-11 
to control the difference in ERC between the foreign and the U.S. firms. Regression 4 introduces 
ERROR interacted with the time variables, intended to analyze the difference in earning 
informativeness over different periods. However, the coefficient for ERROR is not statistically 
significant for any of the periods. 
DISPERSION is introduced in regression 5, and interacted with the time effects in 
regression 6. Average association between the DISPERSION and the abnormal return variance is 
not significant over any of the periods. But the relation is significant once we control the 
difference in association for different periods.  For the early 1995-97 period, higher dispersion 
among analysts’ forecast suggests higher abnormal return variance and hence a higher 
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information content of the earnings disclosure. However, this relation is negative for later 
periods and statistically significant for the 2003-05 period.  
In regression 7, the ERROR*FOREIGN term is included to capture the difference in the 
informativeness of a given surprise between the foreign and the U.S. firms. Consistent with the 
integrity and reliability of foreign issuers disclosure being inferior relative to comparable U.S. 
firms, the ERC for them is lower as demonstrated by the negative and significant coefficient for 
ERROR*FOREIGN. Once this term is introduced, the ERROR term is positive and significant, 
which is the ERC estimate for the U.S. firms. This term is further interacted with time effects and 
introduced in regression 8, but the coefficients are not statistically significant, suggesting no 
significant change in the informativeness of a given surprise for foreign firms either. 
In regression 9, I introduce all the other determinants of the informativeness of a given 
surprise. Consistent with the literature and the absolute abnormal return analysis, smaller firms 
with better growth prospects and higher leverage have higher ERCs on average.  
Regression 10 introduces the interacted determinants of the ERC, which are intended to 
control for the change in association over different periods. The only significant term is the 
negative coefficient for ERROR*DISPERSION*2003-05, which captures the dispersion effect 
on ERC in the 2003-05 period. This result is driven by the inconsistent relation between 
DISPERSION and the abnormal return variance. 
4.3.1 Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg. FD) and its Effect on Information Measures: 
On October 23, 2000, the SEC implemented Regulation FD (Reg. FD hereafter), which prohibits 
firms from privately disclosing value-relevant information to certain preferred analysts and 
institutional shareholders, without simultaneously disclosing the same information to public. As 
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a result, Reg. FD requires that all material information be communicated to all investors at the 
same time. When a firm’s management unintentionally discloses material information to select 
market participants, it must make that information public as soon as practical, but no later than 
24 hours after the initial disclosure80. 
As a result, two distinct and disparate viewpoints about the potential impact of the Reg. 
FD emerged. Securities Industry Association (SIA) argues that prohibiting non-public 
communications on the functioning of financial analysts will reduced the quality of the 
information communicated81. On the contrary, the SEC argues that prohibiting non-public 
communications will lead greater independence from financial analysts82.  
Following these perspectives, Heflin, Subramanyam and Zhang (2003) examined whether 
Reg. FD impairs the flow of financial information to capital markets prior to earnings 
announcements. Using a three quarters of pre and post-FD period, they empirically investigate 
whether the implementation of FD is associated with changes in earnings-related information 
environment, specifically the forecast error and the dispersion.  In general, they find no reliable 
evidence of significant deterioration in the information environment after implementation of FD. 
Using a longer post-FD period83, Mohanram and Sunder (2006) confirm Heflin et al. 
(2003)’s findings with respect to the forecast accuracy and dispersion. In addition, they 
                                                 
80 Regulation FD, Rule 101(d) 
81 Security Industry Association (SIA). 2000. Comment letter to the SEC. Online at  
http://www.sifma.org/regulatory/comment_letters/comment_letter_archives/30966602.pdf  
82 U.S. Securities Exchange Commission, Regulation Fair Disclosure Revisited December 2001, 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/regfdstudy.htm 
83 October 1999 - September 2000 pre-FD and January 2001-December 2001 post-FD period. 
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document that firms with most analyst following in the pre-FD period suffer significant decline, 
whereas firms with least analyst following experience an increase in the analyst coverage. Their 
findings on the analysts’ coverage pre and post-FD periods suggests that analysts are shifting 
coverage to firms where the greater level of effort is likely to yield competitive advantage over 
other analysts, which would compensate for the limited information channels in post-FD period 
The overtime comparison of 2003-05 post-SOX period with 1995-97 and 1998-00 pre-
SOX periods overlaps with the confounding Reg. FD effects. To asses the robustness of my 
analysis on forecast ERROR and DISPERSION by controlling for the documented Reg. FD 
effect, I introduced “Number of Analyst following” in multivariate analysis. Table 22 displays 
the analysis for the ERROR and DISPERSION measures. Results for Regression 13 are same as 
Table 16 and 17. In regression 14, I introduced ‘Num Analyst’ to control for the change in 
analysts coverage overtime as documented by Mohanram and Sunder (2006). Overall, all 
findings are similar to the previous analysis and are not driven by overtime trend in analyst 
coverage.  
For the forecast accuracy measure ERROR, the results are inconsistent with H1-Null and 
suggest no significant improvement or deterioration in the post-SOX period relative to pre-SOX 
periods. As expected, analyst coverage is negatively related with the ERROR and it is higly 
significant. Forecast ERROR is marginally higher for the 1998-00 period, but it is statistically 
significant only for foreign issuers. The estimated coefficient for this interacted term 
‘Foreign*1998-00’ and for the foreign firm identifier ‘Foreign’, are slightly lower in regression 
14. This observation suggests that the difference in forecast error between foreign issuers and 
U.S. firms are partially attributable to the difference in the level analysts’ coverage. Regression 
15 introduced the ‘Num Analyst’ interacted with the ‘1998-00’ and 2003-05’ periods. 
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Interestingly, the negative association between the analyst coverage and the forecast ERROR 
does not hold for the early 1995-97 period. All other results are same as the previous analysis on 
Table 16.  
The results for the DISPERSION are also same as the previous analysis on Table 17 and 
suggest no significant improvement or deterioration in the post-SOX period relative to pre-SOX 
periods for the U.S. firms. However the improvement in forecast dispersion for foreign issuers in 
the post-SOX period holds even after controlling for the analyst coverage trend overtime. As 
expected, analyst coverage is negatively related with the DISPERSION and it is highly 
significant. The estimated coefficient for the foreign firm identifier ‘Foreign’ is slightly lower in 
regression 14. This suggests that the difference in forecast dispersion between foreign and U.S. 
firms are partially attributable to the difference in analysts coverage. Regression 15 introduced 
the ‘Num Analyst’ interacted with the ‘1998-00’ and 2003-05’ periods. Once again, the negative 
association between the analyst coverage and the forecast DISPERSION does not hold for the 
early 1995-97 period. 
Overall, my findings are not driven by the change in level of analysts’ coverage overtime. 
While I attempted to control for the documented Reg. FD related factor that could affect my 
inferences about the post-SOX period, I can never completely rule out the possibility that our 
results are attributable to some other unknown structural change related to Reg. FD. 
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5.0  CONCLUSION 
The passage of the SOX Act represents a landmark change in the extent and the integrity 
of information disclosed by the public firms. My findings on forecast accuracy and dispersion 
are partially aligned with Begley et al. (2007) by documenting no significant improvement in the 
post-SOX period. However, these measures have not significantly improved or deteriorated 
either, in the post-SOX period relative to the earlier periods of 1995-97 and 1998-00 for U.S. 
firms. Also for the foreign issuers, there is no significant improvement or deterioration in earning 
forecast accuracy over different periods. This observation does not support H1-Null but holds 
with H1-a. Moreover the results are consistent with the enhanced disclosure requirements not 
contributing any additional information on average for U.S. firms.  
However, the findings suggest some improvement in forecast dispersion for the foreign 
issuers in the post-SOX period relative to both the earlier 1995-97 and the 1998-2000 periods. 
Yet, this does not hold for the comparable U.S. firms. Hence, the results are partially aligned 
with the H1-Null Hypothesis for forecast dispersion and suggest significant improvement in 
forecast dispersion in the post-SOX period relative to pre-SOX periods for the foreign issuers. In 
addition, there is deterioration in forecast accuracy and dispersion for the 1998-00 period and it 
is statistically significant for the foreign issuers.  
Moreover, my analysis on the informativeness of a given surprise suggests no significant 
change in this measure for the post-SOX period, which is consistent with Cohen et al. (2007). 
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This holds for both foreign issuers and comparable U.S. firms. This does not support H2-Null but 
it is consistent with the alternative H2-a and suggests that mandated governance rules and the 
internal control system have not improved the integrity of the public information and do not 
contribute to the information content of an earnings announcement. The results are robust and 
hold for alternative estimation periods and alternative information content measures similar to 
Cohen et al. (2007). 
In addition the results do not change when the analyst coverage is included in the analysis, so the 
findings are not driven by the difference analysts coverage between foreign and U.S. firms and 
the overtime trend on number of analysts following. 
 
 
APPENDIX A – SOX Compliance Dates 
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT COMPLIANCE DATES FOR U.S AND FOREIGN ISSUERS84 
  U.S issuers Foreign issuers filing 20-F or 40-F 
Large Accelerated Filer November 15, 2004 (was June 15, 2004) July 15, 2006 for both 
Small-Accelerated Filer November 15, 2004 (was June 15, 2004) July 15, 2006 for mgt report (July 15, 2007 for auditor attestation) 
NON-Accelerated Filer Dec 15, 2007 for mgt report (Dec 15, 2008 for auditor attestation) (was April 15, 2005, July 15, 2005, July 15, 2006, July 15, 2007) Dec 15, 2007 for mgt report (Dec 15, 2008 for auditor attestation) 
Schedule Changes on March 2, 2005 and September 21, 2005 and recent on Aug 9, 2006  
 
Under revised Rule 12b-2, a large accelerated filer is defined as a company that meets all of the following: 
The company had an aggregate worldwide common equity public float of $700 million or more. 
The company has been subject to the annual and periodic reporting requirements of the Exchange Act for at least 12 months. 
The company has filed at least one annual report. 
The company is not a "small business issuer" eligible to report on Forms 10-KSB and 10-QSB. 
An "accelerated filer" is now defined as a company whose worldwide common equity public float, as calculated above, is at least $75 million but less than $700 million and meets the other three requirements for 
large accelerated filers described above. 
Accelerated filer or large accelerated filer status takes effect as of the end of the issuer's fiscal year and is determined by computing the public float as of the last  business day of the issuer's most recently 
completed second fiscal quarter. "Public float" is defined as the voting and non-voting common equity held  by the company's non-affiliates. Once a company has achieved accelerated or large accelerated filer 
status at the end of a fiscal year, that status remains in effect  until the company determines that it can exit accelerated or large accelerated filer status, as described below. 
                                                 
84 SEC announcement on Aug. 9, 2006 SEC  Release No. 2006-136  http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-136.htm  
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APPENDIX B – Legislative and Administrative Announcements Related to the SOX Act 
B.1 SOX RELATED ANNOUNCEMENTS AND TIME 
No Date Announcement 
1 January 17th, 2002 Thursday EST 13:30 Pitt Harvey proposed changes for accounting oversight 
2 April 16th, 2002 Tuesday EDT 18:44 H.R. FS  committee approved HR.3763 (by 49-12) 
 April 23rd, 2002 Tuesday EDT 17:22 House passed Oxley Bill (by 334-90) Counfounding event 
3 June 18th, 2002 Tuesday EDT 14:52 Senate committee approved S.2673 (Sarbanes Bill) (by 17-4) 
4 June 25th, 2002 Tuesday EDT 18:26 Worldcom Inc. announced the fraud 
5 June 26th, 2002 Wednesday EDT 19:01 SEC ordered onetime Certification Rule due mid-August 
 July 15th, 2002 Monday EDT 18:43 Senate passed Sarbanes Bill (by 97-0) Expected outcome 
6 July 16th, 2002 Tuesday EDT 13:42 House passed the toughen version of Oxley Bill (by 391-28) 
7 July 25th, 2002 Thursday EDT 8:00 Conference report agreed in the House and the Senate. 
 July 30th, 2002 Signed by President and became Law No: 107-204 Expected outcome 
8 August 27th, 2002 Tuesday EDT 12:23 SEC approved certification as permanent rule including foreign firms 
9 October 8th, 2002 Tuesday EDT 16:08 Harvey Pitt addressed foreign issuers concern. 
10 October 16th, 2002 Wednesday EDT 10:51 SEC proposed rules for 404, 406, 407 
 November 5th, 2002 Tuesday EST 18:03 Harvey Pitt resigned) (confounding event) Confounding event 
11 January 8th, 2003 Tuesday EST 11:25 SEC issued accommodations for foreign governance practices. 
B.2 SOX RELATED ANNOUCENEMT DETAILS 
January 17th, 2002 Thursday EST 13:30 (GMT 18:30) 
Announcement: US Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Harvey Pitt 
proposed changes to accounting profession oversight. "We initially envision a public 
body that will be dominated by public members with two primary components - 
discipline and quality control," Pitt said at a news conference. "We are at the early stages 
of this proposal and many details remain to be worked out."  
 Corresponding Date:  Day: January 17th, 2002 
Intraday: January 17th, EST 13:30 – 14:30 
 
 
April 16th, 2002 Tuesday EDT85 18:44 (GMT 22:44) 
Announcement: The House Financial Services Committee ordered to report the bill to 
toughen oversight of corporate accounting and financial reports by 49-12 vote. The bill 
approved by the House panel would create a five-member board to oversee accounting 
firms, with a majority of members independent of the accounting profession. Auditors 
would be barred from offering certain consulting and internal audit services to audit 
clients under the bill 
 Corresponding Date:  Day: April 17th, 2002 
Intraday: April 17th, EDT 9:30 – 12:30 
 
 
                                                 
85 Daylight saving for US is observed for the following dates:  
   For 2002: April 7th – October 27th; For 2003: April 6th – October 26th. 
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April 23rd, 2002 Tuesday EDT 17:22 (GMT 21:22) 
Announcement: The House Financial Services Committee issued the proposed 
Corporate, Auditing Accountability, Responsibility and Transparency Act HR.3763. State 
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer supports the amendment to protect investors from 
conflicts of interest by Wall Street analysts. The amendment would require brokerages to 
disclose when their stock analysts rate companies that pay the brokerages investment 
banking fees for arranging mergers or underwriting new stock offerings.  
 Corresponding Date:  Day: Confounding announcement 
Intraday: Confounding announcement 
 
June 18th, 2002 Tuesday EDT 14:52 (GMT 18:52) 
Announcement: The Senate Banking Committee on Tuesday approved a bill that would 
establish a new independent oversight board authorized to discipline accountants. In a 17-
4 vote, the committee backed the proposal that also seeks to boost auditor independence 
by restricting the consulting services accountants can offer to audit clients. 
The revised bill would create a new oversight board to set ethical and quality standards 
for accountants, with full authority to investigate any CPA or accounting firms. The 
SEC's own budget would get a big boost as the Senate bill authorizes $776 million for the 
agency in fiscal 2003, allowing it to hire more staff, raise pay and upgrade its computers. 
Corporate executives would be required to certify their company's quarterly and annual 
reports. Bill would make it illegal for executives to mislead or coerce an auditor, and 
require executives to forfeit any profits or bonuses made one year before an inaccurate 
financial report that must be restated 
 Corresponding Date:  Day: June 18th, 2002 
Intraday: June 18th, EDT 14:52 – 15:52 
 
June 25th, 2002 Tuesday EDT 18:26 (GMT 22:26) 
Announcement: WorldCom Inc.'s (WCOM) board of directors has discovered that the 
company engaged in "massive fraud," overstating its EBITDA by $3.6 billion over the 
last five quarters. The discovery was found during an internal investigation. WorldCom 
has fired its longtime chief financial officer, Scott Sullivan.  
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 Corresponding Date:  Day: June 26th, 2002 
Intraday: June 26th, EST 9:30 – 12:30 
 
June 26th, 2002 Wednesday EDT 19:01 (GMT 23:01) 
Announcement: SEC approved an order directed at about 1,000 of the nation's largest 
companies saying that chief executive and chief financial officers must certify the 
accuracy and veracity of disclosures and financial statements. The executives will have to 
certify the results from their last annual report and every interim report since. The 
Securities and Exchange Commission issued a list of the top 945 U.S. publicly-traded 
companies with revenues greater than $1.2 Billion, whose financial statements must be 
certified as accurate by their chief executive and financial officers starting in mid-August. 
 Corresponding Date:  Day: June 27th, 2002 
Intraday: June 27th, EDT 9:30 – 12:30 
 
July 15th, 2002 Monday EDT 18:43 (GMT 22:43) 
Announcement: The U.S. Senate on Monday passed a sweeping reform bill in response 
to recent corporate scandals, by a 97-0 vote. 
Senate Bill Creates five-member, private-sector oversight board, creates new penalties 
for corporate fraud and document shredding, bans personal loans from companies to their 
top officials and directors. Restricts a wide range of consulting and other non-auditing 
services, Company directors would be held directly responsible for the accountants 
preparing financial reports, Calls for an additional $300 million or so for the SEC 
 Corresponding Date:  Day: Anticipated annoucement 
Intraday: Anticipated announcement 
 
July 16th, 2002 Tuesday EDT 13:42 (GMT 17:42) 
Announcement: The US House of Representatives voted on Tuesday to toughen their 
version of an accounting industry reform bill to match the standards of a Senate bill 
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passed a day earlier, as lawmakers competed to produce the toughest possible response to 
the string of major accounting scandals that have seriously shaken investor confidence. 
The bill, which passed with overwhelming bipartisan support 391-28, would add criminal 
penalties to earlier corporate reform legislation passed by the House in April. 
House Bill creates five-member accounting oversight board with disciplinary powers and 
contains new stiffer criminal penalties for corporate fraud. Restricts more narrow range 
of consulting and other non-auditing services that accounting firms can provide to their 
audit clients. 
 Corresponding Date:  Day: July 16th, 2002 
Intraday: June 16th, EDT 13:42 – 14:42 
 
July 24th, 2002 Thursday EDT 18:11 (GMT 22:11) 
 Announcement:  
The U.S. House of Representatives on Thursday approved the final version of a sweeping 
corporate reform bill by 423-3 that beefs up oversight of accounting and dramatically 
increases penalties for corporate fraud.  
The US Senate on Thursday afternoon voted 99-0 to overwhelmingly confirm a corporate 
reform bill approved hours earlier by the House of Representatives. 
 Corresponding Date:  Day: July 25th, 2002 
Intraday: July 25th, EDT 9:30 – 12:30 
 
July 30th, 2002 Tuesday EDT 08:02 (GMT 12:02) 
Announcement: President Bush signed into law the most far-reaching government 
crackdown on business fraud since the post-Depression era. A wave of corporate 
accounting scandals in an election year helped propel the reforms to approval in Congress 
with extraordinary speed.  
 Corresponding Date:  Day: Anticipated announcement 
Intraday: Anticipated announcement 
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August 27th, 2002 Tuesday EDT 12:23 (GMT 16:23) 
Announcement: US Securities and Exchange Commission on Tuesday voted 
unanimously to approve rules that will require chief executives and financial officers, 
including the executives of foreign companies listed on US stock exchanges to vouch 
personally for the accuracy of their financial statements.  
The regulation will oblige CEOs and CFOs of foreign firms listed on U.S. stock markets, 
or selling securities to larger than a given number of investors in the U.S., to swear to the 
validity of their annual financial statements, called 20-F. The move, which will come into 
effect on Wednesday, came as a blow to the foreign companies which had raised 
objections with the SEC. They had hoped for an exemption, or at least a compromise 
measure.  
 Corresponding Date:  Day: August 27th, 2002 
Intraday: August 27th, EDT 12:23 – 13:23 
 
October 8th, 2002 Tuesday EDT 16:08 (GMT 20:08) 
Announcement:  Foreign firms’ hope for exemption vanishes. Speaking by video link 
Tuesday to a financial group in London, SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt said the SEC will be 
"fully faithful" in enforcing the new law, but will also be mindful of the impact of 
regulation on U.S. and global markets. EU commissioner for financial services, discussed 
possible exemptions for non-US accounting firms. Mr Pitt said he had limited room for 
maneuver in granting exemptions to non-US companies, and must respect the will of 
Congress. 
"We cannot promise that our final rules will always accord with your concerns, but we do 
promise to listen and carefully evaluate them," Beller said. As the SEC writes rules to 
implement the law, "foreign companies can expect that many of the new rules will apply 
to them," said SEC corporation finance division director Alan Beller, speaking to the 
same group in London.  
Governance rules could be troublesome for foreign firms. By next April, the SEC is 
required to bar U.S. markets from listing companies that don't have an independent audit 
committee, a feature rarely required outside the U.S. SEC lawyer Beller indicated that 
could be a problem for Germany, which requires employees to sit on corporate boards 
and take part in audit oversight, even though they wouldn't be considered to be 
independent.  
 Corresponding Date:  Day: October 9th, 2002 
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Intraday: October 9th, EDT 9:30 – 11:00 
 
October 16th, 2002 Wednesday EDT 10:51 (GMT 14:51) 
Announcement:  The Securities and Exchange Commission sent proposed rules out for 
public comment, having companies report annually on their internal controls, requiring 
companies to adopt and monitor codes of ethics along with a third rule to require 
companies to disclose if their boards' audit committee has any "financial experts" on it. 
No exemption for non-US firms. 
 Corresponding Date:  Day: October 16th, 2002 
Intraday: October 16th, EDT 10:51 – 11:51 
 
November 5th, 2002 Tuesday EST 18:03 (GMT 23:03) 
Announcement: Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman Harvey Pitt resigned 
under pressure Tuesday night 
 Corresponding Date:  Day: Confounding Announcement 
Intraday: Confounding Announcement 
 
January 8th, 2003 Tuesday EST 11:25 (GMT 16:25) 
Announcement: The SEC said it had voted in favor of a proposed rule requiring 
companies listed on U.S. stock exchanges to have independent auditing committees, as 
mandated under Sarbanes-Oxley. The SEC, however, also proposed certain exemptions 
for foreign-based firms that operate under different types of corporate governance 
systems.  
John Coffee, law professor at Columbia University, said the SEC's move helped answer 
foreign concerns over "US imperialism". "Some companies wanted requirements dropped 
altogether. The SEC's move is rational and shows it is trying to meet them halfway," he 
said.  
These provisions address concerns by Japanese and German firms and include:  
  131
-- allowing non-management employees to serve as audit committee members, consistent 
with "co-determination" and similar requirements in some countries;  
-- allowing shareholders to select or ratify the selection of auditors, also consistent with 
requirements in many foreign countries;  
-- allowing alternative structures such as boards of auditors to perform auditor oversight 
functions where such structures are provided for under local law; and  
-- addressing the issue of foreign government shareholder representation on audit 
committees.  
 Corresponding Date:  Day: January 8th, 2002 
Intraday: January 8th, EST 11:25 – 12:25 
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APPENDIX C– Methodology Details 
C.1 BOEHMER, MUSUMECI AND POULSEN (1991) ‘STANDARDIZED CROSS-
SECTIONAL’ APPROACH: 
The ordinary cross-sectional test assumes no cross sectional dependence in abnormal returns. 
Ordinary cross sectional test statistics are calculated by dividing the mean abnormal returns during event 
period by its contemporaneous cross-sectional standard error as in equation (1). 
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Boehmer, Musumeci and Poulsen (1991) ‘Standardized cross-sectional’ approach incorporates 
the information from both the estimation and the event period. Event-period abnormal returns are first 
standardized by the estimation period standard deviation, similar to Patell’s (1976) test statistics. Cross-
sectional technique is then applied to the standardized abnormal returns, and the test statistics is 
calculated as equation (2) 
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C.2 T-STATISTICS ADJUSTMENTS FOR CROSS CORRELATION 
C.2.1 Patell Adjustment for Cross-correlation: 
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Using this adjusted standard deviation for mean standardized abnormal return, we have 
correlation adjusted t-statistics. 
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C.2.2 BMP Adjustment for Cross-correlation: 
BMP approach uses sample variance as the estimate for standard deviation for mean 
standardized abnormal return.  
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However Sefcik and Thompson (1986) discuss that if there is cross-correlation, cross-
sectional variance understates (negatively biased estimator for) variance of mean standardized 
abnormal return, because;  ( ) ( ) ( )ρσσσρ −=−= 1      and    1 2222 AAASE )  
Using the unbiased estimator for variance of mean standardized abnormal return; 
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C.3 SEFCIK AND THOMPSON (1986) WEIGHTED PORTFOLIO METHOD 
If the abnormal return of the N firms around the events of interest are hypothesized to be 
related with K (firm and country) characteristics, modeled by the following cross sectional 
regression.  
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1. For each factor k, estimate the corresponding portfolio weights, k-th row of W. 
2. Calculate time series return for the portfolio k as   
3. For each portfolio run Multivariate regression with dummy variables for event 
windows to get estimate for portfolio abnormal return. 
4. Repeat for each factor portfolio 
This procedure generates K estimates of AR, which is same as K elements of B for OLS 
i.   
one.expect  Fin  sticscharacteri firm
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ii. Unlike cross-sectional regression, standard errors of these estimates account fully 
for the cross correlation and heteroskedasticity in firm disturbances. 
iii. Residuals incorporate the cross-correlation and heteroskedasticity is the 
motivation for Mandelker (1974) 
iv. Event effect for each portfolio corresponds to one coefficient in a cross sectional 
model. 
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TABLES & FIGURES 
Figure 1: Overtime Trend for Foreign Issuers 
ADR programs are represented by the solid bars, foreign issues other than ADRs (Non-ADRs) are shown by bars with diagonal lines. New issues are shown in green color. Voluntarily 
terminated issues and involuntarily cancelled issues (due to Bankruptcy-Liquidation, Merger & Acquisitions, or dropped from exchanges) are shown in red color. Issues that are established in 
previous years and are not cancelled are shown by blue bars (survived issues).  
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Figure 2: BHAR performance, S&P 500, FTSE excl. U.S. and value-weighted Foreign issuers portfolio. 
Overall BHAR performance of the markets, over June/01 – Aug/03. Figure 2 presents the Buy-and-Hold performance of a value-weighted foreign issuers’ portfolio along with the S&P 500 
and FTSE Developed Countries index excluding U.S. (FTSE index).  U.S. market is represented by the S&P 500 [red], Global Markets other than. U.S. is represented by the FTSE World 
Index excluding U.S. [green], foreign issuers listed in U.S. represented by the VW Cross-Listed Index [black]. Average BHAR performance is approximately -5% for the first six months  
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Figure 3: Difference in BHAR performance, S&P 500, FTSE excl. U.S. and value-weighted Foreign issuers portfolio. 
Overall difference in BHAR performance of the markets, over June/01 – Aug/03. Figure 2 presents the difference in Buy-and-Hold performance of a value-weighted foreign issuers’ portfolio 
along with the S&P 500 and FTSE Developed Countries index excluding U.S. (FTSE index). U.S. market is represented by the S&P 500 [red], Global Markets other than. U.S. is represented 
by the FTSE World Index excluding U.S. [green], foreign issuers listed in U.S. represented by the VW Cross-Listed Index [black].  
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Table 1 – Foreign Issuers Sample 
Table 1 summarizes the foreign issuers sample and the survival information for foreign issuers that are active around the SOX legislative events. I exclude issuers from countries known as tax 
havens, such as Bermuda, Barbados, Marshall Islands, Cayman Islands, Bahamas, British Virgin Islands and Belize. For issues with different classes, I only include the issues with the one-
share-one-vote scheme. Final sample includes 889 listings, starting as early as 1930. There are 135 issues that are terminated before the enactment of the SOX Act, and 79 foreign firms 
accessed U.S. equity markets after the enactment of SOX. There are 675 foreign issuers that are active around the SOX legislative events. The final sample for my analysis consists of 675 
foreign issuers. 
 
Category N OTC listed Exchange Listed
All Sample 888 60 828
(135) (43) (92)
(79) (2) (77)
2 6
1 (Voluntarily) terminated - 3
2 (Voluntarily) deregistered - 1
3 M & A 2 2
4 (Involuntarily) dropped - -
674 15 659
6 199
1 (Voluntarily) terminated 4 61
2 (Voluntarily) deregistered - 76
3 M & A 2 26
4 (Involuntarily) dropped - 36
Listings terminated before SOX Act
Listings new after SOX Act
ADRs active around SOX events
Listings cancelled after SOX
New Listings cancelled before Dec 2006
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Table 2 – Industry Distribution 
Industry classification is based on the 2-digit NAICS, from Compustat for the fiscal year 2001. Panel A presents the industry classification for listing type sub-groups, Panel B for the legal 
origin sub-groups. 
Panel A:  
Industry Description ADR Non-ADR
Accommodation and Food Services 0.3% 0.8%
Administrative and Support, Waste Management and Remediation Services 1.3% 0.4%
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting 0.8% 0.0%
Arts, Entertainment and Recreation 0.0% 0.8%
Construction 1.3% 2.0%
Finance and Insurance 9.7% 3.6%
Health Care and Social Assistance 0.3% 0.8%
Information and Cultural Industries 22.3% 20.2%
Manufacturing 43.7% 43.3%
Mining and Oil and Gas Extraction 4.6% 11.7%
Non-classifiable establishments 1.3% 0.0%
Other Services (except Public Administration) 0.0% 0.4%
Professional, Scientific and Technical Services 2.8% 6.1%
Real Estate and Rental and Leasing 0.5% 2.0%
Retail Trade 3.1% 0.4%
Transportation and Warehousing 2.8% 2.4%
Utilities 3.6% 0.4%
Wholesale Trade 1.8% 4.5%  
 
Panel B: 
Industry Description Common Civil
Accommodation and Food Services 0.8% 0.0%
Administrative and Support, Waste Management and Remediation Services 1.4% 0.4%
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting 0.3% 0.7%
Arts, Entertainment and Recreation 0.5% 0.0%
Construction 0.5% 3.0%
Finance and Insurance 6.2% 8.9%
Health Care and Social Assistance 0.5% 0.4%
Information and Cultural Industries 21.7% 21.2%
Manufacturing 41.7% 46.1%
Mining and Oil and Gas Extraction 11.4% 1.9%
Non-classifiable establishments 0.0% 1.9%
Other Services (except Public Administration) 0.0% 0.4%
Professional, Scientific and Technical Services 5.1% 2.6%
Real Estate and Rental and Leasing 1.1% 1.1%
Retail Trade 1.6% 2.6%
Transportation and Warehousing 2.4% 3.0%
Utilities 1.4% 3.7%
Wholesale Trade 3.3% 2.2%  
 
Table 3 – Country Distribution 
Table 3 provides the foreign issuers’ country distribution. Columns 2-3 provides the number of listings in year 2001. Columns 4-5 
provide percentage of ADR and Non-ADR listings from each country. Columns 6-7 provide the listing weights (ADR vs. Non-ADR) 
within the country.  
 
.
Country ADR Non-ADR Country% Country% Within Country %
Within 
Country %
argentina 11 2.7% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
australia 18 1 4.4% 0.4% 94.7% 5.3%
austria 1 0.2% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
belgium 1 1 0.2% 0.4% 50.0% 50.0%
brazil 5 1.2% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
canada 153 0.0% 61.4% 0.0% 100.0%
chile 18 4.4% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
china 15 3.7% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
denmark 3 0.7% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
england 79 2 19.3% 0.8% 97.5% 2.5%
finland 5 1.2% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
france 29 7.1% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
germany 20 2 4.9% 0.8% 90.9% 9.1%
greece 4 1.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
hong kong 8 2 2.0% 0.8% 80.0% 20.0%
hungary 1 0.2% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
india 10 2.4% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
indonesia 2 0.5% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
ireland 13 3.2% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
israel 9 68 2.2% 27.3% 11.7% 88.3%
italy 13 3.2% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
japan 27 6.6% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
jordan 0 1 0.0% 0.4% 0.0% 100.0%
luxembourg 2 2 0.5% 0.8% 50.0% 50.0%
mexico 23 1 5.6% 0.4% 95.8% 4.2%
netherlands 23 11 5.6% 4.4% 67.6% 32.4%
new zealand 3 0.7% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
norway 6 1.5% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
peru 2 0.5% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
philippines 2 0.5% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
poland 1 0.2% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
portugal 3 0.7% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
russia 4 1.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
singapore 2 4 0.5% 1.6% 33.3% 66.7%
south africa 8 2.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
south korea 6 1.5% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
spain 7 1.7% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
sweden 6 1 1.5% 0.4% 85.7% 14.3%
switzerland 12 2.9% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
taiwan 5 1.2% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
turkey 1 0.2% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%
venezuela 2 0.5% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0%  
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Table 4 – Firm Characteristics 
Legal Origin classification and Shareholder Right Score are from La Porta et al., 1998 and 2003. Legal origin is equal to 1 for Civil origin legislations, Shareholder Rights Score dummy is 1 
for legislations with below median score. Financial values are for fiscal year 2001. Assets and Market capitalization are used as the firm size measure. Leverage is computed as book value of 
debt over book value of assets. ROA is calculated as EBIT over Book value of Assets. I use Market-to-Book ratio of Assets which is frequently used as a proxy for Investment opportunities. I 
also use sales growth as a measure of a firm’s growth opportunities (Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz (2006)). It is calculated as the 3-year geometric average of annual growth in sales prior to 
2001. I use the following country level factors: GDP growth, Total Market capitalization over GDP. Since GDP is not a forward looking market measure, GDP growth is measured as the 3 
year geometric average of annual GDP growth post 2002. As equity based measures which captures the market’s assessment of firms’ equity risk, I use betas of foreign issuers’ vis-à-vis 
FTSE index (excluding US), volatility of stock returns, and the root mean square error from the market model. As financial based risk measures that account for the level and the types of 
investments I use capital expenditure over asset, R&D expenditure over asset and Cash over asset. 
 
Panel A: Firm Characteristics for the full sample 
 
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 25th Pctl 75th Pctl Skewness Kurtosis
Legal Origin 659 42.4% 0.0% 49.5% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.307 -1.911
Shareholder Rights Score 659 42.9% 0.0% 49.5% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.288 -1.923
Total Assets 623 $18,316 $1,122 $72,075 $3 $839,298 $148 $6,633 7.447 63.737
Market Equity 613 $7,716 $786 $19,753 $2 $176,509 $137 $5,237 4.832 28.927
Debt/TotAssets 573 40.2% 41.0% 20.8% 1.3% 94.9% 22.8% 54.9% 0.162 -0.643
Return on Assets 614 4.6% 8.6% 23.2% -261.9% 103.9% 1.4% 14.0% -4.226 36.677
Mkt2Book Assets 612 1.86 1.30 2.01 0.31 23.94 1.03 1.92 6.306 54.258
Sales annual geo %growth 576 37.1% 11.3% 140.4% -78.5% 233.7% 0.3% 28.8% 9.905 126.265
GDP annual geo % growth 658 3.99% 3.94% 1.748 -2.472 9.965 3.27 4.981 0.268 2.635
Market Cap / GDP 658 104.82 97.11 61.06 7.62 316.06 51.64 132.65 1.071 1.339
FTSE Beta 646 0.92 0.74 0.68 -0.44 3.93 0.41 1.33 0.86 0.494
Sigma Return 646 4.5% 3.8% 2.5% 1.1% 21.2% 2.6% 5.9% 1.652 4.675
Sigma Residual 646 4.4% 3.7% 2.5% 1.1% 20.9% 2.5% 5.6% 1.705 4.865
R&D/TotAssets 357 8.3% 4.0% 11.2% 0.0% 78.6% 0.8% 12.2% 2.589 9.256
CapExp/TotAssets 581 6.5% 4.5% 6.5% 0.0% 62.5% 2.4% 8.4% 2.893 14.364
Cash /TotAssets 635 18.7% 10.6% 20.7% 0.0% 95.9% 4.0% 27.9% 1.594 2.129  
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Panel B: Firm Characteristics for Legal origin sub- samples: 
 
Legal Origin N Variable Mean Median Std Dev Min Max 25th Pctl 75th Pctl Skewness Kurtosis
Shareholder Rights Score 20.3% 0.0% 40.2% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.485 0.208
Total Assets $9,769 $324 $51,299 $3 $695,877 $72 $2,516 10.036 116.475
Market Equity $4,759 $342 $18,066 $4 $176,509 $59 $2,629 7.372 60.49
Debt/TotAssets 37.5% 37.0% 22.1% 1.3% 94.9% 18.0% 53.3% 0.358 -0.747
Return on Assets 0.6% 6.7% 28.1% -261.9% 103.9% -4.4% 13.2% -3.585 26.132
Mkt2Book Assets 2.08 1.43 2.44 0.44 23.94 1.06 2.18 5.643 40.146
Mkt2Book Equity 3.80 1.92 11.82 -9.66 206.71 1.10 3.31 14.579 246.206
Sales annual geo %growth 50.3% 13.4% 177.4% -78.5% 2233.7% -0.1% 40.4% 8.159 82.703
GDP annual geo % growth 4.53 4.57 1.31 2.343 9.965 3.27 4.981 2.116 7.781
Market Cap / GDP 116.83 110.10 56.89 32.78 316.06 78.31 175.40 1.069 1.927
FTSE Beta 0.90 0.72 0.72 -0.39 3.93 0.34 1.39 0.84 0.475
Sigma Return 5.1% 4.6% 2.7% 1.3% 21.2% 2.9% 6.6% 1.477 4.233
Sigma Residual 5.0% 4.6% 2.7% 1.3% 20.9% 2.8% 6.4% 1.526 4.373
R&D/TotAssets 10.5% 6.4% 12.7% 0.0% 78.6% 0.9% 15.5% 2.158 6.413
CapExp/TotAssets 6.4% 4.0% 7.2% 0.0% 62.5% 2.1% 7.9% 3.172 15.18
Cash /TotAssets 22.5% 13.3% 23.1% 0.0% 95.9% 4.5% 35.8% 1.205 0.686
Shareholder Rights Score 73.6% 100.0% 44.2% 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 100.0% -1.075 -0.851
Total Assets $30,190 $3,785 $92,391 $3 $839,298 $882 $18,299 5.839 38.79
Market Equity $11,852 $2,122 $21,250 $2 $130,357 $489 $11,719 2.85 9.301
Debt/TotAssets 44.2% 45.4% 18.1% 1.5% 94.7% 32.9% 55.9% -0.02 -0.108
Return on Assets 10.0% 10.7% 11.6% -94.2% 40.6% 5.9% 14.7% -3.063 25.588
Mkt2Book Assets 1.55 1.20 1.10 0.31 7.86 0.99 1.68 3.221 12.25
Mkt2Book Equity 2.45 1.70 2.45 -3.48 15.85 0.96 3.05 2.447 8.024
Sales annual geo %growth 19.1% 9.3% 56.5% -40.0% 671.3% 0.6% 21.2% 7.92 79.509
GDP annual geo % growth 3.25 3.66 1.985 -2.472 7.933 2.32 3.937 0.266 0.63
Market Cap / GDP 88.46 77.37 62.82 7.62 279.93 36.85 99.03 1.403 1.681
FTSE Beta 0.94 0.80 0.63 -0.44 3.27 0.45 1.28 0.91 0.465
Sigma Return 3.7% 3.1% 2.0% 1.1% 14.1% 2.5% 4.4% 1.83 4.247
Sigma Residual 3.6% 3.0% 1.9% 1.1% 14.1% 2.4% 4.2% 1.929 4.774
R&D/TotAssets 5.0% 2.3% 7.2% 0.0% 58.8% 0.5% 6.9% 3.811 22.821
CapExp/TotAssets 6.6% 5.2% 5.2% 0.0% 28.6% 3.1% 9.2% 1.445 2.446
Cash /TotAssets 13.5% 8.1% 15.3% 0.2% 93.7% 3.4% 17.5% 2.37 7.179
279Civil
Common 380
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Table 5 – Pearson Correlation 
This table provides the Pearson correlation coefficient and the p-values for the correlation among firm and country characteristics used in cross-sectional analysis. 
 
Legal 
Origin
Shareholder 
Rights Score
Total 
Assets
Market 
Cap. Leverage ROA MTB Asset
MTB 
Equity
Sales 
Growth
GDP 
Growth
Market 
Cap / GDP
Sigma 
Return
Sigma 
Residual Beta
R&D / Tot 
Assets
CapExp/ Tot 
Assets
Cash/ Tot 
Assets
100%
53.2% 100.0%
<.0001
14.0% 4.9% 100.0%
0.0004 0.2177
17.7% 2.7% 50.6% 100.0%
<.0001 0.5003 <.0001
16.0% 7.5% 13.0% 6.3% 100.0%
0.0001 0.0714 0.0018 0.1361
20.0% -3.2% 2.4% 14.6% 14.5% 100.0%
<.0001 0.4282 0.5491 0.0003 0.0005
-13.2% -11.3% -7.9% 6.1% -18.5% 0.0% 100.0%
0.0011 0.0049 0.0498 0.1311 <.0001 0.9928
-7.3% -7.0% -2.2% 3.0% -3.7% -7.5% 33.4% 100.0%
0.072 0.0856 0.5787 0.4522 0.3816 0.067 <.0001
-11.0% -9.1% -4.6% -4.2% -18.1% -16.6% 8.8% 2.3% 100.0%
0.0083 0.0281 0.2694 0.3172 <.0001 <.0001 0.0345 0.5865
-36.3% 0.0% -10.3% -16.2% -12.2% -8.0% 6.5% 4.3% 10.2% 100.0%
<.0001 0.9935 0.0101 <.0001 0.0035 0.0469 0.1084 0.2892 0.0144
-23.0% -31.6% 9.2% 13.7% 6.3% 4.7% 6.7% 5.0% 3.1% -8.4% 100.0%
<.0001 <.0001 0.0213 0.0007 0.1338 0.2495 0.0966 0.2191 0.4584 0.0307
-26.5% 0.5% -20.6% -27.1% -20.6% -48.5% 9.1% -0.1% 19.7% 12.7% 4.5% 100.0%
<.0001 0.9083 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0237 0.9721 <.0001 0.0012 0.2508
-27.6% -0.7% -21.8% -28.3% -19.9% -48.3% 8.2% -0.2% 19.5% 13.0% 4.3% 99.9% 100.0%
<.0001 0.8536 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0416 0.9509 <.0001 0.001 0.2795 <.0001
-3.7% 12.5% -8.3% -4.2% -18.9% -24.3% 19.9% 2.0% 13.8% 7.0% 1.5% 47.3% 43.5% 100.0%
0.3538 0.0015 0.038 0.3038 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.6146 0.0009 0.0735 0.699 <.0001 <.0001
-23.9% 0.5% -18.6% -13.7% -21.0% -71.4% 22.0% 21.6% 12.8% 10.8% -6.0% 47.3% 46.8% 27.7% 100.0%
<.0001 0.925 0.0004 0.0105 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.02 0.0415 0.26 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
2.0% -2.1% -6.6% 2.2% 5.0% 7.0% 8.5% 0.3% 0.9% 7.2% -7.2% -6.8% -7.1% 4.5% 0.8% 100.0%
0.6283 0.6217 0.1162 0.5993 0.2427 0.0965 0.0445 0.9423 0.8403 0.0848 0.0812 0.1031 0.0854 0.2758 0.8849
-21.5% 2.3% -13.8% -15.7% -49.7% -40.6% 23.9% 5.3% 22.8% 8.8% 2.4% 51.0% 50.0% 37.1% 43.8% -14.2% 100.0%
<.0001 0.5657 0.0005 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.1891 <.0001 0.026 0.5514 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0006
Shareholder Rights Score
Sales Growth
Beta
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Legal Origin
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
Number of Observations
Total Assets
Market Cap.
Leverage
ROA
MTB_asset
MTB_equity
GDP Growth
Market Cap/GDP
Cash/TotAssets
Sigma Return
Sigma Residual
R&D/TotAssets
CapExp/TotAssets
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Table 6 – Index Returns 
This list of SOX events includes 4 events (highlighted in grey color) that are excluded for later analysis. 2 of them are excluded because of other confounding events that reveal significant information 
for U.S. market. In addition, 2 more are dropped due to highly expected outcome. For statistical tests on announcement date, I follow the study by Mitchell and Netter (1989). Time series return data 
form pre- and post-event periods provide variance estimates to test statistical significance. The source of the pre-event time series data is the 150 trading days preceding the first announcement January 
17, 2002, and the source of the post-event time-series data is the 150 trading days following the last announcement January 8, 2002. All three t-statistics with different variance estimates are reported in 
table 6, t-values based on the prevent-period variance are in parenthesis, t-values based on the post-event period variance are in brackets, and t-values on doubling the prevent-period are in braces. Index 
returns reported in columns 6-9 are average market reactions, Columns 10 & 11, “MVRM US” and “MVRM Frgn.”, provides the excess returns of U.S. firms and foreign issuers vis-à-vis global 
markets. Columns 12 & 13 in Table-6 report the S&P 500 return and EW foreign issuers’ portfolio from the close on the day of the announcement through 12:30 on the event day, for the announcements 
after trading hours. I calculate the 1 hour return after the announcement. For announcements after trading hours, I calculate the 3 hours return from 9:30 to 12:30 next trading day. For the announcements 
before the trading hours, I use the 3 hours intraday return for the same trading day. Time series intraday return from pre and post-event periods provide variance estimate to test statistical significance. 
 
Panel A: Results for the legislative announcements leading to SOX Act. 
Annc. No Expec. Annc. Date Ret. Date Announcement EW US SP500 EW Frgn. MVMR 
Fr
FTSE MVMR US
gn.
EW Frgn
0.23%
SP500
0.70% 1.00% 0.81% 0.52% 0.07% -0.28% 0.26%
(0.72) (0.83) (0.69) (0.48) (0.19) (0.38) (-0.64) (1.09)
[0.92] [0.82] [0.91] [0.53] 0.852 0.707 [-0.69] [1.29]
{0.41} {0.59} {0.49} {0.34} {-0.45} {0.77}
0.10% -0.20% 0.76% 0.88% 0.00% 0.87% 0.32% 0.80%
(0.1) (-0.17) (0.65) (0.81) (0.01) (1.4) (0.37) (0.35)
[0.13] [-0.17] [0.86] [0.90] 0.993 0.164 [0.37] [0.51]
{0.06} {-0.12} {0.46} {0.58} {0.26} {0.25}
-0.24% -0.71% -0.22% -0.13% 0.05% 0.12% -1.06% 0.04%
(-0.24) (-0.59) (-0.19) (-0.12) (0.14) (0.19) (-1.55) (0.07)
[-0.31] [-0.58] [-0.25] [-0.13] 0.889 0.852 [-1.80] [0.18]
{-0.14} {-0.41} {-0.14} {-0.08} {-1.09} {0.05}
-0.04% 0.09% -0.18% 0.28% -0.14% -0.20% 0.12% 0.08%
(-0.04) (0.08) (-0.15) (0.26) (-0.37) (-0.32) (0.19) (0.13)
[-0.05] [0.08] [-0.2] [0.29] 0.709 0.752 [0.21] [0.27]
{-0.02} {0.05} {-0.11} {0.19} {0.13} {0.09}
-0.84% -0.27% -1.19% -0.77% -0.41% -1.11% -1.91% -0.47%
(-0.86) (-0.22) (-1.11) (-0.71) (-1.08) (-1.78)* (-2.26)** (-0.21)
[-1.11] [-0.22] [-1.46] [-0.79] 0.283 0.076 [-2.22]** [-0.30]
{-0.50} {-0.16} {-0.79} {-.50} {-1.60} {-0.15}
1.15% 1.76% 0.97% 0.72% 0.24% 0.06% 0.26% -0.10%
(1.18) (1.45) (0.84) (0.67) (0.65) (0.1) (0.30) (-0.04)
[1.51] [1.43] [1.11] [0.74] 0.517 0.928 [0.30] [-0.06]
{0.68} {1.03} {0.59} {0.47} {0.21} {-0.03}
-0.04% -1.84% -0.38% -0.19% 0.73% 0.42% -0.98% -0.04%
(-0.04) (-1.52) (-0.32) (-0.18) (1.92) (0.67) (-1.16) (-0.02)
[-0.05] [-1.50] [-0.43] [-0.2] 0.055 0.504 [-1.14] [-0.02]
{-0.02} {-1.07} {-0.23} {-0.13} {-0.82} {-0.01}
-0.04% -1.84% -0.38% -0.19% 0.73% 0.42% 0.28% -0.10%
(-0.04) (-1.52) (-0.32) (-0.18) (1.92)* (0.67) (0.59) (-0.40)
[-0.05] [-1.50] [-0.43] [-0.2] 0.055 0.504 [0.63] [-0.52]
{-0.02} {-1.07} {-0.23} {-0.13} {0.42} {-0.28}
-0.32% -0.56% -1.29% 2.42% 0.14% -0.98% 0.36% 2.28%
(-0.32) (-0.46) (-1.11) (2.24)** (0.37) (-1.57) -0.42 (1.01)
[-0.41] [-0.46] [-1.47] [2.48]** 0.713 0.119 [0.41] [1.46]
{-0.19} {-0.33} {-0.79} {1.58}* {0.30} {0.71}
0.55% 0.42% 1.04% 0.97% 0.02% 0.78% -1.35% -1.95%
(0.56) (0.35) (0.90) (0.9) (0.05) (1.24) (-1.59) (-0.86)
[0.72] [0.35] [1.18] [1.00] 0.963 0.215 [-1.56] [-1.25]
{0.32} {0.25} {0.63} {0.64} {-1.12} {-0.61}
1 none 17-Jan-02 Harvey Pitt proposed changes to accounting oversight.
17-Jan-02
13:30
2 - 17-Apr-02 HR - FS cmt approved the proposal for HR 3763 by 49-12
16-Apr-02
18:44
3 Conf. 24-Apr-02 House passed HR 3763 Oxley Bill
24-Apr-02
15:25
4 - 18-Jun-02 SEN - B cmt approved the proposal for Sarbane's Bill by 17-4
18-Jun-02
14:52
5 - 26-Jun-02 Worldcom announced the fraud
25-Jun-02
18:26
6 none 27-Jun-02 SEC approved onetime CEO/CFO certification due mid-August
26-Jun-02
19:01
7 Exp. 16-Jul-02 SEN passed the Sarbanes Bill S.2673 by 97-0
15-Jul-02
18:43
8 - 16-Jul-02 HR passed the Oxley Bill HR 5118 by 391-28 amended with stiffer punishment
16-Jul-02
13:42
9 - 25-Jul-02 Conference report agreed in Senate and House.
25-Jul-02
8:00
30-Jul-02 President signed the Act
30-Jul-02
8:02
10 Exp.
Daily Returns Intraday Returns
Index Returns MVMR Regression Index Returns
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Panel B: Results for the administrative events after SOX being signed by the President. 
 
Annc. No Expec. Annc. Date Ret. Date Announcement EW US SP500 EW Frgn. MVMR 
Fr
FTSE MVMR US
gn.
EW Frgn
0.95%
SP500
-1.08% -1.39% 0.15% 1.45% -0.52% -0.39% -0.08%
(-1.10) (-1.14) (0.13) (1.34) (-1.38) (1.52) (-0.71) (-0.33)
[-1.41] [-1.13] [0.17] [1.49] 0.169 0.130 [-0.85] [-0.38]
{-0.64} {-0.81} {0.09} {0.95} {-0.50} {-0.23}
-2.43% -2.73% -1.93% -0.57% -0.96% -0.39% -1.78% -2.23%
(-2.49)** (-2.25)** (-1.66)* (-0.53) (-2.53)** (-0.62) (-2.11)** (-0.99)
[-3.19]*** [-2.23]** [-2.18]** [-0.58] 0.012 0.536 [-2.07]** [-1.43]
{-1.44} {-1.59} {-1.17} {-0.37} {-1.49} {-0.70}
-1.16% -2.41% -0.99% -0.73% 0.08% 0.29% -0.83% 0.05%
(-1.19) (-1.99)** (-0.86) (-0.68) (0.21) (0.47) (-1.16) (0.13)
[-1.51] [-1.97]** [-1.13] [-0.75] 0.832 0.639 [-1.28] [0.003]
{-0.69} {-1.41} {-0.61} {-0.48} {-0.82} {0.09}
1.57% 0.91% 1.30% -0.68% 0.75% 0.75% 0.19% -0.30%
(1.61)* (0.76) (1.12) (-0.63) (1.98)** (1.2) (0.22) (-0.13)
[2.07]** [0.75] [1.48] [-0.70] 0.048 0.232 [0.22] [-0.19]
{0.93} {0.53} {0.79} {-0.44} {0.16} {-0.09}
-0.66% -1.41% -0.73% -1.48% 0.13% 0.02% -0.14% 0.17%
(-0.68) (-1.16) (-0.62) (-1.37) (0.35) (0.03) (-0.26) (0.52)
[-0.87] [-1.15] [-0.82] [-1.52] 0.728 0.979 [-0.20] [0.04]
{-0.39} {-0.82} {-0.44} {-0.97} {-0.18} {0.37}
11 events SUM -4.62% -7.96% -4.00% 2.53% -0.64% 0.16% -3.99% 0.66%
MVMR 0.23% 1.95%
9-Oct-02 Harvey Pitt addressed foreign issuers, limited room for maneuver - 2nd blow
12:23
8-Oct-02
16:08
27-Aug-02 SEC approved annual CEO/CFO certification including foreign firms - 1st blow
27-Aug-02
16-Oct-02 SEC issued proposals for 404(int ctrl), 406 (code eth), 407(fin exp)
6-Nov-02 Harvey Pitt resigned
5-Nov-02
18:03
8-Jan-03
11:25
13 -
16-Oct-02
10:51
12 -
Daily Returns
Index Returns
Intraday Returns
15 +
MVMR Regression Index Returns
11 -
8-Jan-03 SEC proposed provisions to accommodate different legislations.
14 Conf.
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Table 7 Panel A – Univariate Results for Foreign issuers and U.S. firms 
Table 7 provides the cumulative market reaction for foreign issuers’ portfolio and the U.S. firms’ portfolio. Panel A provides the results for the subgroups of SOX compliance, non-complaint OTC 
listings versus SOX mandated listings on organized exchanges. Since, OTC traded listings are not registered under Securities Act, SOX compliance is not mandatory for these firms. Within the group of 
exchange listed issues, Panel B displays the findings by the exchange listed, Amex, NASDAQ and NYSE. Along with the t-statistics for EW portfolios (t-car), I report t-statistics adjusted by BMP 
approach (appendix C.1)  for event induced variance (t-scar), and further adjusted by KP approach (appendix C.2)  for possible cross-correlation (t-scar adj) and the test statistics for non-parametric 
Wilcoxon sign test. Percentage of observations with positive reaction from non-parametric test helps to document whether the impact is widespread or not. 
 
Panel A: CAR results for foreign issuers and U.S. firms, by the subgroups of SOX compliance 
 
N CAR % positive t_car t_scar t_scar_adj t_sign Listing
659 -5.19% 32.02% -6.46 -10.61 -2.14 -9.23 Exch Listed
15 5.02% 33.33% 0.49 -0.35 -0.34 -1.29 OTC Listed
N CAR % positive t_car t_scar t_scar_adj t_sign Listing
5142 -6.61% 27.67% -27.46 -37.32 -4.73 -32.02 Exch Listed
767 -4.46% 40.16% -2.23 -3.72 -1.15 -5.45 OTC Listed
U.S. Firms
Foreign Issuers
 
 
Panel B: CAR results for foreign issuers and U.S. firms, by the subgroups of exchange listing. 
 
N CAR % positive t_car t_scar t_scar_adj t_sign Listing
20 10.38% 50.00% 0.92 0.60 0.40 0.00 AMEX
291 -5.10% 36.43% -3.51 -4.58 -1.54 -4.63 NASDAQ
348 -6.17% 27.30% -9.69 -11.35 -2.51 -8.47 NYSE
15 5.02% 33.33% 0.49 -0.35 -0.34 -1.29 OTC Listed
N CAR % positive t_car t_scar t_scar_adj t_sign Listing
501 -3.05% 38.52% -3.60 -6.14 -1.69 -5.14 AMEX
2735 -5.76% 33.64% -15.11 -17.89 -2.08 -17.11 NASDAQ
1906 -8.77% 16.26% -33.46 -39.84 -5.64 -29.46 NYSE
767 -4.46% 40.16% -2.23 -3.72 -1.15 -5.45 OTC Listed
Foreign Issuers
U.S. Firms
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Table 8 Panel A – Univariate Results for Foreign issuers by Legal Origin 
Table 8 provides the mean CARs for exchange listed foreign issuers by the country legislation measures. I use LLSV (1998) classification to group jurisdiction as common vs. civil legal 
origin. I also use Shareholder Rights Score from LLSV (1998) as country level investor protection proxy. Panel A presents the result for sub-groups of home country legislation characteristics 
‘Legal Origin’, and the Institutional environment measure, median ‘Shareholder Right Score’. In Panel B, results are provided for each country, for the countries with at least 3 foreign issuers 
listed in U.S. exchanges. Along with the t-statistics for EW portfolios (t-car), I report t-statistics adjusted by BMP approach (appendix C.1)  for event induced variance (t-scar), and further 
adjusted by KP approach (appendix C.2)  for possible cross-correlation (t-scar adj) and the test statistics for non-parametric Wilcoxon sign test. Percentage of observations with positive 
reaction from non-parametric test helps to document whether the impact is widespread or not. 
 
Panel  A:  CAR Result for sub-groups of Legal Origin and the Institutional environment measure, median ‘Shareholder Right Score’ 
 
N CAR % positive t_car t_scar t_scar_adj t_sign Legal Origin
380 -4.95% 32.37% -4.35 -7.47 -2.11 -6.87 Common
279 -5.52% 31.54% -5.02 -7.60 -1.89 -6.17 Civil
N CAR % positive t_car t_scar t_scar_adj t_sign Shr. Rights Score
377 -5.81% 30.24% -5.21 -9.00 -2.55 -7.67 Above Median
282 -4.37% 34.40% -3.81 -5.76 -1.45 -5.24 Below Median
N CAR % positive t_car t_scar t_scar_adj t_sign
Legal Org. 
Country 
Groups
380 -4.95% 32.37% -4.35 -7.47 -2.11 -6.87 English
185 -5.29% 35.14% -4.42 -5.32 -1.59 -4.04 French
73 -7.73% 19.18% -2.92 -6.04 -2.14 -5.27 German 
21 0.11% 42.86% 0.03 -0.69 -0.46 -0.65 Scandinavian
Legal Origin
Shareholder Rights Score
Legal Origin - Country Groups
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Panel B: Results are provided for each country, for the countries with at least 3 foreign issuers 
 
N CAR % positive t_car t_scar t_scar_adj t_sign country
11 -4.84% 54.55% -0.51 -0.33 -0.22 0.3 argentina
19 -5.68% 26.32% -1.98 -2.57 -1.92 -2.06 australia
5 -5.19% 20.00% -0.88 -1.19 -0.75 -1.34 brazil
153 -5.36% 33.33% -3.95 -5.07 -1.78 -4.12 canada
18 -8.49% 16.67% -3.42 -3.65 -2.02 -2.83 chile
15 -6.89% 26.67% -3.29 -3.64 -1.83 -1.81 china
81 -2.42% 32.10% -0.65 -2.43 -1.08 -3.22 england
5 4.54% 60.00% 0.77 0.68 0.59 0.45 finland
29 -4.91% 41.38% -1.7 -1.63 -0.81 -0.93 france
22 -0.78% 31.82% -0.1 -1 -0.64 -1.71 germany
10 -7.06% 30.00% -0.84 -1.61 -1.47 -1.26 hong kong
10 -14.82% 10.00% -4.15 -4.04 -2.87 -2.53 india
13 -4.55% 30.77% -1.2 -1.89 -1.54 -1.39 ireland
77 -3.74% 36.36% -1.63 -2.03 -0.9 -2.39 israel
13 -4.08% 30.77% -1.23 -1.29 -0.94 -1.39 italy
27 -9.85% 11.11% -4.91 -6.3 -2.15 -4.04 japan
24 -4.72% 33.33% -2.01 -1.91 -0.99 -1.63 mexico
34 -3.82% 32.35% -1.08 -1.85 -1.02 -2.06 netherlands
6 -0.44% 33.33% -0.14 -0.77 -0.64 -0.82 norway
6 -25.56% 33.33% -2.18 -2.41 -1.51 -0.82 singapore
8 -1.36% 25.00% -0.44 -0.55 -0.28 -1.41 south africa
6 -14.45% 0.00% -4.23 -3.37 -2.25 -2.45 south korea
7 1.46% 57.14% 0.5 0.39 0.19 0.38 spain
7 -10.10% 28.57% -1.72 -1.63 -1.41 -1.13 sweden
12 -3.94% 33.33% -1.2 -1.07 -0.61 -1.15 switzerland
5 -29.08% 0.00% -5.9 -5.4 -2.29 -2.24 taiwan
By Country
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Table 9 – Cross-Sectional Analysis: Size & Growth factors 
Cross-sectional analysis using Sefcik and Thompson (1986) approach (Appendix C.3) in MVRM setting to address the possible cross correlation. Table 9 presents the results for size and 
growth measures after controlling for firm, industry and country factors. All regressions control for leverage, ROA, and also country level measures such as institutional environment, growth 
and capital market development measures.  All regressions include industry fixed effects to control for otherwise uncaptured industry effect. Regressions 1-4 study the size effect and the 
association with the market reaction. Regressions 5-10 analyze the firm level growth measures. 
 
Panel A: Regression results using Shareholder Rights Score as a measure for institutional environment 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Size
log(Asset)
-0.00735** 
(0.0461)
-0.00648 
(0.1591)
-0.00737** 
(0.0451)
-0.00774** 
(0.0356)
-0.00783** 
(0.0372)
-0.00781** 
(0.0378)
-0.00793** 
(0.0330)
-0.00899 
(0.5401)
Gov*log(Asset)
-0.00211 
(0.7383)
-0.00393 
(0.8692)
log(MktCap)
-0.00897** 
(0.0105)
-0.00842* 
(0.0618)
-0.01559 
(0.2690)
Gov*log(MktCap)
-0.00121 
(0.8470)
0.000104 
(0.9965)
Growth
Sales Growth
-0.00246 
(0.6296)
-0.00420 
(0.4257)
-0.00213 
(0.6782)
-0.00331 
0.5367
Gov*SalesGrowth
 0.02802 
(0.1460)
0.02998 
(0.1267)
Mkt2Book
-0.00319 
(0.3703)
-0.00204 
(0.5977)
-0.00345 
(0.3272)
0.001789 
(0.7324)
Gov*Mkt2Book
-0.00733 
(0.4786)
-0.00414 
(0.7961)
Governance
Share Rights Sc.
0.02068 
(0.6618)
0.01425 
(0.7557)
0.00173 
(0.9186)
0.01867 
(0.4446)
0.00743 
(0.6547)
0.03428 
(0.5483)
Leg Origin
Industry Fixed (17 factors) (17 factors) (17 factors) (17 factors) (17 factors) (17 factors) (17 factors) (17 factors) (17 factors) (17 factors)
Firm Level
Leverage
-0.01737 
(0.6474)
-0.01887 
(0.6210)
-0.03273 
(0.3781)
-0.03391 
(0.3634)
-0.03126 
(0.4172)
-0.03130 
(0.4169)
-0.02322 
(0.5512)
-0.02464 
(0.5283)
-0.03832 
(0.3287)
-0.06110 
(0.1562)
ROA
0.03818 
(0.2698)
0.03851 
(0.2669)
0.04639 
(0.1822)
0.04628 
(0.1852)
0.01008 
(0.7775)
0.01544 
(0.6668)
0.04085 
(0.2447)
0.04329 
(0.2214)
0.01325 
(0.7126)
0.02482 
(0.4969)
Country:
GDP Growth
-0.01059** 
(0.0139)
-0.00993** 
(0.0282)
-0.01070** 
(0.0141)
-0.01022** 
(0.0241)
-0.00964** 
(0.0262)
-0.00941** 
(0.0338)
-0.01034** 
(0.0180)
-0.01039** 
(0.0210)
-0.0090** 
(0.0431)
-0.00944** 
(0.0404)
MktCap / GDP
-0.00018 
(0.1343)
-0.00016 
(0.2425)
-0.00015 
(0.2315)
-0.00012 
(0.3639)
-0.00013 
(0.3027)
-0.00009 
(0.4856)
-0.00016 
(0.2002)
-0.00013 
(0.3302)
-0.00008 
(0.5530)
-0.00003 
(0.8199)
Controls:
Regression No
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Panel B: Regression results using Legal Origin as the institutional environment measure. 
Regressions 1-4 study the size effect and the association with the market reaction. Regressions 5-10 analyze the firm level growth measures. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Size
log(Asset)
-0.00735** 
(0.0461)
-0.00626 
(0.2084)
-0.00737** 
(0.0451)
-0.00759* 
(0.0567)
-0.00783** 
(0.0372)
-0.00816** 
(0.0446)
-0.00796** 
(0.0473)
0.01509 
(0.3034)
Gov*log(Asset)
-0.00359 
(0.6151)
-0.02869 
(0.2551)
log(MktCap)
-0.00897** 
(0.0105)
-0.00851* 
(0.0649)
-0.0213 
(0.1201)
Gov*log(MktCap)
-0.00179 
(0.7915)
0.02480 
(0.3125)
Growth
Sales Growth
-0.00246 
(0.6296)
-0.00375 
(0.4767)
-0.00228 
(0.6557)
-0.00251 
0.6383
Gov*SalesGrowth
0.01933 
(0.3216)
0.01737 
(0.3787)
Mkt2Book
-0.00319 
(0.3703)
-0.00220 
(0.5612)
-0.00360 
(0.3052)
0.003061 
(0.5521)
Gov*Mkt2Book
-0.00811 
(0.4586)
-0.01645 
(0.3399)
Governance
Share Rights Sc.
Leg Origin
0.02991 
(0.5749)
0.01608 
(0.7449)
-0.00254 
(0.8881)
0.01620 
(0.5272)
0.00044 
(0.9802)
0.05689 
(0.3745)
Industry Fixed (17 factors) (17 factors) (17 factors) (17 factors) (17 factors) (17 factors) (17 factors) (17 factors) (17 factors) (17 factors)
Firm Level
Leverage
-0.01737 
(0.6474)
-0.01722 
(0.6508)
-0.03273 
(0.3781)
-0.03298 
(0.3786)
-0.03126 
(0.4172)
-0.03027 
(0.4328)
-0.02322 
(0.5512)
-0.02355 
(0.5463)
-0.03784 
(0.3347)
-0.05620 
(0.1916)
ROA
0.03818 
(0.2698)
0.03447 
(0.3285)
0.04639 
(0.1822)
0.04435 
(0.2093)
0.01008 
(0.7775)
0.009914 
(0.7816)
0.04085 
(0.2447)
0.04279 
(0.2264)
0.01352 
(0.7075)
0.01309 
(0.7210)
Country:
GDP Growth
-0.01059** 
(0.0139)
-0.01052** 
(0.0151)
-0.01070** 
(0.0141)
-0.01070** 
(0.0147)
-0.00964** 
(0.0262)
-0.00971** 
(0.0257)
-0.01034** 
(0.0180)
-0.01070** 
(0.0156)
-0.00939** 
(0.0316)
-0.01012** 
(0.0221)
MktCap / GDP
-0.00018 
(0.1343)
-0.00018 
(0.1542)
-0.00015 
(0.2315)
-0.00014 
(0.2699)
-0.00013 
(0.3027)
-0.00012 
(0.3525)
-0.00016 
(0.2002)
-0.00014 
(0.2741)
-0.00010 
(0.4335)
-0.00010 
(0.4673)
Regression No
Controls:
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Table 10 – Risk Taking Measures 
Table 10 presents the results for the market based and accounting based risk taking measures after controlling for firm, industry and country factors. All regressions control for leverage, 
ROA, and also country level measures such as institutional environment, growth and capital market development measures.  All regressions include industry fixed effects to control for 
otherwise uncaptured industry effect. Regressions 1-6 study the market based risk taking measures, along with the interaction variable with institutional environment dummy. Regressions 7-
12 consider the risk taking measures based on the accounting measures. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
log(Asset)
-0.00888* 
(0.0517)
-0.00898** 
(0.0500)
-0.00853* 
(0.0660)
-0.00864* 
(0.0640)
-0.00742** 
(0.0462)
-0.00741** 
(0.0465)
-0.00574 
(0.2461)
-0.00577 
(0.2446)
-0.00515 
(0.1846)
-0.00540 
(0.1681)
-0.00899** 
(0.0197)
-0.00904** 
(0.0191)
Mkt2Book
-0.00264 
(0.4564)
-0.00269 
(0.4482)
-0.00265 
(0.4538)
-0.00271 
(0.4460)
-0.00232 
(0.5192)
-0.00228 
(0.5276)
-0.00279 
(0.4985)
-0.00303 
(0.4660)
-0.00204 
(0.5702)
-0.00199 
(0.5794)
-0.00180 
(0.6153)
-0.00200 
(0.5789)
Market Measures
Sigma Ret
-0.2448 
(0.5933)
-0.1846 
(0.7135)
Gov*SigmaRet
-0.1846 
(0.7696)
Unsystematic
-0.1793 
(0.7006)
-0.1248 
(0.8065)
Gov*Unsystematic
-0.1701 
(0.7895)
Systematic
-0.00429
(0.6707)
-0.00711 
(0.6168)
Gov*Systematic
0.0051 
(0.7779)
B/S Measures
R&D / Asset
-0.3781 
(0.7796)
-0.00135 
(0.9929)
Gov*R&D ratio
-0.08786 
(0.6085)
Capex / Asset
-0.01182 
(0.9237)
-0.06972 
(0.6824)
Gov*Capex ratio
0.1203 
(0.6216)
Cash / Asset
-0.06755 
(0.1419)
-0.05355 
(0.3300)
Gov*Cash ratio
-0.03200 
(0.6418)
Governance
Share Rights Sc.
0.00711 
(0.6646)
0.01524 
(0.6366)
0.00689 
(0.6739)
0.01415 
(0.6559)
0.00755 
(0.6475)
0.0055 
(0.7600)
0.0048 
(0.8211)
0.1161 
(0.6442)
0.0033 
(0.8442)
-0.00427 
(0.8516)
0.00788 
(0.6302)
0.01384 
(0.5057)
Leg Origin
Industry Fixed (17 factors) (17 factors) (17 factors) (17 factors) (17 factors) (17 factors) (17 factors) (17 factors) (17 factors) (17 factors) (17 factors) (17 factors)
Firm Level
Leverage
-0.0180 
(0.6407)
-0.01753 
(0.6503)
-0.01778 
(0.6452)
-0.01732 
(0.6544)
-0.02057 
(0.5983)
-0.02146 
(0.5842)
-0.06759 
(0.2030)
-0.06820 
(0.1996)
-0.04008 
(0.3131)
-0.04076 
(0.3056)
-0.04573 
(0.2864)
-0.04563 
(0.2878)
ROA
0.03416 
(0.3470)
0.03360 
(0.3561)
0.03582 
(0.3235)
0.03529 
(0.3318)
0.03702 
(0.2953)
0.03714 
(0.2941)
0.006700 
(0.8973)
0.005165 
(0.9210)
0.02644 
(0.4542)
0.02923 
(0.4143)
0.0276 
(0.4389)
0.02790 
(0.4344)
Country:
GDP Growth
-0.00960** 
(0.0303)
-0.00973** 
(0.0291)
-0.00964** 
(0.0297)
-0.00975** 
(0.0287)
-0.00984** 
(0.0259)
-0.00972** 
(0.0285)
-0.01031* 
(0.0974)
-0.01081* 
(0.0865)
-0.00995** 
(0.0277)
-0.01034** 
(0.0243)
-0.01006** 
(0.0226)
-0.01016** 
(0.0216)
MktCap / GDP
-0.00013 
(0.3327)
-0.00014 
(0.3160)
-0.00013 
(0.3203)
-0.00014 
(0.3060)
-0.00014 
(0.3016)
-0.00014 
(0.3059)
-0.00011 
(0.5508)
-0.00012 
(0.5206)
-0.00019 
(0.1650)
-0.00019 
(0.1699)
-0.00012 
(0.3683)
-0.00013 
(0.3432)
Regression No
Controls:
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Table 11 – Univariate Results for Foreign issuers and U.S. firms 
Table 11 provides the cumulative market reaction for foreign issuers’ portfolio and the U.S. firms’ portfolio. Panel A provides the results for the subgroups of SOX compliance, non-
complaint OTC listings versus SOX mandated listings on organized exchanges. Since, OTC traded listings are not registered under Securities Act, SOX compliance is not mandatory for these 
firms. Within the group of exchange listed issues, Panel B displays the findings by the exchange listed, Amex, NASDAQ and NYSE. Along with the t-statistics for EW portfolios (t-car), I 
report t-statistics adjusted by BMP approach (appendix C.1)  for event induced variance (t-scar), and further adjusted by KP approach (appendix C.2)  for possible cross-correlation (t-scar 
adj) and the test statistics for non-parametric Wilcoxon sign test. Percentage of observations with positive reaction from non-parametric test helps to document whether the impact is 
widespread or not. 
N CAR % positive t_car t_scar t_scar_adj t_sign Listing
659 -4.95% 32.17% -5.28 -9.89 -1.99 -9.15 Exch Listed
15 6.26% 33.33% 0.47 -0.20 -0.19 -1.29 OTC Listed
N CAR % positive t_car t_scar t_scar_adj t_sign Listing
5142 -6.86% 29.72% -24.06 -33.72 -4.27 -29.09 Exch Listed
767 -2.91% 41.98% -1.10 -2.83 -0.88 -4.44 OTC Listed
N CAR % positive t_car t_scar t_scar_adj t_sign Listing
20 16.12% 50.00% 1.23 1.33 0.88 0.00 AMEX
291 -4.08% 37.11% -2.44 -3.51 -1.18 -4.40 NASDAQ
348 -6.88% 27.01% -9.14 -11.78 -2.61 -8.58 NYSE
15 6.26% 33.33% 0.47 -0.20 -0.19 -1.29 OTC Listed
N CAR % positive t_car t_scar t_scar_adj t_sign Listing
501 -2.54% 40.92% -2.51 -4.95 -1.36 -4.07 AMEX
2735 -5.47% 36.60% -12.12 -15.10 -1.75 -14.02 NASDAQ
1906 -9.99% 16.89% -32.86 -37.52 -5.30 -28.91 NYSE
767 -2.91% 41.98% -1.10 -2.83 -0.88 -4.44 OTC Listed
U.S. Firms
Foreign Issuers
Foreign Issuers
U.S. Firms
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PANEL B: Univariate Results for Foreign issuers by Legal Origin 
Table 11 - Panel B provides the mean CAR Result for sub-groups of Legal Origin and the Institutional environment measure, median ‘Shareholder Right Score’. I use LLSV (1998) 
classification to group jurisdiction as common vs. civil legal origin. I also use Shareholder Rights Score from LLSV (1998) as country level investor protection proxy. Panel A presents the 
result for sub-groups of home country legislation characteristics ‘Legal Origin’, and the Institutional environment measure, median ‘Shareholder Right Score’. In Panel B, results are provided 
for each country, for the countries with at least 3 foreign issuers listed in U.S. exchanges. Along with the t-statistics for EW portfolios (t-car), I report t-statistics adjusted by BMP approach 
(appendix C.1)  for event induced variance (t-scar), and further adjusted by KP approach (appendix C.2)  for possible cross-correlation (t-scar adj) and the test statistics for non-parametric 
Wilcoxon sign test. Percentage of observations with positive reaction from non-parametric test helps to document whether the impact is widespread or not. 
 
N CAR % positive t_car t_scar t_scar_adj t_sign Legal Origin
380 -4.05% 33.42% -3.00 -6.27 -1.77 -6.46 Common
279 -6.17% 30.47% -5.01 -8.02 -1.99 -6.53 Civil
N CAR % positive t_car t_scar t_scar_adj t_sign Shr. Rights Score
377 -4.93% 31.30% -3.78 -7.89 -2.24 -7.26 Above Median
282 -4.98% 33.33% -3.76 -5.97 -1.50 -5.60 Below Median
N CAR % positive t_car t_scar t_scar_adj t_sign
Legal Org. 
Country 
Groups
380 -4.05% 33.42% -3.00 -6.27 -1.77 -6.46 English
185 -5.70% 33.51% -4.22 -5.65 -1.69 -4.48 French
73 -8.76% 19.18% -3.06 -6.30 -2.23 -5.27 German 
21 -1.28% 42.86% -0.25 -1.01 -0.68 -0.65 Scandinavian
Shareholder Rights Score
Legal Origin - Country Groups
Legal Origin
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Table 12 – Risk Taking Analysis (without LLSV measures) 
Table 12 presents the results for the market based and accounting based risk taking measures after controlling for firm, industry and country factors. All regressions control for leverage, 
ROA, and also country level measures such as institutional environment, growth and capital market development measures.  All regressions include industry fixed effects to control for 
otherwise uncaptured industry effect. Regressions 1-6 study the market based risk taking measures, along with the interaction variable with institutional environment dummy. Regressions 7-
12 consider the risk taking measures based on the accounting measures. 
(1) (3) (5) (7) (9) (11)
log(Asset)
-0.00878* 
(0.0538)
-0.00845* 
(0.0682)
-0.00738** 
(0.0469)
-0.00575 
(0.2447)
-0.00515 
(0.1841)
-0.00892** 
(0.0205)
Mkt2Book
-0.00280 
(0.4268)
-0.00281 
(0.4252)
-0.00253 
(0.4788)
-0.00293 
(0.4716)
-0.00211 
(0.5534)
-0.00199 
(0.5757)
Market Measures
Sigma Ret
-0.2345 
(0.6081)
Gov*SigmaRet
Unsystematic
-0.1719 
(0.7121)
Gov*Unsystematic
Systematic
-0.0037
(0.7111)
Gov*Systematic
B/S Measures
R&D / Asset
-0.03656 
(0.7862)
Gov*R&D ratio
Capex / Asset
-0.01087 
(0.9297)
Gov*Capex ratio
Cash / Asset
-0.06643 
(0.1479)
Gov*Cash ratio
Governance
Share Rights Sc. - - - - - -
Leg Origin - - - - - -
Industry Fixed (17 factors) (17 factors) (17 factors) (17 factors) (17 factors) (17 factors)
Firm Level
Leverage
-0.01741 
(0.6514)
-0.01721 
(0.6554)
-0.01960 
(0.6149)
-0.06655 
(0.2076)
-0.03995 
(0.3142)
-0.0446 
(0.2973)
ROA
0.03485 
(0.3365)
0.03642 
(0.3146)
0.03787 
(0.2832)
0.00752 
(0.8844)
0.02673 
(0.4484)
0.02831 
(0.4266)
Country:
GDP Growth
-0.00999** 
(0.0211)
-0.01003** 
(0.0208)
-0.01024** 
(0.0180)
-0.01064* 
(0.0779)
-0.01012** 
(0.0224)
-0.01048** 
(0.0153)
MktCap / GDP
-0.00015 
(0.2216)
-0.00015 
(0.2141)
-0.00016 
(0.1928)
-0.00012 
(0.4680)
-0.0002 
(0.1147)
-0.00014 
(0.2433)
Regression No
Controls:
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Table 13 – Descriptive Statistics 
All I/B/E/S forecast data are for the month closest to, but preceding by [-3, -1] months, the annual earnings announcement. ERROR is the absolute forecast error, |actual-median forecast|, scaled by the 
firm’s stock price five, six or ten days before the earnings announcement. DISPERSION is the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts scaled by the firm’s stock price before the earnings 
announcement. |CAR| is the absolute value of the abnormal return for a three-day window centered on the earnings announcement date calculated from a market model estimated over the period from 
210 to 11 days before the earnings announcement date. VOLATILITY is the standard deviation of market model residuals over the period from 210 to 11 days before the earnings announcement date. 
BA is the total assets reported at the previous fiscal year-end in millions of dollars. ME is the market value of a firm’s equity at the end of the previous fiscal year in millions of dollars. RD/Sales is the 
ratio of R&D expense to sales at the previous fiscal year-end. MTB is the ratio of the firm’s market value (market value of equity plus the book value of total assets minus the book value of equity) to 
the firm’s book value of total assets at the prior fiscal year-end. LEVERAGE is the ratio of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities to total assets. Intang/Asset is the ratio of intangible assets to total 
assets at the previous fiscal year-end. Differences in means are assessed using paired t-test and medians are assessed using a Wilcoxon rank-sum test. 
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev Variable N Mean Median Std Dev Mean Diff T-test p-value Median Diff Wilcoxon Z
CAR|[-1,+1] 195 0.57% 0.26% 4.08% CAR|[-1,+1] 173 0.55% 0.10% 4.25% 0.02% 0.03 0.973 0.15% -1.06
|CAR| [-1,+1] 195 3.59% 2.63% 2.92% |CAR| [-1,+1] 173 4.11% 3.23% 3.22% -0.51% -2.39 0.017 -0.60% -2.00
AR_sigma 195 2.42% 1.69% 1.93% AR_sigma 173 2.54% 2.09% 1.74% -0.11% -1.59 0.112 -0.40% -2.87
Volatility 195 2.55% 2.11% 1.40% Volatility 173 2.30% 1.89% 1.18% 0.25% 2.14 0.033 0.22% 2.11
Error 194 1.03% 0.42% 1.55% Error 173 0.32% 0.15% 0.45% 0.71% 7.44 <.0001 0.26% 10.21
Dispersion 195 0.82% 0.42% 1.12% Dispersion 173 0.24% 0.13% 0.29% 0.58% 9.00 <.0001 0.30% 13.85
Num.Analyst 195 7.56 5.00 6.47 Num.Analyst 173 11.83 9.00 8.83 -4.27 -6.86 <.0001 -4.00 -6.88
BA 195 $16,415 $1,730 $60,722 BA 173 $8,939 $1,207 $24,273 $7,476 2.19 0.029 $523 0.84
ME 195 $7,636 $1,783 $15,735 ME 173 $7,029 $1,556 $14,315 $607 0.26 0.792 $227 1.57
MTB 195 2.26 1.66 2.00 MTB 173 2.30 1.64 2.08 -0.04 -0.25 0.803 0.02 -0.53
log (MTB) 195 0.62 0.50 0.54 log (MTB) 173 0.63 0.47 0.54 -0.01 -0.51 0.610 0.03 -0.53
log (ME) 195 7.40 7.46 1.97 log (ME) 173 7.32 7.25 1.90 0.08 1.04 0.299 0.21 1.57
Leverage 195 40.65% 39.48% 25.04% Leverage 173 41.15% 41.57% 28.00% -0.49% -0.04 0.969 -2.08% 0.29
RD/Asset 110 11.03% 4.01% 25.54% RD/Asset 94 11.56% 2.82% 40.50% -0.52% -0.11 0.911 1.18% 0.89
Intang/Asset 178 4.88% 1.00% 8.90% Intang/Asset 144 8.91% 2.85% 12.78% -4.04% -5.05 <.0001 -1.85% -5.29
CAR|[-1,+1] 285 0.62% 0.20% 6.19% CAR|[-1,+1] 217 0.09% 0.22% 5.25% 0.53% 1.00 0.319 -0.02% 0.71
|CAR| [-1,+1] 285 5.43% 4.54% 4.12% |CAR| [-1,+1] 217 5.23% 4.46% 3.65% 0.20% 0.27 0.784 0.08% 0.66
AR_sigma 285 3.50% 2.96% 2.42% AR_sigma 217 3.52% 3.03% 2.21% -0.02% -0.83 0.408 -0.07% -0.44
Volatility 285 3.50% 3.06% 1.60% Volatility 217 3.26% 2.83% 1.34% 0.24% 2.08 0.038 0.24% 2.06
Error 279 1.46% 0.60% 2.12% Error 216 0.61% 0.14% 1.20% 0.86% 8.19 <.0001 0.47% 12.48
Dispersion 285 1.26% 0.56% 1.90% Dispersion 217 0.39% 0.12% 0.73% 0.87% 10.30 <.0001 0.44% 16.45
Num.Analyst 285 7.61 6.00 6.09 Num.Analyst 217 10.48 8.00 8.00 -2.87 -6.17 <.0001 -2.00 -5.55
BA 285 $20,870 $1,749 $68,004 BA 217 $15,145 $1,788 $45,329 $5,725 1.40 0.162 -$38 1.37
ME 285 $12,718 $2,201 $27,603 ME 217 $12,198 $1,748 $28,577 $520 -0.09 0.932 $453 -0.65
MTB 285 2.67 1.59 3.37 MTB 217 2.66 1.61 2.89 0.01 -0.61 0.541 (0.03) -1.23
log (MTB) 285 0.62 0.46 0.70 log (MTB) 217 0.65 0.48 0.65 -0.03 -0.91 0.361 (0.02) -1.23
log (ME) 285 7.61 7.68 2.09 log (ME) 217 7.53 7.46 2.05 0.08 -0.31 0.760 0.22 -0.65
Leverage 285 38.09% 38.58% 22.96% Leverage 217 40.08% 40.60% 23.90% -1.99% 0.20 0.841 -2.02% 0.12
RD/Asset 160 13.87% 5.26% 29.32% RD/Asset 101 17.17% 3.92% 49.20% -3.30% -1.39 0.165 1.33% 1.13
Intang/Asset 263 8.17% 3.36% 12.29% Intang/Asset 190 11.70% 4.31% 16.40% -3.53% -3.15 0.002 -0.95% -3.37
CAR|[-1,+1] 313 -0.15% -0.32% 3.99% CAR|[-1,+1] 216 0.38% 0.00% 4.37% -0.54% -1.99 0.046 -0.32% -2.07
|CAR| [-1,+1] 313 3.94% 3.29% 2.88% |CAR| [-1,+1] 216 4.55% 3.81% 3.16% -0.61% -2.36 0.018 -0.52% -1.19
AR_sigma 313 2.62% 2.05% 1.89% AR_sigma 216 2.77% 2.23% 1.92% -0.15% -1.37 0.171 -0.18% -0.48
Volatility 313 2.25% 1.95% 1.02% Volatility 216 2.17% 1.90% 1.06% 0.09% 0.89 0.374 0.04% 1.88
Error 311 1.01% 0.46% 1.78% Error 216 0.39% 0.20% 0.63% 0.61% 7.26 <.0001 0.26% 10.67
Dispersion 313 0.68% 0.40% 0.85% Dispersion 216 0.31% 0.12% 0.54% 0.37% 8.33 <.0001 0.28% 14.36
Num.Analyst 313 6.27 4.00 5.95 Num.Analyst 216 9.62 6.00 7.77 -3.35 -7.45 <.0001 -2.00 -7.95
BA 313 $39,012 $3,715 $145,250 BA 216 $27,697 $3,573 $104,529 $11,315 1.35 0.179 $142 0.25
ME 313 $13,395 $3,278 $25,930 ME 216 $13,049 $3,162 $25,621 $346 0.05 0.963 $116 0.33
MTB 311 1.96 1.61 1.30 MTB 215 2.11 1.57 1.50 -0.15 -2.08 0.038 0.04 -1.48
log (MTB) 311 0.54 0.47 0.45 log (MTB) 215 0.59 0.45 0.50 -0.04 -1.87 0.062 0.03 -1.48
log (ME) 313 8.07 8.08 1.84 log (ME) 216 8.10 8.05 1.76 (0.03) 0.04 0.965 0.03 0.33
Leverage 312 37.52% 37.63% 19.30% Leverage 216 38.14% 39.02% 21.23% -0.62% -0.01 0.990 -1.40% -0.38
RD/Asset 180 13.07% 4.82% 27.48% RD/Asset 123 11.53% 3.10% 28.55% 1.54% 0.44 0.659 1.72% -1.66
Intang/Asset 310 13.13% 5.12% 17.30% Intang/Asset 213 17.43% 10.29% 19.16% -4.30% -3.88 0.000 -5.16% -4.13
Mean test Median test
1998-00
2003-05
Foreign Issuers Sample U.S. Matching Sample
1995-97
 
Table 14 – Correlations between Information measures and Firm characteristics 
This table displays the Pearson correlations for the sample used in the analysis.  The sample includes firm-years in the period of July 1995 - June 2000 and July 2003 - June 2005 that have 
sufficient I/B/E/S, Compustat and CRSP data used in the analysis. P-values are presented with the estimated correlation coefficients. This sample includes foreign issuers and comparable U.S. 
firms matched with the market value of equity at the beginning of each 3-years period. The sample firms is restricted by the data requirements, and cover the firms with analyst forecast and 
earnings data available from I/B/E/S for fiscal years ending between C. Firms must be followed by at least three analysts for a reasonable dispersion measure and also have data available 
from Compustat and CRSP databases. Firms in regulated industries (regulated utilities, financial services) are excluded. Additionally, observations for which absolute forecast error is greater 
than 100% of the stock price are also excluded. The number of foreign issuers and U.S. firms for each analysis period is reported in the table, along with the total number of unique firm for 
each sample. 
  
Foreign |CAR|[-1,+1] AR sigma Volatility Error Dispersion Num. Analyst log(BA) log(ME) log(MTB) Leverage RD/Sales
100.0%
-3.7% 100.0%
0.034
-3.3% 47.5% 100.0%
0.065 <.0001
Volatility 4.4% 37.3% 46.4% 100.0%
0.013 <.0001 <.0001
22.1% 1.1% 1.8% 19.5% 100.0%
<.0001 0.527 0.307 <.0001
26.0% 0.6% 0.2% 20.4% 50.1% 100.0%
<.0001 0.736 0.914 <.0001 <.0001
-21.5% -0.2% -1.5% -13.8% -18.1% -15.6% 100.0%
<.0001 0.925 0.395 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
0.6% -27.0% -32.4% -57.3% -9.3% -7.2% 27.9% 100.0%
0.752 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
1.9% -22.2% -24.1% -48.2% -18.5% -18.1% 39.4% 87.7% 100.0%
0.287 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
-3.6% 14.3% 21.0% 27.8% -17.1% -21.7% 16.5% -31.5% 13.4% 100.0%
0.042 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
-0.4% -0.8% -2.6% -8.8% 6.3% 2.3% -4.8% 8.1% 9.9% 3.4% 100.0%
0.808 0.641 0.134 <.0001 0.000 0.196 0.007 <.0001 <.0001 0.051
-0.7% 9.2% 16.2% 29.9% 4.3% 4.5% -4.4% -23.3% -13.3% 24.6% -7.3% 100.0%
0.689 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.016 0.010 0.012 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
-10.6% 2.0% 1.8% -6.2% -6.8% -9.2% -1.1% -3.4% 0.2% -0.7% 13.5% -0.5%
<.0001 0.287 0.325 0.001 0.000 <.0001 0.563 0.065 0.921 0.701 <.0001 0.792
Foreign
Pearson Correlation Coefficients
Prob > |r| under H0: Rho=0
|CAR|[-1,+1]
AR sigma
Error
Dispersion
RD/Sales
Num. Analyst
log(1+(Intang/Assets))
log(BA)
log(ME)
log(MTB)
Leverage
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Table 15 – Regressions for Forecast Error and Dispersion, separate for each analysis period. 
Separate panel regressions of analysts’ forecast errors and dispersion on firm characteristics for each analysis period. The dependent 
variable is ERROR, the absolute forecast error, |actual-median forecast|; scaled by the firm’s stock price before the earnings 
announcement. ln(BA) is the natural log of total assets reported at the previous fiscal year-end. RD/Sales is the ratio of R&D expense 
to sales at the previous fiscal year-end. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities to total assets. 
Ln(1+Intang2Asset) is the natural log of one plus the ratio of intangible assets to total assets at the previous fiscal year-end. Volatility 
is the standard deviation of market model residuals over the period from 210 to 11 days before the earnings announcement date. The 
regressions also include FOREIGN dummy variables for foreign firms. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
 
regression 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6
Intercept 0.003 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.004 -0.007 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.008
5.02*** 3.57*** 3.27*** 2.36** 2.45** -2.36** 5.16*** 3.47*** 2.83*** 2.19** 2.4** -3.95***
Foreign 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
7.08*** 7.09*** 7.13*** 7.14*** 6.9*** 6.45*** 9.63*** 9.64*** 9.85*** 9.85*** 9.46*** 8.94***
ln(BA) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
-1.79* -2.14** -2.27** -2.3** 1.21 -1.63 -2.15** -2.24** -2.29** 2.43**
RD/Sales 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.44 0.42 0.47 0.14 2.5*** 2.49** 2.58*** 2.16**
missing R&D/Sales 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
2.37** 2.53** 2.49** 3.19*** 4.17** 4.26*** 4.2*** 5.24***
Leverage 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002
2.01** 2.11** 2.51** 1.32 1.56 2.12**
ln(1+Intang2Asset) -0.003 -0.001 -0.004 -0.002
-0.72 -0.2 -1.35 -0.63
Volatility 0.224 0.216
4.63*** 6.55***
Adj R-sq 5.21% 5.45% 5.84% 6.16% 6.11% 8.22% 9.31% 9.48% 11.51% 11.58% 11.66% 15.65%
Intercept 0.005 0.012 0.011 0.009 0.010 -0.005 0.003 0.007 0.006 0.005 0.006 -0.006
5.64*** 5.3*** 4.91*** 3.82*** 3.95*** -1.46 5.0*** 4.53*** 3.65*** 3.08*** 3.29*** -2.39**
Foreign 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.008
8.63*** 8.51*** 8.7*** 8.62*** 8.38*** 8.11*** 10.2*** 10.09*** 10.55*** 10.5*** 10.2*** 9.94***
ln(BA) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000
-3.39*** -3.87*** -4.1*** -4.15*** -1.06 -2.82*** -3.74*** -3.82*** -3.89*** -0.52
RD/Sales 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000
-0.26 0.00 -0.05 -0.93 0.89 1.00 0.94 -0.06
missing R&D/Sales 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006
2.69*** 2.8*** 2.78*** 3.59*** 5.65*** 5.69*** 5.67*** 6.6***
Leverage 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.002 0.002 0.003
2.53** 2.67*** 3.23*** 1.13 1.35 1.97**
ln(1+Intang2Asset) -0.005 -0.006 -0.005 -0.006
-1.03 -1.35 -1.4 -1.76*
Volatility 0.249 0.202
5.31*** 5.98***
Adj R-sq 6.42% 7.33% 7.81% 8.28% 8.28% 10.57% 8.78% 9.37% 11.85% 11.87% 11.95% 14.73%
Intercept 0.004 0.007 0.007 0.004 0.005 -0.014 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.010
5.98*** 4.28*** 4.11*** 2.12** 2.98*** -4.91*** 7.8*** 2.77*** 2.57** 1.42 2.37** -5.81***
Foreign 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003
6.7*** 6.72*** 6.73*** 6.8*** 6.35*** 6.25*** 7.84*** 7.84*** 7.85*** 7.86*** 7.39*** 7.33***
ln(BA) 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
-2.2** -2.18** -2.9*** -3.29*** 2.69*** 0.15 0.04 -0.36 -0.78 5.11***
RD/Sales 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.50 0.66 0.51 0.33 0.46 0.55 0.38 0.18
missing R&D/Sales 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
0.52 0.66 0.61 1.83* 1.23 1.3 1.26 2.58***
Leverage 0.011 0.012 0.012 0.004 0.005 0.004
5.69*** 6.3*** 6.18*** 3.2*** 3.9*** 3.72***
ln(1+Intang2Asset) -0.010 -0.006 -0.007 -0.004
-3.75*** -2.12** -4.05*** -2.31**
Volatility 0.396 0.254
8.4*** 9.07***
Adj R-sq 3.30% 3.58% 3.47% 5.77% 6.72% 11.52% 4.49% 4.41% 4.39% 5.07% 6.20% 11.79%
2003-05
1995-97
Error Dispersion
1998-00
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Table 16 – Panel Regression for Forecast Error over the all observation period. 
Panel regressions of analysts’ forecast errors on firm characteristics. Specification is same as the separate regression analysis with ERROR, being the absolute forecast error, ln(BA) is the 
natural log of total , RD/Sales is the ratio of R&D expense to, Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities to total assets, Ln(1+Intang2Asset) is the natural log of one 
plus the ratio of intangible assets to total assets at the previous fiscal year-end. Volatility is the standard deviation of market model residuals. The regressions also include time effects 1998-00 
and 2003-05 along with the FOREIGN dummy variables for foreign firms. All factors are interacted with the time effects. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
Regression 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Intercept 0.003 0.003 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.005 -0.009 -0.008 -0.007
4.58*** 4.25*** 6.09*** 3.03*** 5.71*** 5.71*** 3.69*** 4.2*** 4.08*** 3.84*** -4.73*** -3.66*** -2.03**
Foreign 0.007 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
12.91*** 6.0*** 6.02*** 6.02*** 6.04*** 6.04*** 6.08*** 6.08*** 5.83*** 5.8*** 5.35*** 5.48*** 5.53***
1998-00 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.002 0.003
5.0*** 1.62 1.77* 2.19** 1.62 1.63 1.71* 0.55 1.94* 1.57 -1.08 -1.33 0.59
2003-05 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.002 -0.008
-0.21 0.47 0.96 0.39 1.07 1.07 1.38 -1.1 1.89* 1.95* 1.42 -0.96 -1.61
Foreign*1998-00 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
2.6*** 2.53** 2.48** 2.61*** 2.61*** 2.54** 2.54** 2.53** 2.51** 2.69*** 2.6*** 2.48**
Foreign*2003-5 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
-0.7 -0.69 -0.7 -0.7 -0.7 -0.72 -0.72 -0.71 -0.78 -0.44 -0.58 -0.72
ln(BA) -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
-4.39*** -1.52 -4.8*** -4.8*** -5.36*** -5.45*** -5.58*** -5.59*** 1.31 1.45 1.04
ln(BA)*1998-00 -0.001 -0.001
-1.62* -1.54
ln(BA)*2003-05 0.000 0.000
-0.09 0.7
R&D/Sales 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.48 0.29 0.58 0.65 0.55 0.52 0.11 0.07 0.11
missing R&D/Sales 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003
3.18*** 3.16*** 3.43*** 3.4*** 3.38*** 3.38*** 4.97*** 4.97*** 4.94***
R&D/Sales*1998-00 0.000 -0.001
-0.22 -1.27
R&D/Sales*2003-05 0.000 0.000
0 0.1
Leverage 0.007 0.003 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.004
5.58*** 1.74* 6.08*** 6.03*** 6.79*** 6.72*** 2.14**
Leverage*1998-00 0.002 0.003
0.8 1.2
Leverage*2003-05 0.008 0.008
2.69*** 2.6**
ln(1+Intang2Asset) -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005 -0.001
-3.29*** -1.04 -2.57** -2.43** -0.18
ln(1+Intang2Asset)*1998-00 0.001 -0.005
0.1 -0.79
ln(1+Intang2Asset)*2003-05 -0.003 -0.005
-0.53 -0.72
Volatility 0.278 0.218 0.223
10.29*** 4.77*** 3.98***
Volatility*1998-00 0.053 0.017
1.0 0.25
Volatility*2003-05 0.135 0.185
2.34** 2.41**
Adj R-sq 5.85% 6.19% 6.71% 6.76% 6.95% 6.89% 7.80% 7.96% 8.08% 8.05% 10.96% 11.06% 11.27%
Error
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Table 17 - Panel Regression for Forecast Dispersion over the all observation period. 
Panel regressions of dispersion among analysts’ forecast on firm characteristics. Specification is same as the separate regression analysis with DISPERSION, being the standard deviation of 
analysts; forecasts, ln(BA) is the natural log of total , RD/Sales is the ratio of R&D expense to, Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities to total assets, 
Ln(1+Intang2Asset) is the natural log of one plus the ratio of intangible assets to total assets at the previous fiscal year-end. Volatility is the standard deviation of market model residuals. The 
regressions also include time effects 1998-00 and 2003-05 along with the FOREIGN dummy variables for foreign firms. All factors are interacted with the time effects. *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Regression 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
Intercept 0.002 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.006 -0.008 -0.008
5.56*** 4.48*** 4.93*** 3.01*** 4.19*** 4.04*** 3.08*** 3.04*** 3.54*** 3.31*** -4.73*** -5.46*** -3.45***
Foreign 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.006
15.75*** 8.34*** 8.35*** 8.36*** 8.45*** 8.5*** 8.47*** 8.47*** 8.19*** 8.13*** 7.65*** 7.7*** 7.72***
1998-00 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.003
4.6*** 1.21 1.31 1.83* 1.02 1.04 1.06 0.78 1.32 1.17 -1.34 -1.45 1.11
2003-05 -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.003
-1.6 0.79 1.09 -0.74 1.32 1.44 1.48 -0.01 2.07** 2.0** 1.28 0.67 -0.88
Foreign*1998-00 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
2.74*** 2.69*** 2.63*** 2.84*** 2.77*** 2.8*** 2.82*** 2.8*** 2.75*** 2.75*** 2.96*** 2.79***
Foreign*2003-5 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
-2.43** -2.43** -2.43** -2.45** -2.51** -2.45** -2.46** -2.45** -2.48** -2.17** -2.2** -2.31**
ln(BA) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
-2.74*** -1.41 -3.63*** -3.55*** -3.91*** -3.95*** -4.16*** -4.17*** 3.69*** 3.33*** 2.1**
ln(BA)*1998-00 0.000 -0.001
-1.41 -1.86*
ln(BA)*2003-05 0.000 0.000
1.17 0.88
R&D/Sales 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1.61 2.15** 1.66* 1.69* 1.62* 1.6* 0.8 1.14 1.86*
missing R&D/Sales 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
6.48*** 6.55*** 6.6*** 6.59*** 6.55*** 6.55*** 8.4*** 8.42*** 8.49***
R&D/Sales*1998-00 0.000 0.000
0.58 -0.87
R&D/Sales*2003-05 0.000 0.000
-1.6 -1.38
Leverage 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002
2.84*** 1.15 3.47*** 3.44*** 3.82*** 4.24*** 1.83*
Leverage*1998-00 0.000 0.001
-0.1 0.37
Leverage*2003-05 0.003 0.002
1.34 0.92
ln(1+Intang2Asset) -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.002
-3.77*** -1.23 -3.17*** -2.93*** -0.55
ln(1+Intang2Asset)*1998-00 0.000 -0.004
-0.1 -0.87
ln(1+Intang2Asset)*2003-05 -0.002 -0.001
-0.39 -0.33
Volatility 0.192 0.209 0.216
10.57*** 6.76*** 5.69***
Volatility*1998-00 0.007 -0.029
0.2 -0.63
Volatility*2003-05 0.014 0.056
0.36 1.07
Adj R-sq 8.17% 8.98% 9.16% 9.32% 10.31% 10.35% 10.51% 10.52% 10.87% 10.82% 12.70% 14.49% 14.65%
Dispersion
Table 18 - Panel Regression for Earnings Announcement Abnormal returns, for each period. 
Panel regressions of earnings announcement abnormal returns on firm characteristics. The dependent variable is |CAR|; the absolute 
abnormal return for the three-day window centered on the earnings announcement date calculated using a market model over the 
period 210–11 days before the announcement. FOREIGN is the foreign firms identifier. ERROR is the absolute forecast error, |actual 
earnings-median forecast|; scaled by the firm’s stock price before the earnings announcement. DISPERSION is the standard deviation 
of analysts’ forecasts scaled by the firm’s stock price before the earnings announcement. Ln(MTB) is the natural log of the ratio of the 
firm’s market value (market value of equity plus the book value of total assets minus the book value of equity) to the firm’s book 
value of total assets at the prior fiscal year-end. Ln(ME) is natural log of the market value of a firm’s equity at the end of the previous 
fiscal year. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities to total assets. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
.
regression 1 2 3
Intercept 0.040 0.040 0.038
26.7*** 25.77*** 22.49***
Foreign -0.006 -0.007 -0.004
-2.53** -2.98*** -1.62
Error -0.005 1.101
-0.06 2.43**
Dispersion 0.249 0.270
1.84* 1.72*
Foreign*Error -0.669
-2.33**
Dispersion*Error 2.070
0.41
Ln(MTB)*Error 0.463
2.41**
Ln(ME)*Error -0.111
-2.43**
Leverage*Error -0.047
-0.12
Adj R-sq 0.50% 0.67% 2.58%
Intercept 0.052 0.052 0.052
27.92*** 27.4*** 25.11***
Foreign 0.001 0.001 0.004
0.34 0.19 1.12
Error -0.052 0.493
-0.62 1.51
Dispersion 0.103 -0.023
0.88 -0.15
Foreign*Error -0.299
-1.4
Dispersion*Error 2.648
1.05
Ln(MTB)*Error -0.020
-0.13
Ln(ME)*Error -0.091
-2.77***
Leverage*Error 0.441
1.42
Adj R-sq -0.07% -0.17% 0.59%
Intercept 0.043 0.043 0.043
27.37*** 26.51*** 24.07***
Foreign -0.004 -0.004 -0.003
-1.88* -2.04** -1.16
Error 0.051 1.211
0.64 3.12**
Dispersion 0.045 0.038
0.36 0.24
Foreign*Error -0.163
-0.68
Dispersion*Error -0.431
-0.12
Ln(MTB)*Error 0.399
2.42**
Ln(ME)*Error -0.200
-4.58***
Leverage*Error 0.344
1.39
Adj R-sq 0.19% 0.11% 1.76%
1995-97
1998-00
2003-05
Abs CAR
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Table 19 - Panel Regression for Earnings Announcement Abnormal returns, over all sample period. 
Panel regressions of earnings announcement abnormal returns on firm characteristics. The dependent variable is |CAR|; the absolute 
abnormal return for the three-day window centered on the earnings announcement date calculated using a market model over the 
period 210–11 days before the announcement. FOREIGN is the foreign firms identifier. ERROR is the absolute forecast error, |actual 
earnings-median forecast|; scaled by the firm’s stock price before the earnings announcement. DISPERSION is the standard deviation 
of analysts’ forecasts scaled by the firm’s stock price before the earnings announcement. Ln(MTB) is the natural log of the ratio of the 
firm’s market value (market value of equity plus the book value of total assets minus the book value of equity) to the firm’s book 
value of total assets at the prior fiscal year-end. Ln(ME) is natural log of the market value of a firm’s equity at the end of the previous 
fiscal year. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities to total assets. The regressions also include time 
effects 1998-00 and 2003-05 and all factors are interacted with these time effects. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
Regression 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Intercept 0.039 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.038 0.038
28.13*** 24.03*** 23.91*** 23.59*** 23.79*** 23.27*** 22.9*** 22.89*** 22.95*** 21.18*** 20.15***
1998-00 0.015 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.014
8.98*** 5.16*** 5.14*** 5.18*** 5.14*** 5.24*** 4.94*** 4.94*** 5.15*** 5.16*** 5.47***
2003-05 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.006
2.24** 1.31 1.31 1.27 1.29 1.43 1.22 1.21 1.54 2.05** 2.07**
Foreign -0.003 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004
-2.06** -2.27** -2.33** -2.35** -2.48** -2.69*** -1.97** -1.73* -1.54 -1.21 -1.45
Foreign*1998-00 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.008
1.93* 1.91* 2.01** 1.85* 2.08** 2.03** 1.9* 1.84* 1.85* 1.94*
Foreign*2003-5 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001
0.51 0.51 0.51 0.57 0.81 0.61 0.28 0.54 -0.01 0.36
ERROR 0.025 0.058 -0.010 -0.008 0.262 0.260 0.741 0.778 1.101
0.57 0.61 -0.21 -0.15 2.13** 2.11** 3.68*** 3.66*** 2.18**
ERROR*1998-00 -0.072 -0.609
-0.62 -1.05
ERROR*2003-05 0.005 0.109
0.04 0.17
DISPERSION 0.113 0.250 0.110 0.115 0.063 0.064 0.270
1.58 1.76* 1.54 1.61 0.7 0.71 1.54
DISPERSION*1998-00 -0.179 -0.293
-1.09 -1.33
DISPERSION*2003-05 -0.168 -0.232
-0.9 -0.95
ERROR*Foreign -0.313 -0.352 -0.308 -0.621 -0.669
-2.41** -2.22** -2.33** -2.07** -2.09**
ERROR*Foreign*1998-00 0.007 0.218 0.370
0.06 0.66 1
ERROR*Foreign*2003-05 0.115 0.596 0.507
0.87 1.61 1.23
ERROR*Dispersion 1.381 5.904 2.070
0.83 1.18 0.37
ERROR*Dispersion*1998-00 -4.381 0.578
-0.86 0.1
ERROR*Dispersion*2003-05 -5.387 -2.501
-0.97 -0.37
ERROR*ln(MTB) 0.252 0.539 0.463
2.73*** 2.63*** 2.16**
ERROR*ln(MTB)*1998-00 -0.576 -0.484
-2.33** -1.89
ERROR*ln(MTB)*2003-05 -0.117 -0.064
-0.44 -0.23
ERROR*ln(ME) -0.123 -0.092 -0.111
-5.82*** -2.12** -2.18**
ERROR*ln(ME)*1998-00 -0.019 0.020
-0.39 0.34
ERROR*ln(ME)*2003-05 -0.074 -0.089
-1.39 -1.29
ERROR*Leverage 0.404 0.098 -0.047
2.45** 0.26 -0.1
ERROR*Leverage*1998-00 0.235 0.488
0.54 0.93
ERROR*Leverage*2003-05 0.305 0.391
0.67 0.74
Adj R-sq 2.47% 2.52% 2.51% 2.47% 2.55% 2.53% 2.68% 2.65% 3.69% 3.76% 3.78%
Abs (CAR)
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Table 20 - Panel Regression for the Variance of the Abnormal returns, for each period. 
Panel regressions the variance of the abnormal returns on firm characteristics. The dependent variable is AR_sigma; the variance of 
the abnormal return for the three-day window centered on the earnings announcement date calculated using a market model over the 
period 210–11 days before the announcement. FOREIGN is the foreign firms identifier. ERROR is the absolute forecast error, |actual 
earnings-median forecast|; scaled by the firm’s stock price before the earnings announcement. DISPERSION is the standard deviation 
of analysts’ forecasts scaled by the firm’s stock price before the earnings announcement. Ln(MTB) is the natural log of the ratio of the 
firm’s market value (market value of equity plus the book value of total assets minus the book value of equity) to the firm’s book 
value of total assets at the prior fiscal year-end. Ln(ME) is natural log of the market value of a firm’s equity at the end of the previous 
fiscal year. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities to total assets. *, ** and *** indicate significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
regression 1 2 3
Intercept 0.024 0.024 0.023
25.81*** 24.71*** 21.78***
Foreign -0.002 -0.003 -0.002
-1.46 -2.13** -1.32
Error -0.024 1.212
-0.36 4.06***
Dispersion 0.233 0.239
2.56** 1.79*
Foreign*Error -0.164
-0.82
Dispersion*Error -1.235
-0.22
Ln(MTB)*Error 0.245
2.14**
Ln(ME)*Error -0.160
-5.85***
Leverage*Error -0.179
-0.67
Adj R-sq 0.14% 0.72% 5.03%
Intercept 0.035 0.036 0.035
28.7*** 28.3*** 25.96***
Foreign -0.001 -0.001 0.002
-0.8 -0.43 0.83
Error -0.046 0.729
-0.76 3.48***
Dispersion -0.028 -0.160
-0.35 -1.52
Foreign*Error -0.265
-1.94*
Dispersion*Error 2.441
1.18
Ln(MTB)*Error 0.168
1.54
Ln(ME)*Error -0.096
-3.81***
Leverage*Error -0.032
-0.13
Adj R-sq -0.03% -0.09% 1.68%
Intercept 0.027 0.027 0.027
28.48*** 27.87*** 25.24***
Foreign -0.002 -0.002 -0.001
-1.27 -1.23 -0.78
Error 0.158 0.887
3.03*** 3.54***
Dispersion -0.220 -0.102
-2.66*** -1.04
Foreign*Error -0.066
-0.46
Dispersion*Error -4.893
-2.29**
Ln(MTB)*Error 0.346
3.37***
Ln(ME)*Error -0.134
-4.96***
Leverage*Error 0.364
2.1**
Adj R-sq 0.05% 0.78% 3.23%
1995-97
1998-00
2003-05
AR sigma
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Table 21 - Panel Regression for the Variance of the Abnormal returns, over all sample period. 
Panel regressions the variance of the abnormal returns on firm characteristics. The dependent variable is AR_sigma; the variance of the abnormal 
return for the three-day window centered on the earnings announcement date calculated using a market model over the period 210–11 days before 
the announcement. FOREIGN is the foreign firms identifier. ERROR is the absolute forecast error, |actual earnings-median forecast|; scaled by 
the firm’s stock price before the earnings announcement. DISPERSION is the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts scaled by the firm’s stock 
price before the earnings announcement. Ln(MTB) is the natural log of the ratio of the firm’s market value (market value of equity plus the book 
value of total assets minus the book value of equity) to the firm’s book value of total assets at the prior fiscal year-end. Ln(ME) is natural log of 
the market value of a firm’s equity at the end of the previous fiscal year. Leverage is the ratio of long-term debt and debt in current liabilities to 
total assets. The regressions also include time effects 1998-00 and 2003-05 and all factors are interacted with these time effects. *, ** and *** 
indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Regression 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Intercept 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.023
26.38*** 21.67*** 21.57*** 21.25 21.59*** 20.72*** 20.96*** 20.96*** 21.00*** 19.97*** 18.10***
1998-00 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.012 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.012
10.25*** 7.17*** 7.15*** 7.28*** 7.15*** 7.47*** 6.97*** 6.97*** 7.19*** 6.35*** 6.84***
2003-05 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004
3.09*** 2.06** 2.05** 1.86* 2.05** 2.54** 1.99** 1.99** 2.41** 1.82* 2.35**
Foreign -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002
-1.94* -1.23 -1.28 -1.31 -1.19 -1.93* -0.83 -0.80 -0.70 -0.73 -1.10
Foreign*1998-00 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.004
0.30 0.29 0.59 0.32 1.02 0.48 0.89 0.49 1.14 1.46
Foreign*2003-5 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
0.20 0.20 0.06 0.18 0.93 0.22 -0.16 0.25 0.04 0.41
ERROR 0.015 0.034 0.029 0.035 0.158 0.154 0.790 0.855 1.212
0.49 0.47 0.87 1.03 2.02** 1.96** 5.87*** 6.25*** 3.38***
ERROR*1998-00 -0.090 -0.483
-1.07 -1.20
ERROR*2003-05 0.064 -0.324
0.73 -0.73
DISPERSION -0.044 0.204 -0.047 -0.034 -0.031 -0.075 0.239
-0.93 1.99** -0.97 -0.71 -0.51 -1.19 1.49
DISPERSION*1998-00 -0.288 -0.400
-2.46** -2.17**
DISPERSION*2003-05 -0.339 -0.342
-2.63*** -1.78*
ERROR*Foreign -0.152 -0.149 -0.121 -0.086 -1.235
-1.82* -1.38 -1.45 -0.41 -0.18
ERROR*Foreign*1998-00 -0.087 -0.209 3.676
-0.95 -0.93 0.52
ERROR*Foreign*2003-05 0.098 0.035 -3.657
1.06 0.15 -0.51
ERROR*Dispersion -1.704 8.704 -0.164
-1.36 1.72* -0.68
ERROR*Dispersion*1998-00 -7.639 -0.102
-1.53 -0.38
ERROR*Dispersion*2003-05 -13.819 0.098
-2.68*** 0.34
ERROR*ln(MTB) 0.243 0.293 0.245
4.04*** 2.18** 1.77*
ERROR*ln(MTB)*1998-00 -0.127 -0.077
-0.78 -0.46
ERROR*ln(MTB)*2003-05 0.056 0.101
0.33 0.57
ERROR*ln(ME) -0.126 -0.140 -0.161
-8.56*** -5.00*** -4.86***
ERROR*ln(ME)*1998-00 0.034 0.066
1.04 1.66*
ERROR*ln(ME)*2003-05 0.008 0.027
0.25 0.63
ERROR*Leverage 0.294 -0.117 -0.179
2.49** -0.42 -0.55
ERROR*Leverage*1998-00 0.057 0.147
0.17 0.38
ERROR*Leverage*2003-05 0.489 0.543
1.50 1.46
Adj R-sq 3.57% 3.51% 3.49% 3.60% 3.48% 3.66% 3.55% 3.69% 5.84% 6.13% 6.24%
AR sigma
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Table 22 - Panel Regression for Forecast Error and Dispersion with the Analyst Coverage 
Panel regressions of analysts’ forecast error and dispersion on firm characteristics and overtime analyst coverage trend. Num. Analyst 
is the number of analyst following each stock. Specification is same as the separate regression analysis with ERROR, being the 
absolute forecast error, ln(BA) is the natural log of total , RD/Sales is the ratio of R&D expense to, Leverage is the ratio of long-term 
debt and debt in current liabilities to total assets, Ln(1+Intang2Asset) is the natural log of one plus the ratio of intangible assets to total 
assets at the previous fiscal year-end. Volatility is the standard deviation of market model residuals. The regressions also include time 
effects 1998-00 and 2003-05 along with the FOREIGN dummy variables for foreign firms. All factors are interacted with the time 
effects. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Regression 13 14 15 13 14 15
Intercept -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 -0.006
-2.03** -1.78* -1.68 -3.45*** -2.34** -2.25**
Foreign 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.005
5.53*** 4.38*** 4.84*** 7.72*** 6.01*** 6.42***
1998-00 0.003 0.008 0.007 0.003 0.005 0.005
0.59 1.55 1.43 1.11 1.42 1.31
2003-05 -0.008 -0.006 -0.006 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004
-1.61 -1.19 -1.23 -0.88 -1.13 -1.15
Foreign*1998-00 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002
2.48** 1.95* 1.31 2.79*** 2.73*** 2.12**
Foreign*2003-5 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002
-0.72 -0.7 -1.15 -2.31** -1.78* -2.22**
ln(BA) 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
1.04 2.14** 1.01 2.1** 2.04** 0.96
ln(BA)*1998-00 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000
-1.54 -2.1** -0.72 -1.86* -2.03** -0.75
ln(BA)*2003-05 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
0.7 0.12 0.96 0.88 0.98 1.76*
R&D/Sales 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001
0.11 -0.18 -0.31 1.86* -0.11 -0.23
missing R&D/Sales 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
4.94*** 4.63*** 4.57*** 8.49*** 7.89*** 7.82***
R&D/Sales*1998-00 -0.001 -0.004 -0.004 0.000 -0.003 -0.003
-1.27 -0.87 -0.76 -0.87 -0.99 -0.88
R&D/Sales*2003-05 0.000 0.007 0.008 0.000 0.005 0.006
0.1 1.45 1.57 -1.38 1.53 1.65
Leverage 0.004 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002
2.14** 1.2 1.46 1.83* 1.26 1.51
Leverage*1998-00 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.001
1.2 0.8 0.63 0.37 -0.16 -0.33
Leverage*2003-05 0.008 0.007 0.007 0.002 0.002 0.002
2.6** 2.52** 2.26** 0.92 1.08 0.81
ln(1+Intang2Asset) -0.001 0.002 0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003
-0.18 0.41 0.33 -0.55 -0.62 -0.7
ln(1+Intang2Asset)*1998-00 -0.005 -0.012 -0.012 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
-0.79 -1.67 -1.68 -0.87 -0.85 -0.85
ln(1+Intang2Asset)*2003-05 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.001 -0.001 0.000
-0.72 -1 -0.91 -0.33 -0.13 -0.03
Volatility 0.223 0.226 0.227 0.216 0.206 0.207
3.98*** 3.53*** 3.55*** 5.69*** 4.55*** 4.56***
Volatility*1998-00 0.017 -0.032 -0.028 -0.029 -0.032 -0.030
0.25 -0.42 -0.38 -0.63 -0.61 -0.57
Volatility*2003-05 0.185 0.142 0.141 0.056 0.039 0.039
2.41** 1.74* 1.74* 1.07 0.67 0.67
Num Analyst -0.024 -0.006 -0.013 0.000
-6.4*** -0.84 -4.71*** -0.07
Num Analyst*1998-00 -0.030 -0.019
-2.89*** -2.61***
Num Analyst*2003-05 -0.020 -0.014
-2.11** -2.17**
Adj R-sq 11.35% 12.58% 12.78% 14.65% 15.28% 15.44%
Error Dispersion
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